Adverse selection, credit, and efficiency: the case of the missing market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment, entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need to borrow in order to invest. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, the competitive equilibrium is typically inefficient. We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurs can only access monitored lending. If a new set of markets is added to provide entrepreneurs with additional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic of these additional markets is that lending in them must be unmonitored, in the sense that it does not condition total borrowing or investment by entrepreneurs. This makes it possible to attain efficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new markets while separating them in the markets for monitored loans.

Asessing public policies. The case of education in Europe and the interaction between personal and institutional factors

The paper deals with the comparative study of European citizens' satisfaction with the state of education in their respective countries. Individual and contextual effects are tested applying multilevel analysis. The results show that educational public policies (level of decentralization, degree of comprehensiveness and public spending) as well as the students' social environment (socioeconomic and cultural status) have a sound impact on the opinions about the state of education.

Assessing the Political Viability of Labour Market Reform: The Case of Employment Protection

We analyze the political support for employment protection legislation. Unlike my previous work on the same topic, this paper pays a lot of attention to the role of obsolescence in the growth process. In voting in favour of employment protection, incumbent employees trade off lower living standards (because employment protection maintains workers in less productive activities) against longer job duration. The support for employment protection will then depend on the value of the latter relative to the cost of the former. We highlight two key deeterminants of this trade-off: first, the workers' bargaining power, second, the economy's growth rate-more precisely its rate of creative destruction.

A polynomial algorithm for special case of the one-machine scheduling problem with time-lags

The standard one-machine scheduling problem consists in schedulinga set of jobs in one machine which can handle only one job at atime, minimizing the maximum lateness. Each job is available forprocessing at its release date, requires a known processing timeand after finishing the processing, it is delivery after a certaintime. There also can exists precedence constraints between pairsof jobs, requiring that the first jobs must be completed beforethe second job can start. An extension of this problem consistsin assigning a time interval between the processing of the jobsassociated with the precedence constrains, known by finish-starttime-lags. In presence of this constraints, the problem is NP-hardeven if preemption is allowed. In this work, we consider a specialcase of the one-machine preemption scheduling problem with time-lags, where the time-lags have a chain form, and propose apolynomial algorithm to solve it. The algorithm consist in apolynomial number of calls of the preemption version of the LongestTail Heuristic. One of the applicability of the method is to obtainlower bounds for NP-hard one-machine and job-shop schedulingproblems. We present some computational results of thisapplication, followed by some conclusions.

Quality assurance mechanisms in agrifood: The case of the Spanish fresh meat sector

The largest fresh meat brand names in Spain are analyzed here to studyhow quality is signaled in agribusiness and how the underlying quality-assurance organizations work. Results show, first, that organizationalform varies according to the specialization of the brand name.Publicly-controlled brand names are grounded on market contracting withindividual producers, providing stronger incentives. In contrast,private brands rely more on hierarchy, taking advantage of itssuperiority in solving specific coordination problems. Second, theseemingly redundant coexistence of several quality indicators for agiven product is explained in efficiency terms. Multiple brands areshown to be complementary, given their specialization in guaranteeingdifferent attributes of the product.

Entrepreneurship, organization and economic performance among Spanish firms, 1930-1975. The case of the motor industry

Before the Civil War (1936-1939), Spain had seen the emergence offirms of complex organizational forms. However, the conflict andthe postwar years changed this pattern. The argument put forwardin this paper is based on historical experience, the efforts willbe addressed to explain the development of Spanish entrepreneurshipduring the second half of the twentieth century. To illustrate thechange in entrepreneurship and organizational patterns among theSpanish firms during the Francoist regime we will turn to the caseof the motor vehicle industry.

Adopting a new religion: The case of Protestantism in 16th Century Germany

Using a rich dataset of territories and cities of the Holy Roman Empire in the16th century, this paper investigates the determinants of adoption and diffusion ofProtestantism as a state religion. A territory s distance to Wittenberg, the city whereMartin Luther taught, is a major determinant of adoption. This finding can be explainedthrough a theory of strategic neighbourhood interactions: in an uncertainlegal context, introducing the Reformation was a risky enterprise for territorial lords,and had higher prospects of success if powerful neighbouring states committed tothe new faith first. The model is tested in a panel dataset featuring the dates ofintroduction of the Reformation.

Health care provider choice in the case of patient-initiated contacts. An extended version of discrete choice of model demand

This paper analyzes the nature of health care provider choice inthe case of patient-initiated contacts, with special reference toa National Health Service setting, where monetary prices are zeroand general practitioners act as gatekeepers to publicly financedspecialized care. We focus our attention on the factors that mayexplain the continuously increasing use of hospital emergencyvisits as opposed to other provider alternatives. An extendedversion of a discrete choice model of demand for patient-initiatedcontacts is presented, allowing for individual and town residencesize differences in perceived quality (preferences) betweenalternative providers and including travel and waiting time asnon-monetary costs. Results of a nested multinomial logit model ofprovider choice are presented. Individual choice betweenalternatives considers, in a repeated nested structure, self-care,primary care, hospital and clinic emergency services. Welfareimplications and income effects are analyzed by computingcompensating variations, and by simulating the effects of userfees by levels of income. Results indicate that compensatingvariation per visit is higher than the direct marginal cost ofemergency visits, and consequently, emergency visits do not appearas an inefficient alternative even for non-urgent conditions.

Institutional constraints on organizations: The case of Spanish car dealerships

We study the effect of organizational choice and institutions on the performance ofSpanish car dealerships. Using outlet-level data from 1994, we find that verticallyintegrateddealerships showed substantially lower labor productivity, higher labor costs andlower profitability than franchised ones. Despite these gaps in performance, no verticallyintegratedoutlet was separated until 1994, yet the few outlets that were eventuallyseparated systematically improved their performance. We argue that the conversion ofintegrated outlets into franchised ones involved significant transaction costs, due to aninstitutional environment favoring permanent, highly-unionized employment relations. Inline with this argument, we find that the observed separations occurred in distributionnetworks that underwent marked reductions in worker unionization rates, following thelegalization of temporary labor contracts.

Adverse selection, credit and efficiency: The case of the missing market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment,entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need toborrow from banks. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, the competitiveequilibrium is typically inefficient.We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurscan only borrow from banks. If an additional market is added to provide entrepreneurs withadditional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic of thisadditional market is that it must be non-exclusive, in the sense that entrepreneurs must be ableto simultaneously borrow from many different lenders operating in it. This makes it possible toattain efficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new market while separating them in themarket for bank loans.

The P-median problem in a changing network: The case of Barcelona

In this paper a p--median--like model is formulated to address theissue of locating new facilities when there is uncertainty. Severalpossible future scenarios with respect to demand and/or the travel times/distanceparameters are presented. The planner will want a strategy of positioning thatwill do as ``well as possible'' over the future scenarios. This paper presents a discrete location model formulation to address this P--Medianproblem under uncertainty. The model is applied to the location of firestations in Barcelona.

Adverse selection, credit and efficiency: The case of the missing market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment,entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects needto borrow in order to invest. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, thecompetitive equilibrium is typically inefficient.We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurscan only access monitored lending. If a new set of markets is added to provide entrepreneurswith additional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic ofthese additional markets is that lending in them must be unmonitored, in the sense that it doesnot condition total borrowing or investment by entrepreneurs. This makes it possible to attainefficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new markets while separating them in the marketsfor monitored loans.

Asessing public policies. The case of education in Europe and the interaction between personal and institutional factors

The paper deals with the comparative study of European citizens satisfaction with thestate of education in their respective countries. Individual and contextual effects aretested applying multilevel analysis. The results show that educational public policies(level of decentralization, degree of comprehensiveness and public spending) as well asthe students social environment (socioeconomic and cultural status) have a soundimpact on the opinions about the state of education.