Stepwise multiple testing as formalized data snooping

It is common in econometric applications that several hypothesis tests arecarried out at the same time. The problem then becomes how to decide whichhypotheses to reject, accounting for the multitude of tests. In this paper,we suggest a stepwise multiple testing procedure which asymptoticallycontrols the familywise error rate at a desired level. Compared to relatedsingle-step methods, our procedure is more powerful in the sense that itoften will reject more false hypotheses. In addition, we advocate the useof studentization when it is feasible. Unlike some stepwise methods, ourmethod implicitly captures the joint dependence structure of the teststatistics, which results in increased ability to detect alternativehypotheses. We prove our method asymptotically controls the familywise errorrate under minimal assumptions. We present our methodology in the context ofcomparing several strategies to a common benchmark and deciding whichstrategies actually beat the benchmark. However, our ideas can easily beextended and/or modied to other contexts, such as making inference for theindividual regression coecients in a multiple regression framework. Somesimulation studies show the improvements of our methods over previous proposals. We also provide an application to a set of real data.

Calibration of stochastic volatility models via second order approximation: the Heston model case

Using a suitable Hull and White type formula we develop a methodology to obtain asecond order approximation to the implied volatility for very short maturities. Using thisapproximation we accurately calibrate the full set of parameters of the Heston model. Oneof the reasons that makes our calibration for short maturities so accurate is that we alsotake into account the term-structure for large maturities. We may say that calibration isnot "memoryless", in the sense that the option's behavior far away from maturity doesinfluence calibration when the option gets close to expiration. Our results provide a wayto perform a quick calibration of a closed-form approximation to vanilla options that canthen be used to price exotic derivatives. The methodology is simple, accurate, fast, andit requires a minimal computational cost.

Bringing game theory to hypothesis testing: Establishing finite sample bounds on inference

Small sample properties are of fundamental interest when only limited data is avail-able. Exact inference is limited by constraints imposed by speci.c nonrandomizedtests and of course also by lack of more data. These e¤ects can be separated as we propose to evaluate a test by comparing its type II error to the minimal type II error among all tests for the given sample. Game theory is used to establish this minimal type II error, the associated randomized test is characterized as part of a Nash equilibrium of a .ctitious game against nature.We use this method to investigate sequential tests for the di¤erence between twomeans when outcomes are constrained to belong to a given bounded set. Tests ofinequality and of noninferiority are included. We .nd that inference in terms oftype II error based on a balanced sample cannot be improved by sequential sampling or even by observing counter factual evidence providing there is a reasonable gap between the hypotheses.

An experimental study of adaptive behavior in an oligopolistic market game

We consider an oligopolistic market game, in which the players are competing firm in the same market of a homogeneous consumption good. The consumer side is represented by a fixed demand function. The firms decide how much to produce of a perishable consumption good, and they decide upon a number of information signals to be sent into the population in order to attract customers. Due to the minimal information provided, the players do not have a well--specified model of their environment. Our main objective is to characterize the adaptive behavior of the players in such a situation.

The effect of intergroup competition on group coordination: An experimental study

We report an experiment on the effect of intergroup competition on group coordination in the minimal-effort game (Van Huyck et al., 1990). The competition was between two 7-person groups. Each player in each group independently chose an integer from 1 to 7. The group with the higher minimum won the competition and each of its members was paid according to the game s original payoff matrix. Members of the losing group were paid nothing. In case of a tie, each player was paid half the payoff in the original matrix. This treatment was contrasted with two control treatments where each of the two groups played an independent coordination game, either with or without information about the minimum chosen by the outgroup. Although the intergroup competition does not change the set of strict equilibria, we found that it improved collective rationality by moving group members in the direction of higher-payoff equilibria. Merely providing group members with information about the minimal-effort level in the other group was not sufficient to generate this effect.