Tobin meets Oates: Solidarity and the optimal fiscal federal structure

We explore the implications for the optimal degree of fiscal decentralization when people spreferences for goods and services, which classic treatments of fiscal federalism (Oates, 1972)place in the purview of local governments, exhibit specific egalitarianism (Tobin, 1970), orsolidarity. We find that a system in which the central government provides a common minimumlevel of the publicly provided good, and local governments are allowed to use their ownresources to provide an even higher local level, performs better from an efficiency perspectiverelative to all other systems analyzed for a relevant range of preferences over solidarity.

Does it cost to be virtuous? The macroeconomic effects of fiscal constraints

We study whether and how fiscal restrictions alter the business cycle features of macrovariables for a sample of 48 US states. We also examine the typical transmission properties of fiscal disturbances and the implied fiscal rules of states with different fiscal restrictions. Fiscal constraints are characterized with a number of indicators. There are similarities in second moments of macrovariables and in the transmission properties of fiscal shocks across states with different fiscal constraints. The cyclical response of expenditure differs in size and sometimes in sign, but heterogeneity within groups makes point estimates statistically insignificant. Creative budget accounting is responsible for the pattern. Implications for the design of fiscal rules and the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact are discussed.

Why do differences in the degree of fiscal decentralization endure?

A notable difference between the U.S. and many countries in Europe is in the degree of fiscal decentralization. Regional (and local) governments in the U.S. have significant autonomy in setting their own taxes and determining how to spend their revenues. This is not true of their counterparts in Spain, France, the United Kingdom, Czech Republic and many other European countries. In recent years, many countries formerly subject to dictatorshipsor communism have been considering decentralizing fiscal responsibility to sub-national governments as part of the process of democratization (see Bird and Ebel, forthcoming). Yet, much of Europe remains immune to adopting effective decentralization in which sub-national units have true taxing authority.

Price differentials in monetary unions: The role of fiscal shocks

We study the effect of regional expenditure and revenue shocks on price differentials for47 US states and 9 EU countries. We identify shocks using sign restrictions on the dynamicsof deficits and output and construct two estimates for structural price differentials dynamics which optimally weight the information contained in the data for all units. Fiscal shocks explain between 14 and 23 percent of the variability of price differentials both in the US and in the EU. On average, expansionary fiscal disturbances produce positive price differential responses while distortionary balance budget shocks produce negative price differential responses. In a number of units, price differential responses to expansionary fiscal shocks are negative. Spillovers and labor supply effects partially explain this pattern while geographical, political, and economic indicators do not.

Social spending and demographics: The role of public policies in the intergenerational redistribution of income. Empirical evidence from Spain and Catalonia

The demographic shift underway in Southern Europe requires a revision of some of thefundamental principles of the traditional welfare state. We analyze the evolution of several aspects of welfare and social expenditure over the last two decades. We find that in the context of the present demographic changes and real estate boom current social and pension policy leads to a new distribution of benefits and burdens which is highly intergenerationally unequal. We argue for a revised definition of public policy based on Musgrave's proposition as a possible rule for an intergenerationally fair distribution.

Organisational innovations and health care decentralisation: A perspective from Spain

Recent policy developments in public health care systems lead to a greater diversity in health care. Decentralisation, either geographically or at an institutional level, is the key force, because it encourages innovation and local initiatives in health care provision. The devolution of responsibilities allows for a sort of de-construction of the status quo by changing both organizational forms and service provision. The new organizations enjoy greater freedom in the way they pay their staff, and are judged according to their results. These organizations may retain financial surpluses, develop spin-off companies and commission a range of specialised services (such as Diagnostic and Treatment Centres in UK) from providers outside the institutional setting in order to have more access to capital markets. However this diversity may generate a feeling of lack of commitment to a national health service and ultimately a loss of social cohesion. By fiscal decentralisation to regional authorities or planned delegation of financial agreements to the providers, financial incentives are more explicit and may seem to place profit-making above a commitment to better health care. An evaluation of the myths and realities of the decentralization process is needed. Here, I offer an assessment pros and cons of the decentralization process of health care in Spain, drawing on the experience of regional reforms from the pioneering organisational innovations implemented in Catalonia in 1981, up to the observed dispersion of health care spending per capita among regions at present.

The elusive costs and the immaterial gains of fiscal contraints

We study whether and how fiscal restrictions alter the business cycle features macrovariables for a sample of 48 US states. We also examine the 'typical' transmission properties of fiscal disturbances and the implied fiscal rules of states with different fiscal restrictions. Fiscal constraints are characterized with a number of indicators. There are similarities in second moments of macrovariables and in the transmission properties of fiscal shocks across states with different fiscal constraints. The cyclical response of expenditure differs in size and sometimes in sign, but heterogeneity within groups makes point estimates statistically insignificant. Creative budget accounting isresponsible for the pattern. Implications for the design of fiscal rules and thereform of the Stability and Growth Pact are discussed.

The effects of tax deductibility on the mix of property taxes and use charges: an empirical analysis of the spanish case

This paper tests some hypothesis about the determinants of the local tax structure. In particular, we focus on the effects that the property tax deductibility in the national income tax has on the relative use of the property tax and user charges. We deal with the incentive effects that local governments face regarding the different sources of revenue by means of a model in which the local tax structure and the level of public expenditure arise as a result of the maximizing behaviour of local politicians subject to the economic effects of the tax system. We attempt to test the hypothesis developed with data corresponding to a set of Spanish municipalities during the period 1987-9l. We find that tax deductibility provides incentives to raise revenues from the property tax but does not introduce a biass against user charges or in favor of overall spending growth

Optimal fiscal policy in overlapping generations models

[eng] This paper provides, from a theoretical and quantitative point of view, an explanation of why taxes on capital returns are high (around 35%) by analyzing the optimal fiscal policy in an economy with intergenerational redistribution. For this purpose, the government is modeled explicitly and can choose (and commit to) an optimal tax policy in order to maximize society's welfare. In an infinitely lived economy with heterogeneous agents, the long run optimal capital tax is zero. If heterogeneity is due to the existence of overlapping generations, this result in general is no longer true. I provide sufficient conditions for zero capital and labor taxes, and show that a general class of preferences, commonly used on the macro and public finance literature, violate these conditions. For a version of the model, calibrated to the US economy, the main results are: first, if the government is restricted to a set of instruments, the observed fiscal policy cannot be disregarded as sub optimal and capital taxes are positive and quantitatively relevant. Second, if the government can use age specific taxes for each generation, then the age profile capital tax pattern implies subsidizing asset returns of the younger generations and taxing at higher rates the asset returns of the older ones.

The determinants of social spending in Spain (1880-1960): Is Lindert right?

[spa] El principal objetivo de este artículo se centra en analizar los orígenes del Estado de Bienestar en España a partir del marco teórico elaborado por Peter Lindert. Con este fin, se ofrece un análisis econométrico de los factores que determinaron la evolución del gasto social público en este país entre 1880 y 1960. Utilizando nueva evidencia cuantitativa, se construyó un panel de datos por quinquenios con el porcentaje de gasto social respecto al PIB desagregado en tres partidas: sanidad, seguridad social y beneficencia. El análisis permite insertar el caso español en el debate internacional y los resultados revelan interesantes singularidades de este país.

The effects of tax deductibility on the mix of property taxes and use charges: an empirical analysis of the spanish case

This paper tests some hypothesis about the determinants of the local tax structure. In particular, we focus on the effects that the property tax deductibility in the national income tax has on the relative use of the property tax and user charges. We deal with the incentive effects that local governments face regarding the different sources of revenue by means of a model in which the local tax structure and the level of public expenditure arise as a result of the maximizing behaviour of local politicians subject to the economic effects of the tax system. We attempt to test the hypothesis developed with data corresponding to a set of Spanish municipalities during the period 1987-9l. We find that tax deductibility provides incentives to raise revenues from the property tax but does not introduce a biass against user charges or in favor of overall spending growth

Sistema fiscal y reforma de la Seguridad Social

El presente trabajo analiza desde un punto de vista cuantitativo, mediante un modelo de equilibrio general de generaciones sucesivas, los efectos sobre la economía española de eliminar el actual sistema de Seguridad Social e implantar uno de capitalización. El análisis considera el proceso de transición y mide en términos de bienestar, quiénes son los agentes que se opondrían a este tipo de reforma. La consideración de la interacción entre el sistema de seguridad social y el sistema fiscal implica mayores beneficios asociados a una reforma de la seguridad social. Sin embargo, este tipo de reforma sigue generando pérdidas de bienestar para la mayoría de agentes vivos en el momentodel inicio de la reforma, existiendo un sesgo en favor del status quo.

The determinants of social spending in Spain (1880-1960): Is Lindert right?

[spa] El principal objetivo de este artículo se centra en analizar los orígenes del Estado de Bienestar en España a partir del marco teórico elaborado por Peter Lindert. Con este fin, se ofrece un análisis econométrico de los factores que determinaron la evolución del gasto social público en este país entre 1880 y 1960. Utilizando nueva evidencia cuantitativa, se construyó un panel de datos por quinquenios con el porcentaje de gasto social respecto al PIB desagregado en tres partidas: sanidad, seguridad social y beneficencia. El análisis permite insertar el caso español en el debate internacional y los resultados revelan interesantes singularidades de este país.

Sistema fiscal y reforma de la Seguridad Social

El presente trabajo analiza desde un punto de vista cuantitativo, mediante un modelo de equilibrio general de generaciones sucesivas, los efectos sobre la economía española de eliminar el actual sistema de Seguridad Social e implantar uno de capitalización. El análisis considera el proceso de transición y mide en términos de bienestar, quiénes son los agentes que se opondrían a este tipo de reforma. La consideración de la interacción entre el sistema de seguridad social y el sistema fiscal implica mayores beneficios asociados a una reforma de la seguridad social. Sin embargo, este tipo de reforma sigue generando pérdidas de bienestar para la mayoría de agentes vivos en el momentodel inicio de la reforma, existiendo un sesgo en favor del status quo.

Optimal fiscal policy in overlapping generations models

[eng] This paper provides, from a theoretical and quantitative point of view, an explanation of why taxes on capital returns are high (around 35%) by analyzing the optimal fiscal policy in an economy with intergenerational redistribution. For this purpose, the government is modeled explicitly and can choose (and commit to) an optimal tax policy in order to maximize society's welfare. In an infinitely lived economy with heterogeneous agents, the long run optimal capital tax is zero. If heterogeneity is due to the existence of overlapping generations, this result in general is no longer true. I provide sufficient conditions for zero capital and labor taxes, and show that a general class of preferences, commonly used on the macro and public finance literature, violate these conditions. For a version of the model, calibrated to the US economy, the main results are: first, if the government is restricted to a set of instruments, the observed fiscal policy cannot be disregarded as sub optimal and capital taxes are positive and quantitatively relevant. Second, if the government can use age specific taxes for each generation, then the age profile capital tax pattern implies subsidizing asset returns of the younger generations and taxing at higher rates the asset returns of the older ones.