La scena nel testo: Enrico IV di Luigi Pirandello

The starting point is the understanding of the dramatic text as literary text, thus it could be analyzed with methodologies coming from literary studies: the dramatic text is literature, creation of language and it can be read and interpreted as such. Of course I acknowledge the text’s performativity, implicit in its characteristic and functions. The analysis of Enrico IV (1921) constitutes a practical application of the proposal and the opportunity for opening the discussion to new perspectives.

Computing congruences of modular forms and Galois representations modulo prime powers

This article starts a computational study of congruences of modular forms and modular Galoisrepresentations modulo prime powers. Algorithms are described that compute the maximum integermodulo which two monic coprime integral polynomials have a root in common in a sensethat is defined. These techniques are applied to the study of congruences of modular forms andmodular Galois representations modulo prime powers. Finally, some computational results withimplications on the (non-)liftability of modular forms modulo prime powers and possible generalisationsof level raising are presented.

Disseny, les investigacions sobre la comunicació i la proposada teoria dels signes

L'àmbit de formació universitària és idoni per recuperar de forma més modesta i autocrítica les tesis de la semiòtica i les teories de la comunicació en la seva relació amb els processos del disseny.

Time consistent Pareto solutions in common access resource gameswith asymmetric players

In the analysis of equilibrium policies in a di erential game, if agents have different time preference rates, the cooperative (Pareto optimum) solution obtained by applying the Pontryagin's Maximum Principle becomes time inconsistent. In this work we derive a set of dynamic programming equations (in discrete and continuous time) whose solutions are time consistent equilibrium rules for N-player cooperative di erential games in which agents di er in their instantaneous utility functions and also in their discount rates of time preference. The results are applied to the study of a cake-eating problem describing the management of a common property exhaustible natural resource. The extension of the results to a simple common property renewable natural resource model in in nite horizon is also discussed.

Time consistent Pareto solutions in common access resource gameswith asymmetric players

In the analysis of equilibrium policies in a di erential game, if agents have different time preference rates, the cooperative (Pareto optimum) solution obtained by applying the Pontryagin's Maximum Principle becomes time inconsistent. In this work we derive a set of dynamic programming equations (in discrete and continuous time) whose solutions are time consistent equilibrium rules for N-player cooperative di erential games in which agents di er in their instantaneous utility functions and also in their discount rates of time preference. The results are applied to the study of a cake-eating problem describing the management of a common property exhaustible natural resource. The extension of the results to a simple common property renewable natural resource model in in nite horizon is also discussed.