Prices versus exams as strategic instruments for competing universities

In this paper we investigate the optimal choice of prices and/or exams by universities in the presence of credit constraints. We first compare the optimal behavior of a public, welfare maximizing, monopoly and a private, profit maximizing, monopoly. Then we model competition between a public and a private institution and investigate the new role of exams/prices in this environment. We find that, under certain circumstances, the public university may have an interest to raise tuition fees from minimum levels if it cares for global welfare. This will be the case provided that (i) the private institution has higher quality and uses only prices to select applicants, or (ii) the private institution has lower quality and uses also exams to select students. When this is the case, there are efficiency grounds for raising public prices

The Determinants of Entrepreneurship in Developing Countries

We address the question of what determines entrepreneurship in developing countries. In particular, because of the influence that this may have on the design of entrepreneurship policies, our main concern is whether the determinants of entrepreneurship are the same and/or have the same impact in developed and developing countries. To this end, we discuss the arguments put forward in the literature in support of the existence of differences in the determinants of entrepreneurship between developed and developing countries. We also analyse the results found in empirical studies on the determinants of formal firm entry (following the World Bank, our proxy of entrepreneurship) in developing countries and compare these results with those typically found in developed countries. Our main conclusion is that policy makers in developing economies should be careful when using evidence from developed countries to design entrepreneurship-promoting policies. Key words: entrepreneurship, developing countries. JEL: O1; O12; L26; M13

Imperfectly informed voters and strategic extremism

We analyze a unidimensional model of two-candidate electoral competition where voters have im- perfect information about the candidates' policy proposals, that is, voters cannot observe the exact policy proposals of the candidates but only which candidate offers the most leftist/rightist platform. We assume that candidates are purely office motivated and that one candidate enjoys a valence advan- tage over the other. We characterize the unique Sequential Equilibrium in very-weakly undominated strategies of the game. In this equilibrium the behavior of the two candidates tends to maximum extremism, due to the voters' lack of information. But it may converge or diverge depending on the size of the advantage. For small values of the advantage candidates converge to the extreme policy most preferred by the median and for large values of the advantage candidates strategies diverge: each candidate specializes in a different extreme policy. These results are robust to the introduction of a proportion of well informed voters. In this case the degree of extremism decreases when the voters become more informed.