Reputation and honesty in a market for information

Previous works on asymmetric information in asset markets tendto focus on the potential gains in the asset market itself. We focus on the market for information and conduct an experimental study to explore, in a game of finite but uncertain duration, whether reputation can be an effective constraint on deliberate misinformation. At the beginning of each period, an uninformed potential asset buyer can purchase information, at a fixed price and from a fully-informed source, about the value of the asset in that period. The informational insiders cannot purchase the asset and are given short-term incentives to provide false information when the asset value is low. Our model predicts that, in accordance with the Folk Theorem, Pareto-superior outcomes featuring truthful revelation should be sustainable. However, this depends critically on beliefs about rationality and behavior. We find that, overall, sellers are truthful 89% of the time. More significantly, the observed frequency of truthfulness is 81% when the asset value is low. Our result is consistent with both mixed-strategy and trigger strategy interpretations and provides evidence that most subjects correctly anticipate rational behavior. We discuss applications to financial markets, media regulation, and the stability of cartels.

General equilibrium with asymmetric information: a dual approach

We study markets where the characteristics or decisions of certain agents are relevant but not known to their trading partners. Assuming exclusive transactions, the environment is described as a continuum economy with indivisible commodities. We characterize incentive efficient allocations as solutions to linear programming problems and appeal to duality theory to demonstrate the generic existence of external effects in these markets. Because under certain conditions such effects may generate non-convexities, randomization emerges as a theoretic possibility. In characterizing market equilibria we show that, consistently with the personalized nature of transactions, prices are generally non-linear in the underlying consumption. On the other hand, external effects may have critical implications for market efficiency. With adverse selection, in fact, cross-subsidization across agents with different private information may be necessary for optimality, and so, the market need not even achieve an incentive efficient allocation. In contrast, for the case of a single commodity, we find that when informational asymmetries arise after the trading period (e.g. moral hazard; ex post hidden types) external effects are fully internalized at a market equilibrium.

Information Dispersion and Equilibrium Multiplicity

This paper studies the implications of correlation of private signals about the liquidation value of a risky asset in a variation of a standard noisy rational expectations model in which traders receive endowment shocks which are private information and have a common component. We …nd that a necessary condition to generate multiple linear partially revealing rational expectations equilibria is the existence of several sources of information dispersion. In this context equilibrium multiplicity tends to occur when information is more dispersed. A necessary condition to have strategic complementarity in information acquisition is to have mul- tiple equilibria. When the equilibrium is unique there is strategic substi- tutability in information acquisition, corroborating the result obtained in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). JEL Classi…cation: D82, D83, G14 Keywords: Multiplicity of equilibria, strategic complementarity, asym- metric information.

Strategic behavior and price discovery

The paper analyzes the effects of strategic behavior by an insider in a price discovery process, akin to an information tatonnement, in the presence of a competitive informed sector. Such processes are used in the preopening period of continuous trading systems in several exchanges. It is found that the insider manipulates the market using a contrarian strategy in order to neutralize the effect of the trades of competitive informed agents. Furthermore, consistently with the empirical evidence available, we find that information revelation accelerates close to the opening, that the market price does not converge to the fundamental value no matter how many rounds the tatonnement has, and that the expected trading volume displays a U-shaped pattern. We also find that a market with a larger competitive sector (smaller insider) has an improved informational efficiency and an increased trading volume. The insider provides a public good (a lower informativeness of the price) for the competitive informed sector.

Conflicts of interest, information provision and competition in banking

In some markets, such as the market for drugs or for financial services, sellers have better information than buyersregarding the matching between the buyer's needs and the good's actual characteristics. Depending on the market structure,this may lead to conflicts of interest and/or the underprovision of information by the seller. This paper studies this issuein the market for financial services. The analysis presents a new model of competition between banks, as banks' pricecompetition influences the ensuing incentives for truthful information revelation. We compare two different firm structures,specialized banking, where financial institutions provide a unique financial product, and one-stop banking, where a financialinstitution is able to provide several financial products which are horizontally differentiated. We show first that, althoughconflicts of interest may prevent information disclosure under monopoly, competition forces full information provision forsufficiently high reputation costs. Second, in the presence of market power, one-stop banks will use information strategicallyto increase product differentiation and therefore will always provide reliable information and charge higher rices thanspecialized banks, thus providing a new justification for the creation of one-stop banks. Finally, we show that, ifindependent financial advisers are able to provide reliable information, this increases product differentiation and thereforemarket power, so that it is in the interest of financial intermediaries to promote external independent financial advice.

Single period Markowitz portfolio selection, performance gauging and duality: a variation on Luenberger's shortage function

Markowitz portfolio theory (1952) has induced research into the efficiency of portfolio management. This paper studies existing nonparametric efficiency measurement approaches for single period portfolio selection from a theoretical perspective and generalises currently used efficiency measures into the full mean-variance space. Therefore, we introduce the efficiency improvement possibility function (a variation on the shortage function), study its axiomatic properties in the context of Markowitz efficient frontier, and establish a link to the indirect mean-variance utility function. This framework allows distinguishing between portfolio efficiency and allocative efficiency. Furthermore, it permits retrieving information about the revealed risk aversion of investors. The efficiency improvement possibility function thus provides a more general framework for gauging the efficiency of portfolio management using nonparametric frontier envelopment methods based on quadratic optimisation.

Effects of competition over quality-adjusted price indexes: an application to the Spanish automobile market

Using a newly constructed data set, we calculate quality-adjusted price indexes after estimating hedonic price regressions from 1988 to 2004 in the Spanish automobile market. The increasing competition was favoured by the removal of trade restrictions and the special plans for the renewal of the Spanish automobile fleet. We find that the increasing degree of competition during those years led to an overall drop in automobile prices by 20 percent which implied considerable consumer gains thanks to higher market efficiency. Additionally, our results indicate that loyalty relevance and discrepancies in automobile reliability declined during those years. This is captured.

Barriers to innovation and public policy in Catalonia

The present paper analyses the link between firms’ decisions to innovate and the barriers that prevent them from being innovative. The aim is twofold. First, it analyses three groups of barriers to innovation: the cost of innovation projects, lack of knowledge and market conditions. Second, it presents the main steps taken by Catalan Government to promote the creation of new firms and to reduce barriers to innovation. The data set used is based on the 2004 official innovation survey of Catalonia which was taken from the Spanish CIS-4 sample. This sample includes individual information on 2,954 Catalan firms in manufacturing industries and knowledge-intensive services (KIS). The empirical analysis reveals pronounced differences regarding a firm’s propensity to innovate and its perception of barriers. Moreover, the results show that cost and knowledge barriers seem to be the most important and that there are substantial sectoral differences in the way that firms react to barriers. The results of this paper have important implications for the design of future public policy to promote entrepreneurship and innovation together.

Migration and information flows. A new lens for the study of contemporary international migration

Aquest document de treball mira d'establir un nou camp d'investigació a la cruïlla entre els fluxos de migració i d'informació i comunicació. Hi ha diversos factors que fan que valgui la pena adoptar aquesta perspectiva. El punt central és que la migració internacional contemporània és incrustada en la dinàmica de la societat de la informació, seguint models comuns i dinàmiques interconnectades. Per consegüent, s'està començant a identificar els fluxos d'informació com a qüestions clau en les polítiques de migració. A més, hi ha una manca de coneixement empíric en el disseny de xarxes d'informació i l'ús de les tecnologies d'informació i comunicació en contextos migratoris. Aquest document de treball també mira de ser una font d'hipòtesis per a investigacions posteriors.

The effectiveness of market intervention policies to improve diet quality and to reduce the prevalence of obesity in Spain

Our project aims at analyzing the relevance of economic factors (mainly income and other socioeconomic characteristics of Spanish households and market prices) on the prevalence of obesity in Spain and to what extent market intervention prices are effective to reduce obesity and improve the quality of the diet, and under what circumstances. In relation to the existing literature worldwide, this project is the first attempt in Spain trying to get an overall picture on the effectiveness of public policies on both food consumption and the quality of diet, on one hand, and on the prevalence of obesity on the other. The project consists of four main parts. The first part represents a critical review of the literature on the economic approach of dealing with the obesity prevalence problems, diet quality and public intervention policies. Although another important body of obesity literature is dealing with physical exercise but in this paper we will limit our attention to those studies related to food consumption respecting the scope of our study and as there are many published literature review dealing with the literature related to the physical exercise and its effect on obesity prevalence. The second part consists of a Parametric and Non-Parametric Analysis of the Role of Economic Factors on Obesity Prevalence in Spain. The third part is trying to overcome the shortcomings of many diet quality indices that have been developed during last decades, such as the Healthy Eating Index, the Diet Quality Index, the Healthy Diet Indicator, and the Mediterranean Diet Score, through the development of a new obesity specific diet quality index. While the last part of our project concentrates on the assessment of the effectiveness of market intervention policies to improve the healthiness of the Spanish Diet Using the new Exact Affine Stone Index (EASI) Demand System.

Information technologies and communication between parents and children

This is an exploratory study that aims, on the one hand, to examine in more detail how children between 12 and 16 years of age use different audiovisual technologies, what they feel and think when using them, and whom they like to speak to about such experiences. On the other hand, we look more deeply into the interactions between adults and children, particularly between parents and their children, in relation to these technologies when children use them at home or in other places. We analysed responses to questionnaires with several common items, administered separately to parents and children. Children’s responses reflect an important level of dissatisfaction when talking with different adults about media activities. Our findings support the thesis that more and more children socialise through new information and communication technologies with little or no recourse to adult criteria, giving rise to the emergence of specific children’s cultures. Crossing of the responses of parents and those of their own children shows us which aspects of media reality adults overestimate or underestimate in comparison to children, and to what degree certain judgements coincide and differ between generations. The results can be applied to the improvement of relations between adults and adolescents, taking advantage of adolescents’ strong motivation to engage in activities using audiovisual media

Introduction to University and the ICT Sector

The innovative subject “Introduction to ICT” combines a general Introductory Course to the University with elements around the Information and Communication Technologies sector (including the ICT engineer competence profile, market aspects, etc.)This new course has been developed and implemented in three degree programmes offered by the Polytechnic School at Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona. The course team consists of thirteen teachers,including business professionals, librarians, computer technicians, institutional representatives as well as an educationalist responsible for advising on methodology and study techniques. The subject was designed for a high number of students (260). At the end of the course, we collected quantitative and qualitativeinformation about the students’ satisfaction. The findings show the positive vision that they had about the topics worked during the subject. This paper describes the course, its implementation and evaluation and, of course, the details of the findings that we collected about students' satisfaction.

Monetary policy with signal extraction from the bond market

Monetary policy is conducted in an environment of uncertainty. This paper sets upa model where the central bank uses real-time data from the bond market togetherwith standard macroeconomic indicators to estimate the current state of theeconomy more efficiently, while taking into account that its own actions influencewhat it observes. The timeliness of bond market data allows for quicker responsesof monetary policy to disturbances compared to the case when the central bankhas to rely solely on collected aggregate data. The information content of theterm structure creates a link between the bond market and the macroeconomythat is novel to the literature. To quantify the importance of the bond market asa source of information, the model is estimated on data for the United Statesand Australia using Bayesian methods. The empirical exercise suggests that thereis some information in the US term structure that helps the Federal Reserve toidentify shocks to the economy on a timely basis. Australian bond prices seemto be less informative than their US counterparts, perhaps because Australia is arelatively small and open economy.

Social capital, government expenditures, and growth

Countries with greater social capital have higher economic growth. We show that socialcapital is also highly positively correlated across countries with government expenditureon education. We develop an infinite-horizon model of public spending and endogenousstochastic growth that explains both facts through frictions in political agency whenvoters have imperfect information. In our model, the government provides servicesthat yield immediate utility, and investment that raises future productivity. Voters aremore likely to observe public services, so politicians have electoral incentives to underprovidepublic investment. Social capital increases voters' awareness of all governmentactivity. As a consequence, both politicians' incentives and their selection improve.In the dynamic equilibrium, both the amount and the efficiency of public investmentincrease, permanently raising the growth rate.

Market versus limit orders in an imperfectly competitive security

This paper analyzes the choice between limit and market orders in animperfectly competitive noisy rational expectations economy. There is a uniqueinsider, who takes into account the effect their trading has on prices. If theinsider behaves as a price taker, she will choose market orders if her privateinformation is very precise and she will choose limit orders otherwise. On thecontrary, if the insider recognizes and exploits her ability to affect themarket price, her optimal choice is to place limit orders whatever the precisionof her private information.