Incumbency (dis)advantage when citizens can propose

This paper analyses the problem that an incumbent faces during the legislature when deciding how to react to citizen proposals such as the outcome of referenda or popular initiatives. We argue that these proposals constitute a potential source of electoral disadvantage when citizens factor in their evaluation of the incumbent his reaction to these proposals. This is because an incumbent politician may jeopardize his re-election by implementing policies close to his preferred ones but unpopular among the electorate. We characterize conditions under which this potential disadvantage becomes in fact an electoral advantage for the incumbent. We find that the choices of the incumbent during the legislature will be closest to citizens policy proposals when the intensity of electoral competition is neither too soft nor too tough. Finally, we use our results to discuss some implications of the use of mechanisms such as referenda and popular assemblies on electoral competition and on the incumbency advantage phenomenon.

Convivencia y participación de jóvenes en Sant Boi de Llobregat (Barcelona)

El presente trabajo constituye un proceso de elaboración, aplicación y análisis de resultados de un estudio por encuesta realizado con la juventud del municipio de Sant Boi del Llobregat1 ubicado en la provincia de Barcelona. El objetivo del trabajo inicial fue hacer un diagnóstico del grado de convivencia y participación de la juventud de 14 a 16 años de edad, con la finalidad de poder fundamentar propuestas educativas de mejora en dichas áreas, tan necesarias para el desarrollo de una ciudadanía más activa y comprometida con la realidad. Para el desarrollo de este diagnóstico contamos con un instrumento de recogida de información de carácter cuantitativo: el cuestionario de convivencia y participación. El marco teórico de partida se basa en la idea de que para desarrollar una ciudadanía activa y comprometida con la realidad es necesario que la juventud desarrolle procesos de participación y que se dé una auténtica convivencia basada en la cohesión social. Los actuales cambios sociales y culturales nos brindan el reto y la oportunidad de crear nuevos escenarios de diálogo entre personas y pueblos de diferentes orígenes; y a su vez, también es cierto que los sistemas de relaciones sociales se hacen más complejos ante la diversidad. Entre los resultados destacamos cómo las relaciones de amistad entre los jóvenes vienen condicionadas por su origen étnico cultural, configurando más un clima de coexistencia que de auténtica convivencia intercultural. Al mismo tiempo, comprobamos que para el desarrollo de la participación de este colectivo tanto en el barrio como en el centro educativo, toman una especial importancia las experiencias previas de la juventud en participación; y que la falta de ella, limita la necesaria proyección comunitaria del centro educativo.

Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences

We consider collective choice problems where a set of agents have to choose an alternative from a finite set and agents may or may not become users of the chosen alternative. An allocation is a pair given by the chosen alternative and the set of its users. Agents have gregarious preferences over allocations: given an allocation, they prefer that the set of users becomes larger. We require that the final allocation be efficient and stable (no agent can be forced to be a user and no agent who wants to be a user can be excluded). We propose a two-stage sequential mechanism whose unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is an efficient and stable allocation which also satisfies a maximal participation property.

Strike outcomes and wage settlements in Spain

This paper analyzes collective bargaining using Spanish firm level data. Centralto the analysis are the joint determination of wage and strike outcomes in adynamic framework and the possibility of segregate wage equation for strike andnon-strike outcomes. Conditional to strikes taking place, we confirm a negativerelationship between strike duration and wage changes in a dynamic context.Furthermore, we find selection in wage equations induced by the strike outcome.In this sense, the possibility of wage determination processes being differentin strike and non-strike samples is not rejected by the data. In particular,wage dynamics are of opposite sing in both strike and non-strike equations.Finally, we find evidence of a 0.33 percentage points wage change strike premium.

Countervailing power? Collusion in markets with decentralized trade

We consider the collective incentives of buyers and sellers to form cartels in markets where trade is realized through decentralized pairwise bargaining. Cartels are coalitions of buyers or sellers that limit market participation and compensate inactive members for abstaining from trade. In a stable market outcome, cartels set Nash equilibrium quantities and cartel memberships are immune to defections. We prove that the set of stable market outcomes is non-empty and we provide its full characterization. Stable market outcomes are of two types: (i) at least one cartel actively restrains trade and the levels of market participation are balanced, or (ii) only one cartel, eventually the cartel that forms on the long side of the market, is active and it reduces trade slightly below the opponent's.

Firm strategies in R&D: cooperation and participation in R&D programs

This paper presents empirical evidence on firms’ decisions to cooperate in R&D and the extent to which government sponsored R&D programs increase cooperation. Using a sample of firms from the Spanish innovation survey we jointly estimate the determinants of firm participation in R&D programs and of choice of cooperation partners. We find that (i) firms participating in national and European programs have different profiles, suggesting program complementarity; (ii) private-private and publicprivate cooperation are associated on average with firms with different characteristics, and (iii) national R&D programs seem to have a positive effect on all types of cooperation, but especially on public-private partnerships.

1st National Accessiblity Plan 2004-2012: achieving equal opportunities and full participation through design for all

According to official statistics, disabled people in Spain number 3.5 million and make up 8.8% of the Spanish population. This group of people are increasingly being recognised as members of society with equal rights, and many of their demands are gradually being transformed into solutions that benefit society as a whole. One example is improved accessibility. Accessible built environments are more human and inclusive places, as well as being easier to get around. Improved accessibility is now recognised as a requirement shared by all members of society, although it is achieved thanks to the demands of disabled people and their representatives. The 1st National Accessibility Plan is a strategic framework for action aimed at ensuring that new products, services and built environments are designed to be accessible for as many people as possible (Design for All) and that existing ones are gradually duly adapted.

Rosca participation in Benin: a commitment issue

In the light of first-hand data from a Beninese urban household survey in Cotonou, we investigate several motives aiming to explain participation in Rotating Savings and Credit Associations. We provide anecdotal pieces of evidence, descriptive statistics, FIML regressions and matching estimates which tend to indicate that most individuals use their participation in a rosca as a device to commit themselves to save money and to deal with self-control problems.

Leadership in collective action

We extend the model of collective action in which groups compete for a budged by endogenizing the group platform, namely the specific mixture of public/private good and the distribution of the private good to group members which can be uniform or performance-based. While the group-optimal platform contains a degree of publicness that increases in group size and divides the private benefits uniformly, a success-maximizing leader uses incentives and distorts the platform towards more private benefits - a distortion that increases with group size. In both settings we obtain the anti-Olson type result that win probability increases with group size.

The Electoral Determinants of Collective Remittances: The Mexican 3x1 Program for Migrants

The 3x1 Program for Migrants is a matching grant scheme that seeks to direct the money sent by migrant organizations abroad to the provision of public and social infrastructure, and to productive projects in migrants’ communities of origin. To do so, the municipal, state, and federal administrations match the amount sent by hometown associations by 3 to 1. This opens the door to the political manipulation of the program. We explore the impact of a particular facet of Mexican political life on the operation of the 3x1: its recent democratization and the increasing political competition at the municipal level. Relying on the literature on redistributive politics, we posit that an increasing number of effective parties in elections may have two different effects. On the one hand, the need to cater to more heterogeneous constituencies may increase the provision of public projects. On the other hand, since smaller coalitions are needed to win elections under tighter competition, fewer public and more private (clientelistic) projects could be awarded. Using a unique dataset on the 3x1 Program for Migrants for over 2,400 municipalities in the period 2002 through 2007, we find a lower provision of public goods in electorally competitive jurisdictions. Thus, we remain sceptical about the program success in promoting public goods in politically competitive locations with high migration levels.

A well-posedness theory in measures for some kinetic models of collective motion

We present existence, uniqueness and continuous dependence results for some kinetic equations motivated by models for the collective behavior of large groups of individuals. Models of this kind have been recently proposed to study the behavior of large groups of animals, such as flocks of birds, swarms, or schools of fish. Our aim is to give a well-posedness theory for general models which possibly include a variety of effects: an interaction through a potential, such as a short-range repulsion and long-range attraction; a velocity-averaging effect where individuals try to adapt their own velocity to that of other individuals in their surroundings; and self-propulsion effects, which take into account effects on one individual that are independent of the others. We develop our theory in a space of measures, using mass transportation distances. As consequences of our theory we show also the convergence of particle systems to their corresponding kinetic equations, and the local-in-time convergence to the hydrodynamic limit for one of the models.