A Game to Promote Understanding about UCD Methods and Process

The User-centered design (UCD) game is a tool forhuman-computer interaction practitioners to demonstrate the key user-centered design methodsand how they interrelate in the design process in an interactive and participatory manner. The target audiences are departments and institutions unfamiliar with UCD but whose work is related to the definition, creation, and update of a product or service.

Detectings low introgression of invasive alleles in an extensively restocked game bird

Interbreeding of two species in the wild implies introgression of alleles from one species into the other only when admixed individuals survive and successfully backcross with the parental species. Consequently, estimating the proportion of first generation hybrids in a population may not inform about the evolutionary impact of hybridization. Samples obtained over a long time span may offer a more accurate view of the spreading of introgressed alleles in a species" gene pool. Common quail (Coturnix coturnix) populations in Europe have been restocked extensively with farm quails of hybrid origin (crosses with Japanese quails, C. japonica). We genetically monitored a common quail population over 15 years to investigate whether genetic introgression is occurring and used simulations to investigate our power to detect it. Our results revealed that some introgression has occurred, but we did not observe a significant increase over time in the proportion of admixed individuals. However, simulations showed that the degree of admixture may be larger than anticipated due to the limited power of analyses over a short time span, and that observed data was compatible with a low rate of introgression, probably resulting from reduced fitness of admixed individuals. Simulations predicted this could result in extensive admixture in the near future.

Effects of punishment in a mobile population playing the prisoner’s dilemma game

We deal with a system of prisoner’s dilemma players undergoing continuous motion in a two-dimensional plane. In contrast to previous work, we introduce altruistic punishment after the game. We find punishing only a few of the cooperator-defector interactions is enough to lead the system to a cooperative state in environments where otherwise defection would take over the population. This happens even with soft nonsocial punishment (where both cooperators and defectors punish other players, a behavior observed in many human populations). For high enough mobilities or temptations to defect, low rates of social punishment can no longer avoid the breakdown of cooperation

On the structure of cooperative and competitive solutions for a generalized assignment game

We study cooperative and competitive solutions for a many- to-many generalization of Shapley and Shubik (1972)'s assignment game. We consider the Core, three other notions of group stability and two al- ternative definitions of competitive equilibrium. We show that (i) each group stable set is closely related with the Core of certain games defined using a proper notion of blocking and (ii) each group stable set contains the set of payoff vectors associated to the two definitions of competitive equilibrium. We also show that all six solutions maintain a strictly nested structure. Moreover, each solution can be identified with a set of ma- trices of (discriminated) prices which indicate how gains from trade are distributed among buyers and sellers. In all cases such matrices arise as solutions of a system of linear inequalities. Hence, all six solutions have the same properties from a structural and computational point of view.