La Crema: A case study of mutual fire insurance

We analyze a mutual fire insurance mechanism usedin Andorra, which is called La Crema in the locallanguage. This mechanism relies on households'announced property values to determine how much ahousehold is reimbursed in the case of a fire andhow payments are apportioned among other households.The only Pareto eficient allocation reachablethrough the mechanism requires that all householdshonestly report the true value of their property.However, such honest reporting is not an equilibriumexcept in the extreme case where the property valuesare identical for all households. Nevertheless, as the size of the society becomes large, thebenefits from deviating from truthful reportingvanish, and all of the non-degenerate equilibriaof the mechanism are nearly truthful andapproximately Pareto efficient.

Banking as an emerging technology: Hoare's Bank, 1702-1742

London s financial market underwent dramatic change after 1700. More limitedthan Paris or Amsterdam in the seventeenth century, London became the leadingfinancial centre in Europe in the eighteenth century. There is an extensive andgrowing literature on the causes of this change, but comparatively little on thechange itself. This article provides detailed information on the operation of theLondon financial market around 1700 by describing the operations of a nascentLondon bank.

Private borrowing during the financial revolution: Hoare’s Bank and its customers, 1702-1724

The financial revolution improved the British government s ability to borrow, andthus its ability to wage war. North andWeingast argued that it also permitted privateparties to borrow more cheaply and widely.We test these inferences with evidencefrom a London bank.We confirm that private bank credit was cheap in the earlyeighteenth century, but we argue that it was not available widely. Importantly, thegovernment reduced the usury rate in 1714, sharply reducing the circle of privateclients that could be served profitably.

Post crisis challenges to bank regulation

The current crisis has swept aside not only the whole of the US investment banking industry butalso the consensual perception of banking risks, contagion and their implication for bankingregulation. As everyone agrees now, risks where mispriced, they accumulated in neuralgic pointsof the financial system, and where amplified by procyclical regulation as well as by the instabilityand fragility of financial institutions.The use of ratings as carved in stone and lack of adequate procedure to swiftly deal withsystemic institutions bankruptcy (whether too-big-to-fail, too complex to fail or too-many to fail).The current paper will not deal with the description and analysis of the crisis, already covered inother contributions to this issue will address the critical choice regulatory authorities will face. Inthe future regulation has to change, but it is not clear that it will change in the right direction. Thismay occur if regulatory authorities, possibly influenced by public opinion and political pressure,adopt an incorrect view of financial crisis prevention and management. Indeed, there are twoapproaches to post-crisis regulation. One is the rare event approach, whereby financial crises willoccur infrequently, but are inescapable.

Bank liquidity, interbank markets and monetary policy

A major lesson of the recent financial crisis is that the interbank lending marketis crucial for banks facing large uncertainty regarding their liquidity needs. Thispaper studies the efficiency of the interbank lending market in allocating funds. Weconsider two different types of liquidity shocks leading to different implications foroptimal policy by the central bank. We show that, when confronted with a distributional liquidity-shock crisis that causes a large disparity in the liquidity held amongbanks, the central bank should lower the interbank rate. This view implies that thetraditional tenet prescribing the separation between prudential regulation and monetary policy should be abandoned. In addition, we show that, during an aggregateliquidity crisis, central banks should manage the aggregate volume of liquidity. Twodifferent instruments, interest rates and liquidity injection, are therefore required tocope with the two different types of liquidity shocks. Finally, we show that failureto cut interest rates during a crisis erodes financial stability by increasing the riskof bank runs.

Insurance with frequent trading: A dynamic analysis of efficient insurance markets

This paper extends existing insurance results on the type of insurance contracts needed for insurance market efficiency toa dynamic setting. It introduces continuosly open markets that allow for more efficient asset allocation. It alsoeliminates the role of preferences and endowments in the classification of risks, which is done primarily in terms of the actuarial properties of the underlying riskprocess. The paper further extends insurability to include correlated and catstrophic events. Under these very general conditions the paper defines a condition that determines whether a small number of standard insurance contracts (together with aggregate assets) suffice to complete markets or one needs to introduce such assets as mutual insurance.

Unemployment insurance with endogenous search intensity and precautionary saving

A welfare analysis of unemployment insurance (UI) is performed in a generalequilibrium job search model. Finitely-lived, risk-averse workers smooth consumption over time by accumulating assets, choose search effort whenunemployed, and suffer disutility from work. Firms hire workers, purchasecapital, and pay taxes to finance worker benefits; their equity is the assetaccumulated by workers. A matching function relates unemployment, hiringexpenditure, and search effort to the formation of jobs. The model is calibrated to US data; the parameters relating job search effort to the probability of job finding are chosen to match microeconomic studies ofunemployment spells. Under logarithmic utility, numerical simulation shows rather small welfaregains from UI. Even without UI, workers smooth consumption effectivelythrough asset accumulation. Greater risk aversion leads to substantiallylarger welfare gains from UI; however, even in this case much of its welfareimpact is due not to consumption smoothing effects, but rather to decreased work disutility, or to a variety of externalities.

Insurance and safety after September 11, 2001: Coming to grips with the costs and threats of terrorism

This chapter, originally written as a consequence of the terrorist attacksof September 11, 2001, provides an elementary, everyday introduction tothe concepts of risk and insurance. Conceptually, risk has two dimensions:a potential loss, and the chance of that loss being realized. People can,however, transfer risk to insurance companies against the payment ofso-called premiums. In practice, however, one needs accurate assessmentsof both losses and probabilities to judge whether premiums are appropriate.For many risks, this poses little problem (e.g., life insurance); however,it is difficult to assess risks of many other kinds of events such as actsof terrorism. It is emphasized, that through evolution and learning, peopleare able to handle many of the common risks that they face in life. Butwhen people lack experience (e.g., new technologies, threats of terrorism),risk can only be assessed through imagination. Not surprisingly, insurancecompanies demand high prices when risks are poorly understood. In particular,the cost of insurance against possible acts of terrorism soared afterSeptember 11. How should people approach risk after the events of that day?Clearly, the world needs to protect itself from the acts of terrorists andother disturbed individuals. However, it is also important to address the root causes of such antisocial movements. It is, therefore, suggested thatprograms addressed at combatting ignorance, prejudice, and socialinequalities may be more effective premiums for reducing the risk ofterrosrtism than has been recognized to date.

Insurance with frequent trading

This paper looks at the dynamic management of risk in an economy with discrete time consumption and endowments and continuous trading. I study how agents in such an economy deal with all the risk in the economy and attain their Pareto optimal allocations by trading in a few natural securities: private insurance contracts and a common set of derivatives on the aggregate endowment. The parsimonious nature ofthe implied securities needed for Pareto optimality suggests that insuch contexts complete markets is a very reasonable assumption.

A positive theory of geographic mobility and social insurance

This paper presents a tractable dynamic general equilibrium model thatcan explain cross-country empirical regularities in geographical mobility,unemployment and labor market institutions. Rational agents vote overunemployment insurance (UI), taking the dynamic distortionary effects ofinsurance on the performance of the labor market into consideration.Agents with higher cost of moving, i.e., more attached to their currentlocation, prefer more generous UI. The key assumption is that an agent'sattachment to a location increases the longer she has resided there. UIreduces the incentive for labor mobility and increases, therefore, thefraction of attached agents and the political support for UI. The mainresult is that this self-reinforcing mechanism can give rise to multiplesteady-states-one 'European' steady-state featuring high unemployment,low geographical mobility and high unemployment insurance, and one'American' steady-state featuring low unemployment, high mobility andlow unemployment insurance.

Is bank debt special for the transmission of monetary policy? Evidence from the stock market

We combine existing balance sheet and stock market data with two new datasets to studywhether, how much, and why bank lending to firms matters for the transmission of monetarypolicy. The first new dataset enables us to quantify the bank dependence of firms precisely,as the ratio of bank debt to total assets. We show that a two standard deviation increase inthe bank dependence of a firm makes its stock price about 25% more responsive to monetarypolicy shocks. We explore the channels through which this effect occurs, and find that thestock prices of bank-dependent firms that borrow from financially weaker banks display astronger sensitivity to monetary policy shocks. This finding is consistent with the banklending channel, a theory according to which the strength of bank balance sheets mattersfor monetary policy transmission. We construct a new database of hedging activities andshow that the stock prices of bank-dependent firms that hedge against interest rate riskdisplay a lower sensitivity to monetary policy shocks. This finding is consistent with aninterest rate pass-through channel that operates via the direct transmission of policy ratesto lending rates associated with the widespread use of floating-rates in bank loans and creditline agreements.

Conocer los tsunamis: un seguro de vida = Knowing the tsunamis: an insurance of life

This monographic explain what it happened last December on Indonesia, the origin of the tsunamis, the effects on the coast, tsunami warning system, etc. To finish we want to emphasize the importance that has the knowledge of this phenomenon and the knowledge of the tsunami and earthquake safety rules. This article presents how explain risks in the classroom with examples about myths, legends, survivors’ chronicles, literature etc

The Unemployment Benefit System: a Redistributive or an Insurance Institution?

[eng] In this paper we analyze how the composition of labor taxation affects unemployment in a unionized economy with capital accumulation and an unemployment benefit system. We show that if the unemployment benefit system is gross Bismarckian then the unemployment rate is reduced if wage taxes are decreased (and thus payroll taxes are increased). However, if the unemployment benefit system is net Bismarckian then the unemployment rate does not depend on how the system is financed. Besides, in a Beveridgean system the labor tax composition does not affect the unemployment rate if and only if the unemployed do not pay taxes and the employed pay a constant marginal tax rate. We also analyze when an unemployment benefit budget-balanced rule makes the economy to have a hysteresis process.

Discrete analysis of dividend payments in a non-life insurance portfolio

The process of free reserves in a non-life insurance portfolio as defined in the classical model of risk theory is modified by the introduction of dividend policies that set maximum levels for the accumulation of reserves. The first part of the work formulates the quantification of the dividend payments via the expectation of their current value under diferent hypotheses. The second part presents a solution based on a system of linear equations for discrete dividend payments in the case of a constant dividend barrier, illustrated by solving a specific case.

The aggregate claims distribution of a life insurance portfolio with a pairwise positive dependence structure

The individual life model has always been considered as the one closest to the real situation of the total claims of a life insurance portfolio. It only makes the ¿nearly inevitable assumption¿ of independence of the lifelenghts of insured persons in the portfolio. Many clinical studies, however, have demonstrated positive dependence of paired lives such as husband and wife. In our opinion, it won¿t be unrealistic expecting a considerable number of married couples in any life insurance portfolio (e.g. life insurance contracts formalized at the time of signing a mortatge) and these dependences materially increase the values for the stop-loss premiums associated to the aggregate claims of the portfolio. Since the stop-loss order is the order followed by any risk averse decison maker, the simplifying hypothesis of independence constitute a real financial danger for the company, in the sense that most of their decisions are based on the aggregated claims distribution. In this paper, we will determine approximations for the distribution of the aggregate claims of a life insurance portfolio with some married couples and we will describe how to make safe decisions when we don¿t know exactly the dependence structure between the risks in each couple. Results in this paper are partly based on results in Dhaene and Goovaerts (1997)