Convertibility, currency controls and the cost of capital in Western Europe, 1950-1999

For most of the post-war period, Europe s capital markets remained largely closed to international capital flows. Thispaper explores the costs of this policy. Using an event-study methodology, I examine the extent to which restrictions ofcurrent and capital account convertibility affected stock returns. The delayed introduction of full currency convertibilityincreased the cost of capital. Also, a string of measures designed to reduce capital mobility before the ultimate collapseof the Bretton Woods System had considerable negative effects. These findings offer an explanation for the mountingevidence suggesting that capital account liberalization facilitates growth.

With a bang, not a whimper: Pricking Germany's "stock market bubble" in 1927 and the slide into depression

In May 1927, the German central bank intervenedindirectly to reduce lending to equity investors.The crash that followed ended the only stockmarket boom during Germany s relative stabilization 1924-28. This paper examines thefactors that lead to the intervention as well asits consequences. We argue that genuine concernabout the exuberant level of the stock market,in addition to worries about an inflow offoreign funds, tipped the scales in favour ofintervention. The evidence strongly suggeststhat the German central bank under HjalmarSchacht was wrong to be concerned aboutstockprices-there was no bubble. Also, theReichsbank was mistaken in its belief thata fall in the market would reduce theimportance of short-term foreign borrowing,and help to ease conditions in the money market.The misguided intervention had important realeffects. Investment suffered, helping to tipGermany into depression.

A century of global equity market correlations

In this paper, we use a unique long-run dataset of regulatory constraints on capital account openness to explain stock market correlations. Since stock returns themselves are highly volatile, any examination of what drives correlations needs to focus on long runs of data. This is particularly true since some of the short-term changes in co-movements appear to reverse themselves (Delroy Hunter 2005). We argue that changes in the co-movement of indices have not been random. Rather, they are mainly driven by greater freedom to move funds from one country to another. In related work, Geert Bekaert and Campbell Harvey (2000) show that equity correlations increase after liberalization of capital markets, using a number of case studies from emerging countries. We examine this pattern systematically for the last century, and find it to be most pronounced in the recent past. We compare the importance of capital account openness with one main alternative explanation, the growing synchronization of economic fundamentals. We conclude that greater openness has been the single most important cause of growing correlations during the last quarter of a century, though increasingly correlated economic fundamentals also matter. In the conclusion, we offer some thoughts on why the effects of greater openness appear to be so much stronger today than they were during the last era of globalization before 1914.

Debt sustainability in historical perspective: The role of fiscal repression

This article examines the debt history of two contenders for European hegemony: 16th-centurySpain and 18th-century Britain. We analyze their fiscal behavior using measures of overborrowingand fiscal policy functions. Our results suggest that stringency was not key for Britain ssuccess in avoiding default. Instead, fiscal repression allowed the United Kingdom to borrowat below-market rates, thereby outspending its continental rivals.

The sustainable debts of Philip II: A reconstruction of Castile's fiscal position, 1566-1596

The defaults of Philip II have attained mythical status as the origin of sovereigndebt crises. We reassess the fiscal position of Habsburg Castile, derivingcomprehensive estimates of revenue, debt, and expenditure from new archivaldata. The king s debts were sustainable. Primary surpluses were large and rising.Debt-to-revenue ratios remained broadly unchanged during Philip s reign.Castilian finances in the sixteenth century compare favorably with those of otherearly modern fiscal states at the height of their imperial ambitions, includingBritain. The defaults of Philip II therefore reflected short-term liquidity crises,and were not a sign of unsustainable debts.

Why England? Demand, growth and inequality during the Industrial Revolution

Why was England first? And why Europe? We present a probabilistic model that builds on big-push models by Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989), combined with hierarchical preferences. The interaction of exogenous demographic factors (in particular the English low-pressure variant of the European marriage pattern)and redistributive institutions such as the old Poor Law combined to make an Industrial Revolution more likely. Essentially, industrialization is the result of having a critical mass of consumers that is rich enough to afford (potentially) mass-produced goods. Our model is then calibrated to match the main characteristics of the English economy in 1750 and the observed transition until 1850.This allows us to address explicitly one of the key features of the British IndustrialRevolution unearthed by economic historians over the last three decades the slowness of productivity and output change. In our calibration, we find that the probability of Britain industrializing is 5 times larger than France s. Contrary to the recent argument by Pomeranz, China in the 18th century had essentially no chance to industrialize at all. This difference is decomposed into a demographic and a policy component, with the former being far more important than the latter.

The rise and decline of children's labour participation levels during the early stages of industrialisation. Catalonia (1850-1925)

This article aims to analyse the reasons for the intensive use of childlabour in the 19th century and its subsequent decline in the first thirdof the 20th century in the context of an economy with a highly flexiblelabour supply like that of Catalonia. During the second half of the 19thcentury,factors relating to family economies, such as numerous familiesand low wages for adults, along with the technologies of the time thatrequired manual labour resources, would appear to explain the intensiveuse of child labour to the detriment of schooling. The technologicalchanges that occurred during the first third of the 20th century, thedemographic transition and adult wage increase (for both men and women)explain the schooling of children up to the age of 15 and theconsequent practical abolition of child labour in that new era ofeconomic modernisation.

Interest rate restrictions in a natural experiment: loan allocation and the change in the usury laws in 1714

This article studies the effects of interest rate restrictions on loan allocation. The British governmenttightened the usury laws in 1714, reducing the maximum permissible interest rate from 6% to5%. A sample of individual loan transactions reveals that average loan size and minimum loan sizeincreased strongly, while access to credit worsened for those with little social capital. Collateralisedcredits, which had accounted for a declining share of total lending, returned to their former role ofprominence. Our results suggest that the usury laws distorted credit markets significantly; we findno evidence that they offered a form of Pareto-improving social insurance.

Poor, hungry and ignorant: Numeracy and the impact of high food prices in industrializing Britain, 1780-1850

This paper uses the ability to recall one s age correctly as an indicator of numeracy.We show that low levels of nutrition impaired numeracy in industrializing England, 1780-1850.Numeracy declined markedly among those born during the war years, especially where wheatwas dear. England s nascent welfare state mitigated the negative effect of high food prices oncognitive skills. Nutrition during early development mattered for labor market outcomes:individuals born in periods or countries with high age heaping were more likely to sort intooccupations with limited intellectual requirements.

Betting on Hitler: The value of political connections in Nazi Germany

This paper examines the value of connections between German industry andthe Nazi movement in early 1933. Drawing on previously unused contemporarysources about management and supervisory board composition and stock returns,we find that one out of seven firms, and a large proportion of the biggest companies,had substantive links with the National Socialist German Workers Party. Firmssupporting the Nazi movement experienced unusually high returns, outperformingunconnected ones by 5% to 8% between January and March 1933. These resultsare not driven by sectoral composition and are robust to alternative estimatorsand definitions of affiliation.

Serial defaults, serial profits: Returns to sovereign lending in Habsburg Spain, 1566-1600

Philip II of Spain accumulated debts equivalent to 60% of GDP. He also defaulted four times onhis short-term loans, thus becoming the first serial defaulter in history. Contrary to a commonview in the literature, we show that lending to the king was profitable even under worst-casescenario assumptions. Lenders maintained long-term relationships with the crown. Lossessustained during defaults were more than compensated by profits in normal times. Defaultswere not catastrophic events. In effect, short-term lending acted as an insurance mechanism,allowing the king to reduce his payments in harsh times in exchange for paying a premium intranquil periods. © 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Inflationary expectations during Germany's great slump

Was the German slump inevitable? This paper argues that -despite thespeed and depth of Germany's deflation in the early 1930s - fear ofinflation is evident in the bond, foreign exchange, and commodity marketsat certain critical junctures of the Great Depression. Therefore, policyoptions were more limited than many subsequent critics of Brüning'spolicies have been prepared to admit. Using a rational expectationsframework, we find strong evidence from the bondmarket to suggest fearof inflation. Futures prices also reveal that market participants werebetting on price increases. These findings are discussed in the contextof reparations and related to the need for a regime shift to overcomethe crisis.

Banking as an emerging technology: Hoare's Bank, 1702-1742

London s financial market underwent dramatic change after 1700. More limitedthan Paris or Amsterdam in the seventeenth century, London became the leadingfinancial centre in Europe in the eighteenth century. There is an extensive andgrowing literature on the causes of this change, but comparatively little on thechange itself. This article provides detailed information on the operation of theLondon financial market around 1700 by describing the operations of a nascentLondon bank.

Malthusian dynamism and the rise of Europe: Make war, not love

This paper argues that Malthusian regimes are capable of sustained changes in per capita incomes. Shifting mortality and fertility schedules can lead to different steady-state income levels, with long periods of growth during the transition. Europe checked the downward pressure on wages through late marriage, which reduced fertility, and a mortality regime that combined high death rates with high incomes. We argue that both emerged as a result of the Black Death.

Private borrowing during the financial revolution: Hoare’s Bank and its customers, 1702-1724

The financial revolution improved the British government s ability to borrow, andthus its ability to wage war. North andWeingast argued that it also permitted privateparties to borrow more cheaply and widely.We test these inferences with evidencefrom a London bank.We confirm that private bank credit was cheap in the earlyeighteenth century, but we argue that it was not available widely. Importantly, thegovernment reduced the usury rate in 1714, sharply reducing the circle of privateclients that could be served profitably.