The Unemployment Benefit System: a Redistributive or an Insurance Institution?

[eng] In this paper we analyze how the composition of labor taxation affects unemployment in a unionized economy with capital accumulation and an unemployment benefit system. We show that if the unemployment benefit system is gross Bismarckian then the unemployment rate is reduced if wage taxes are decreased (and thus payroll taxes are increased). However, if the unemployment benefit system is net Bismarckian then the unemployment rate does not depend on how the system is financed. Besides, in a Beveridgean system the labor tax composition does not affect the unemployment rate if and only if the unemployed do not pay taxes and the employed pay a constant marginal tax rate. We also analyze when an unemployment benefit budget-balanced rule makes the economy to have a hysteresis process.

An overlapping generations approach to price policies in privatehealthcare insurance. The Catalan case

We analyze premium policies and price dispersion among private healthcare insurance firms from an overlapping-generations model. The model shows that firms that apply equal premium to all policyholders and firms that set premiums according to the risk of insured can coexist in the short run, whereas coexistence is unlikely in the long run because it requires the coincidence of economic growth and interest rates. We find support for the model’s results in the Catalan health insurance industry. Keywords: Economic theory, price policies, health insurance, health economics, overlapping-generations. JEL Classifications: I11 / L11 / L23

Consumption, investment and life insurance strategies with heterogeneous discounting

[cat] En aquest treball s'analitza l'efecte que comporta l'introducció de preferències inconsistents temporalment sobre les decisions òptimes de consum, inversió i compra d'assegurança de vida. En concret, es pretén recollir la creixent importància que un individu dóna a la herència que deixa i a la riquesa disponible per a la seva jubilació al llarg de la seva vida laboral. Amb aquesta finalitat, es parteix d'un model estocàstic en temps continu amb temps final aleatori, i s'introdueix el descompte heterogeni, considerant un agent amb una distribució de vida residual coneguda. Per tal d'obtenir solucions consistents temporalment es resol una equació de programació dinàmica no estàndard. Per al cas de funcions d'utilitat del tipus CRRA i CARA es troben solucions explícites. Finalment, els resultats obtinguts s'il·lustren numèricament.

Consumption, investment and life insurance strategies with heterogeneous discounting

[cat] En aquest treball s'analitza l'efecte que comporta l'introducció de preferències inconsistents temporalment sobre les decisions òptimes de consum, inversió i compra d'assegurança de vida. En concret, es pretén recollir la creixent importància que un individu dóna a la herència que deixa i a la riquesa disponible per a la seva jubilació al llarg de la seva vida laboral. Amb aquesta finalitat, es parteix d'un model estocàstic en temps continu amb temps final aleatori, i s'introdueix el descompte heterogeni, considerant un agent amb una distribució de vida residual coneguda. Per tal d'obtenir solucions consistents temporalment es resol una equació de programació dinàmica no estàndard. Per al cas de funcions d'utilitat del tipus CRRA i CARA es troben solucions explícites. Finalment, els resultats obtinguts s'il·lustren numèricament.

Discrete distributions when modeling the disability severity score of motor victims

Many European states apply score systems to evaluate the disability severity of non-fatal motor victims under the law of third-party liability. The score is a non-negative integer with an upper bound at 100 that increases with severity. It may be automatically converted into financial terms and thus also reflects the compensation cost for disability. In this paper, discrete regression models are applied to analyze the factors that influence the disability severity score of victims. Standard and zero-altered regression models are compared from two perspectives: an interpretation of the data generating process and the level of statistical fit. The results have implications for traffic safety policy decisions aimed at reducing accident severity. An application using data from Spain is provided.

Modelling the disability severity score in motor insurance claims: an application to the Spanish case

Bodily injury claims have the greatest impact on the claim costs of motor insurance companies. The disability severity of motor claims is assessed in numerous European countries by means of score systems. In this paper a zero inflated generalized Poisson regression model is implemented to estimate the disability severity score of victims in-volved in motor accidents on Spanish roads. We show that the injury severity estimates may be automatically converted into financial terms by insurers at any point of the claim handling process. As such, the methodology described may be used by motor insurers operating in the Spanish market to monitor the size of bodily injury claims. By using insurance data, various applications are presented in which the score estimate of disability severity is of value to insurers, either for computing the claim compensation or for claim reserve purposes.