Reputation and honesty in a market for information

Previous works on asymmetric information in asset markets tendto focus on the potential gains in the asset market itself. We focus on the market for information and conduct an experimental study to explore, in a game of finite but uncertain duration, whether reputation can be an effective constraint on deliberate misinformation. At the beginning of each period, an uninformed potential asset buyer can purchase information, at a fixed price and from a fully-informed source, about the value of the asset in that period. The informational insiders cannot purchase the asset and are given short-term incentives to provide false information when the asset value is low. Our model predicts that, in accordance with the Folk Theorem, Pareto-superior outcomes featuring truthful revelation should be sustainable. However, this depends critically on beliefs about rationality and behavior. We find that, overall, sellers are truthful 89% of the time. More significantly, the observed frequency of truthfulness is 81% when the asset value is low. Our result is consistent with both mixed-strategy and trigger strategy interpretations and provides evidence that most subjects correctly anticipate rational behavior. We discuss applications to financial markets, media regulation, and the stability of cartels.

Processes and consequences in business ethical dilemmas: The oil industry and climate changes

This paper proposes a framework to examine business ethical dilemmas andbusiness attitudes towards such dilemmas. Business ethical dilemmas canbe understood as reflecting a contradiction between a socially detrimentalprocess and a self-interested profitable consequence. This representationallows us to distinguish two forms of behavior differing by whetherpriority is put on consequences or on processes. We argue that theseforms imply very different business attitudes towards society:controversial or competitive for the former and aligned or cooperativefor the latter. These attitudes are then analyzed at the discursive level in order to address the question of good faith in businessargumentation, i.e. to which extent are these attitudes consistent withactual business behaviors. We argue that consequential attitudes mostlyinvolve communication and lobbying actions aiming at eluding the dilemma.Therefore, the question of good faith for consequential attitudes liesin the consistency between beliefs and discourse. On the other hand,procedural attitudes acknowledge the dilemma and claim a change of theprocess of behavior. They thus raise the question of the consistencybetween discourses and actual behavior. We apply this processes/consequencesframework to the case of the oil industry s climate change ethical dilemmawhich comes forth as a dilemma between emitting greenhouse gases and making more profits . And we examine the different attitudes of two oilcorporations-BP Amoco and ExxonMobil-towards the dilemma.

Recurrent hyperinflations and learning

This paper uses a model of boundedly rational learning to accountfor the observations of recurrent hyperinflations in the lastdecade. We study a standard monetary model where the fullyrational expectations assumption is replaced by a formaldefinition of quasi-rational learning. The model under learningis able to match remarkably well some crucial stylized factsobserved during the recurrent hyperinflations experienced byseveral countries in the 80's. We argue that, despite being asmall departure from rational expectations, quasi-rationallearning does not preclude falsifiability of the model and itdoes not violate reasonable rationality requirements.

Adaptive dynamics and the implementation problem with complete information

This paper studies the equilibrating process of several implementationmechanisms using naive adaptive dynamics. We show that the dynamics convergeand are stable, for the canonical mechanism of implementation in Nash equilibrium.In this way we cast some doubt on the criticism of ``complexity'' commonlyused against this mechanism. For mechanisms that use more refined equilibrium concepts,the dynamics converge but are not stable. Some papers in the literatureon implementation with refined equilibrium concepts have claimed that themechanisms they propose are ``simple'' and implement ``everything'' (incontrast with the canonical mechanism). The fact that some of these ``simple''mechanisms have unstable equilibria suggests that these statements shouldbe interpreted with some caution.

Ignoring information in binary choice with continuous variables: When is less 'more'?

When can a single variable be more accurate in binary choice than multiple sources of information? We derive analytically the probability that a single variable (SV) will correctly predict one of two choices when both criterion and predictor are continuous variables. We further provide analogous derivations for multiple regression (MR) and equal weighting (EW) and specify the conditions under which the models differ in expected predictive ability. Key factors include variability in cue validities, intercorrelation between predictors, and the ratio of predictors to observations in MR. Theory and simulations are used to illustrate the differential effects of these factors. Results directly address why and when one-reason decision making can be more effective than analyses that use more information. We thus provide analytical backing to intriguing empirical results that, to date, have lacked theoretical justification. There are predictable conditions for which one should expect less to be more.

Aggregate monotonic stable single-valued solutions for cooperative games

[cat] En aquest treball caracteritzem les solucions puntuals de jocs cooperatius d'utilitat transferible que compleixen selecció del core i monotonia agregada. També mostrem que aquestes dues propietats són compatibles amb la individualitat racional, la propietat del jugador fals i la propietat de simetria. Finalment, caracteritzem les solucions puntuals que compleixen les cinc propietats a l'hora.

Biaixos informatius als mercats de valors

[cat] L'article presenta els resultats d'unes proves empíriques que mostren com en la informació econòmica a la premsa escrita poden haver-hi biaixos sistemàtics. Les empreses de sectors regulats son més actives informativament la qual cosa es tradueix en un major protagonisme en la premsa econòmica especialitzada. La primera prova empírica consisteix en una comprovació del protagonisme de les empreses de l'Ibex 35 i del Dow Jones a la premsa general i la econòmica d'Espanya i els Estats Units respectivament En la segona es fa una anàlisi de la informació del periòdic econòmic Expansión. L'existència de biaixos informatius sistemàtics indueix a qüestionar-se la hipòtesi de racionalitat en els mercats financers.

Aggregate monotonic stable single-valued solutions for cooperative games

[cat] En aquest treball caracteritzem les solucions puntuals de jocs cooperatius d'utilitat transferible que compleixen selecció del core i monotonia agregada. També mostrem que aquestes dues propietats són compatibles amb la individualitat racional, la propietat del jugador fals i la propietat de simetria. Finalment, caracteritzem les solucions puntuals que compleixen les cinc propietats a l'hora.

Assigning and combining probabilities in single-case studies

There is currently a considerable diversity of quantitative measures available for summarizing the results in single-case studies. Given that the interpretation of some of them is difficult due to the lack of established benchmarks, the current paper proposes an approach for obtaining further numerical evidence on the importance of the results, complementing the substantive criteria, visual analysis, and primary summary measures. This additional evidence consists of obtaining the statistical significance of the outcome when referred to the corresponding sampling distribution. This sampling distribution is formed by the values of the outcomes (expressed as data nonoverlap, R-squared, etc.) in case the intervention is ineffective. The approach proposed here is intended to offer the outcome"s probability of being as extreme when there is no treatment effect without the need for some assumptions that cannot be checked with guarantees. Following this approach, researchers would compare their outcomes to reference values rather than constructing the sampling distributions themselves. The integration of single-case studies is problematic, when different metrics are used across primary studies and not all raw data are available. Via the approach for assigning p values it is possible to combine the results of similar studies regardless of the primary effect size indicator. The alternatives for combining probabilities are discussed in the context of single-case studies pointing out two potentially useful methods one based on a weighted average and the other on the binomial test.