Insurance with frequent trading

This paper looks at the dynamic management of risk in an economy with discrete time consumption and endowments and continuous trading. I study how agents in such an economy deal with all the risk in the economy and attain their Pareto optimal allocations by trading in a few natural securities: private insurance contracts and a common set of derivatives on the aggregate endowment. The parsimonious nature ofthe implied securities needed for Pareto optimality suggests that insuch contexts complete markets is a very reasonable assumption.

An approach to costs and energy consumption in private urban Spanish Mediterranean landscapes from a simplified model in sprinkle irrigation

The number of private gardens has increased in recent years, creating a more pleasant urban model, but not without having an environmental impact, including increased energy consumption, which is the focus of this study. The estimation of costs and energy consumption for the generic typology of private urban gardens is based on two simplifying assumptions: square geometry with surface areas from 25 to 500 m2 and hydraulic design with a single pipe. In total, eight sprinkler models have been considered, along with their possible working pressures, and 31 pumping units grouped into 5 series that adequately cover the range of required flow rates and pressures, resultin in 495 hydraulic designs repeated for two climatically different locations in the Spanish Mediterranean area (Girona and Elche). Mean total irrigation costs for the locality with lower water needs (Girona) and greater needs (Elche) were € 2,974 ha-¹ yr-¹ and € 3,383 ha-¹ yr-¹, respectively. Energy costs accounted for 11.4% of the total cost for the first location, and 23.0% for the second. While a suitable choice of the hydraulic elements of the setup is essential, as it may provide average energy savings of 77%, due to the low energy cost in relation to the cost of installation, the potential energy savings do not constitute a significant incentive for the irrigation system design. The low efficiency of the pumping units used in this type of garden is the biggest obstacle and constraint to achieving a high quality energy solution

Corporate governance and corporate social performance

By integrating the agency and stakeholder perspectives, this study aims to provide a systematic understanding of the firm- and institutional-level corporate governance factors that affect corporate social performance (CSP). We analyze a large global panel dataset and reveal that CSP is positively associated with board independence, but negatively with ownership concentration. These results underscore the idea that the benefits of CSP do not flow to shareholders to the same extent as the costs and that the allocation of resources to CSP is lower when shareholders are powerful. Furthermore, these findings indicate that independent directors should be understood as agents in their own right, not only focused on defending shareholder interests. We also find that CSP is negatively related to investor protection and shareholder-oriented environments, while it is positively related to egalitarian environments. Finally, we jointly analyze firm-level drivers and institutional contexts.

Prevalence and costs of multinutrution in hospitalized patients; the PREDyCES study

Justificación y objetivos: El estudio PREDyCES® tuvo dos objetivos principales. Primero, analizar la prevalencia de desnutrición hospitalaria (DH) en España tanto al ingreso como al alta, y segundo, estimar sus costes asociados. Métodos: Estudio nacional, transversal, observacional, multicéntrico, en condiciones de práctica clínica habitual que evaluó la presencia de desnutrición hospitalaria al ingreso y al alta mediante el NRS-2002®. Una extensión del estudio analizó la incidencia de complicaciones asociadas a la desnutrición, el exceso de estancia hospitalaria y los costes sanitarios asociados a la DH. Resultados: La prevalencia de desnutrición observada según el NRS-2002® fue del 23.7%. El análisis multivariante mostró que la edad, el género, la presencia de enfermedad oncológica, diabetes mellitus, disfagia y la polimedicación fueron los factores principales que se asociaron a la presencia de desnutrición. La DH se asoció a un incremento de la estancia hospitalaria, especialmente en aquellos pacientes que ingresaron sin desnutrición y que presentaron desnutrición al alta (15.2 vs 8.0 días; p < 0.001), con un coste adicional asociado de 5.829€ por paciente. Conclusiones: Uno de cada cuatro pacientes en los hospitales españoles se encuentra desnutrido. Esta condición se asocia a un exceso de estancia hospitalaria y costes asociados, especialmente en pacientes que se desnutren durante su hospitalización. Se debería generalizar el cribado nutricional sistemático con el objetivo de implementar intervenciones nutricionales de conocida eficacia.

Shrouded costs of government: The political economy of state and local public pensions

Why do public-sector workers receive so much of their compensation in the formof pensions and other benefits? This paper presents a political economy model inwhich politicians compete for taxpayers' and government employees' votes by promising compensation packages, but some voters cannot evaluate every aspect of promisedcompensation. If pension packages are "shrouded", so that public-sector workers better understand their value than ordinary taxpayers, then compensation will be highlyback-loaded. In equilibrium, the welfare of public-sector workers could be improved,holding total public-sector costs constant, if they received higher wages and lowerpensions. Centralizing pension determination has two offsetting effects on generosity:more state-level media attention helps taxpayers better understand pension costs, andthat reduces pension generosity; but a larger share of public-sector workers will votewithin the jurisdiction, which increases pension generosity. A short discussion of pensions in two decentralized states (California and Pennsylvania) and two centralizedstates (Massachusetts and Ohio) suggests that centralization appears to have modestlyreduced pensions, but, as the model suggests, this is unlikely to be universal.

Aggregate Costs of Gender Gaps in the Labor Market: A Quantitative Estimate

[eng] This paper examines the quantitative effects of gender gaps in entrepreneurship and labor force participation on aggregate productivity and income per capita. We simulate an occupational choice model with heterogeneous agents in entrepreneurial ability, where agents choose to be workers, self-employed or employers. The model assumes that men and women have the same talent distribution, but we impose several frictions on women's opportunities and pay in the labor market. In particular, we restrict the fraction of women participating in the labor market.

Aggregate Costs of Gender Gaps in the Labor Market: A Quantitative Estimate

This paper examines the quantitative effects of gender gaps in entrepreneurship and labor force participation on aggregate productivity and income per capita. We simulate an occupational choice model with heterogeneous agents in entrepreneurial ability, where agents choose to be workers, self-employed or employers. The model assumes that men and women have the same talent distribution, but we impose several frictions on women's opportunities and pay in the labor market. In particular, we restrict the fraction of women participating in the labor market.

Aggregate Costs of Gender Gaps in the Labor Market: A Quantitative Estimate

This paper examines the quantitative effects of gender gaps in entrepreneurship and labor force participation on aggregate productivity and income per capita. We simulate an occupational choice model with heterogeneous agents in entrepreneurial ability, where agents choose to be workers, self-employed or employers. The model assumes that men and women have the same talent distribution, but we impose several frictions on women's opportunities and pay in the labor market. In particular, we restrict the fraction of women participating in the labor market.

Characterization of Reward Functions in Networks with Costs

In this paper we study network structures in which the possibilities for cooperation are restricted and can not be described by a cooperative game. The benefits of a group of players depend on how these players are internally connected. One way to represent this type of situations is the so-called reward function, which represents the profits obtainable by the total coalition if links can be used to coordinate agents' actions. The starting point of this paper is the work of Vilaseca et al. where they characterized the reward function. We concentrate on those situations where there exist costs for establishing communication links. Given a reward function and a costs function, our aim is to analyze under what conditions it is possible to associate a cooperative game to it. We characterize the reward function in networks structures with costs for establishing links by means of two conditions, component permanence and component additivity. Finally, an economic application is developed to illustrate the main theoretical result.

Computational and Energy Costs of Cryptographic Algorithms on Handheld Devices

Networks are evolving toward a ubiquitous model in which heterogeneousdevices are interconnected. Cryptographic algorithms are required for developing securitysolutions that protect network activity. However, the computational and energy limitationsof network devices jeopardize the actual implementation of such mechanisms. In thispaper, we perform a wide analysis on the expenses of launching symmetric and asymmetriccryptographic algorithms, hash chain functions, elliptic curves cryptography and pairingbased cryptography on personal agendas, and compare them with the costs of basic operatingsystem functions. Results show that although cryptographic power costs are high and suchoperations shall be restricted in time, they are not the main limiting factor of the autonomyof a device.

Minimization of biosynthetic costs in adaptive gene expression responses of yeast to environmental changes

Yeast successfully adapts to an environmental stress by altering physiology and fine-tuning metabolism. This fine-tuning is achieved through regulation of both gene expression and protein activity, and it is shaped by various physiological requirements. Such requirements impose a sustained evolutionary pressure that ultimately selects a specific gene expression profile, generating a suitable adaptive response to each environmental change. Although some of the requirements are stress specific, it is likely that others are common to various situations. We hypothesize that an evolutionary pressure for minimizing biosynthetic costs might have left signatures in the physicochemical properties of proteins whose gene expression is fine-tuned during adaptive responses. To test this hypothesis we analyze existing yeast transcriptomic data for such responses and investigate how several properties of proteins correlate to changes in gene expression. Our results reveal signatures that are consistent with a selective pressure for economy in protein synthesis during adaptive response of yeast to various types of stress. These signatures differentiate two groups of adaptive responses with respect to how cells manage expenditure in protein biosynthesis. In one group, significant trends towards downregulation of large proteins and upregulation of small ones are observed. In the other group we find no such trends. These results are consistent with resource limitation being important in the evolution of the first group of stress responses.

Recovery Risk and Labor Costs in Public-Private Partnerships : Contractual Choice in the US Water industry

We use an ordered logistic model to empirically examine the factors that explain varying degrees of private involvement in the U.S. water sector through public-private partnerships. Our estimates suggest that a variety of factors help explain greater private participation in this sector. We find that the risk to private participants regarding cost recovery is an important driver of private participation. The relative cost of labor is also a key factor in determining the degree of private involvement in the contract choice. When public wages are high relative to private wages, private participation is viewed as a source of cost savings. We thus find two main drivers of greater private involvement: one encouraging private participation by reducing risk, and another encouraging government to seek out private participation in lowering costs.

Privatization, cooperation and costs of solid waste services in small towns

This paper analyzes the cost implications of privatization and cooperation in the provision of solid waste services for a sample of small municipalities. In conducting this empirical analysis, a survey is first designed and administered to municipalities in the Spanish region of Aragon, and then an estimation of the determinants of service costs is undertaken, considering the possible endogeneity of delivery choices. Our findings indicate that cooperation is more effective than privatization in saving costs. Both production forms can enable small municipalities to cut costs by exploiting scale economies. However, the fact that inter-municipal cooperation involves lower transaction costs and is less likely to be affected by competition problems would seem to account for the fact that it is a more effective way of reducing costs.

Empirical analysis of solid management waste costs: Some evidence from Galicia, Spain

This paper analyses the factors that determine solid waste service costs. The empirical analysis is based on information derived from a survey conducted in a sample of Galician municipalities. The results reveal economies of scale in municipalities of fewer than 50,000 inhabitants, such that cooperation between these municipalities could lead to cost savings. It also appears that private delivery is not cheaper than public delivery. Finally, designating a larger proportion of the total waste volume to recycling does not imply greater costs.

Public and Private Production in a Mixed Delivery System: Regulation, Competition and Costs

Academics and policy makers are increasingly shifting the debate concerning the best form of public service provision beyond the traditional dilemma between pure public and pure private delivery modes, because, among other reasons, there is a growing body of evidence that casts doubt on the existence of systematic cost savings from privatization, while any competition seems to be eroded over time. In this paper we compare the relative merits of public and private delivery within a mixed delivery system. We study the role played by ownership, transaction costs, and competition on local public service delivery within the same jurisdiction. Using a stochastic cost frontier, we analyze the public-private urban bus system in the Barcelona Metropolitan Area. Our results suggest that private firms tendering the service have higher delivery costs than those incurred by the public firm, especially when transaction costs are taken into account. Tenders, therefore, do not help to reduce delivery costs. Our results suggest that under a mixed delivery scheme, which permits the co-existence of public and private production, the metropolitan government and the regulator can use private delivery to contain costs in the public firm and, at the same time, benefit from the greater flexibility of private firms for dealing with events not provided for under contract.