Basis set effects on the energy and hardness profiles of the hydrogen fluoride dimer

In earlier work, the present authors have shown that hardness profiles are less dependent on the level of calculation than energy profiles for potential energy surfaces (PESs) having pathological behaviors. At variance with energy profiles, hardness profiles always show the correct number of stationary points. This characteristic has been used to indicate the existence of spurious stationary points on the PESs. In the present work, we apply this methodology to the hydrogen fluoride dimer, a classical difficult case for the density functional theory methods

Les set vides del paper: formats de presentació i models de distribució en línia dels treballs publicats en revistes científiques digitals

Study of the publication models and the means of accessing scientific literature in the current environment of digital communication and the web. The text introduces the concept of journal article as a well-defined and stable unit within the publishing world, and as a nucleus on which professional and scholarly communication has been based since its beginnings in the 17th century. The transformation of scientific communication that the digital world has enabled is analysed. Descriptions are provided of some of the practices undertaken by authors, research organisations, publishers and library-related institutions as a response to the new possibilities being unveiled for articles, both as products as well as for their creation and distribution processes. These transformations affect the very nature of articles as a minimal unit -both unique and stable- of scientific communication. The article concludes by noting that under varying documentary forms of publisher aggregation and bibliographic control -sometimes simultaneously and, even, apparently contradictory- there flourishes a more pluralistic type of scientific communication. This pluralism offers: more possibilities for communication among authors; fewer levels of intermediaries such as agents that intervene and provide added value to the products; greater availability for users both economically speaking and from the point of view of access; and greater interaction and wealth of contents, thanks to the new hypertext and multimedia possibilities.

Coalitionally monotonic set-solutions for cooperative TU games

A static comparative study on set-solutions for cooperative TU games is carried out. The analysis focuses on studying the compatibility between two classical and reasonable properties introduced by Young (1985) in the context of single valued solutions, namely core-selection and coalitional monotonicity. As the main result, it is showed that coalitional monotonicity is not only incompatible with the core-selection property but also with the bargaining-selection property. This new impossibility result reinforces the tradeoff between these kinds of interesting and intuitive economic properties. Positive results about compatibility between desirable economic properties are given replacing the core selection requirement by the core-extension property.

The set of undominated imputations and the core: an axiomatic approach

This paper provides an axiomatic framework to compare the D-core (the set of undominatedimputations) and the core of a cooperative game with transferable utility. Theorem1 states that the D-core is the only solution satisfying projection consistency, reasonableness (from above), (*)-antimonotonicity, and modularity. Theorem 2 characterizes the core replacing (*)-antimonotonicity by antimonotonicity. Moreover, these axioms alsocharacterize the core on the domain of convex games, totally balanced games, balancedgames, and superadditive games

Loop bifurcation and magnetization rotation in exchange-biased Ni/FeF2

Exchange-biased Ni/FeF2 films have been investigated using vector coil vibrating-sample magnetometry as a function of the cooling field strength HFC . In films with epitaxial FeF2 , a loop bifurcation develops with increasing HFC as it divides into two sub-loops shifted oppositely from zero field by the same amount. The positively biased sub-loop grows in size with HFC until only a single positively shifted loop is found. Throughout this process, the negative and positive (sub)loop shifts maintain the same discrete value. This is in sharp contrast to films with twinned FeF2 where the exchange field gradually changes with increasing HFC . The transverse magnetization shows clear correlations with the longitudinal subloops. Interestingly, over 85% of the Ni reverses its magnetization by rotation, either in one step or through two successive rotations. These results are due to the single-crystal nature of the antiferromagnetic FeF2 , which breaks down into two opposite regions of large domains.

The set of undominated imputations and the core: an axiomatic approach

This paper provides an axiomatic framework to compare the D-core (the set of undominatedimputations) and the core of a cooperative game with transferable utility. Theorem1 states that the D-core is the only solution satisfying projection consistency, reasonableness (from above), (*)-antimonotonicity, and modularity. Theorem 2 characterizes the core replacing (*)-antimonotonicity by antimonotonicity. Moreover, these axioms alsocharacterize the core on the domain of convex games, totally balanced games, balancedgames, and superadditive games

Coalitionally monotonic set-solutions for cooperative TU games

A static comparative study on set-solutions for cooperative TU games is carried out. The analysis focuses on studying the compatibility between two classical and reasonable properties introduced by Young (1985) in the context of single valued solutions, namely core-selection and coalitional monotonicity. As the main result, it is showed that coalitional monotonicity is not only incompatible with the core-selection property but also with the bargaining-selection property. This new impossibility result reinforces the tradeoff between these kinds of interesting and intuitive economic properties. Positive results about compatibility between desirable economic properties are given replacing the core selection requirement by the core-extension property.

Els set sabers traslladats al cinema formatiu. "La Ruta Natural"

Podeu consultar el document complet de la "XVI Setmana de Cinema Formatiu" a: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/22523

Els set sabers traslladats al cinema formatiu. "Explorando la máquina de los sueños". El cine y la infancia en contextos de educación no formal

Podeu consultar el document complet de la "XVI Setmana de Cinema Formatiu" a: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/22523

Edgar Morin: Autor dels set sabers i savi educador dels nostres dies

Podeu consultar el document senser de la "XVI Setmana de Cinema Formatiu" a: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/22523

Set obres sobre retòrica i persuasió

El comentari crític de set obres sobre retòrica i persuasió, publicades recentment, ofereix una visió de diverses perspectives teòriques i també de les aplicacions a situacions comunicatives específiques. Les obres són El arte de hablar , de José Antonio Hernández Guerrero i María del Carmen García Tejera; Retórica , de Giambattista Vico, editada per primera vegada en castellà; 40 jocs per parlar català , de Jacqueline Jacquet, Sílvia Casulleras, Núria Mirabet; Acròbates de l'emoció , d'Amadeu Viana; Tres finestres obertes al món de la comunicació , de Ricard Morant i Miquel Peñarroya; El lenguaje de la negociación , de Joan Mulholland; i Tècniques de negociació i resolució de conflictes , de Carles Mendieta i Suñé.

On the coincidence of the Mas-Colell bargaining set and the core

In this paper we prove that the Mas-Colell bargaining set coincides with the core for three-player balanced and superadditive cooperative games. This is no longer true without the superadditivity condition or for games with more than three-players. Furthermore, under the same assumptions, the coincidence between the Mas-Collel and the individual rational bargaining set (Vohra (1991)) is revealed. Keywords: Cooperative game, Mas-Colell bargaining set, balancedness, individual rational bargaining set. JEL classi fication: C71, D63, D71.