Spectral efficiency in reference-signal-assisted low-power wireless communication

Expressions relating spectral efficiency, power and Doppler spectrum are derived for low-power Rayleighfaded wireless channels with proper complex signaling. Noside information on the state of the channel is assumed at the receiver. Rather, periodic reference signals are postulated inaccordance with the functioning of most wireless systems. In contrast with most previous studies, which relied on block-fading channel models, a continuous-fading model is adopted. This embeds the Doppler spectrum directly in thederived expressions thereby imbuing them with practical significance.

Optimum pilot overhead in wireless communication: a unified treatment of continuous and block-fading channels

The optimization of the pilot overhead in wireless fading channels is investigated, and the dependence of this overhead on various system parameters of interest (e.g., fading rate, signal-to-noise ratio) is quantified. The achievable pilot-based spectral efficiency is expanded with respect to the fading rate about the no-fading point, which leads to an accurate order expansion for the pilot overhead. This expansion identifies that the pilot overhead, as well as the spectral efficiency penalty with respect to a reference system with genie-aided CSI (channel state information) at the receiver, depend on the square root of the normalized Doppler frequency. It is also shown that the widely-usedblock fading model is a special case of more accurate continuous fading models in terms of the achievable pilot-based spectral efficiency. Furthermore, it is established that the overhead optimization for multiantenna systems is effectively the same as for single-antenna systems with thenormalized Doppler frequency multiplied by the number of transmit antennas.

Strategic Delegations in Monetary Unions

In monetary unions, monetary policy is typically made by delegates of the member countries. This procedure raises the possibility of strategic delegation - that countries may choose the types of delegates to influence outcomes in their favor. We show that without commitment in monetary policy, strategic delegation arises if and only if three conditions are met: shocks affecting individual countries are not perfectly correlated, risk-sharing across countries is imperfect, and the Phillips Curve is nonlinear. Moreover, inflation rates are inefficiently high. We argue that ways of solving the commitment problem, including the emphasis on price stability in the agreements constituting the European Union are especially valuable when strategic delegation is a problem.

Communication, Coordination, and Efficiency in Evolutionary One-population Models

We analyze the role of commitment in pre-play communication for ensuring efficient evolutionarily stable outcomes in coordination games. All players are a priori identical as they are drawn from the same population. In games where efficient outcomes can be reached by players coordinating on the same action we find commitment to be necessary to enforce efficiency. In games where efficienct outcomes only result from play of different actions, communication without commitment is most effective although efficiency can no longer be guaranteed. Only when there are many messages then inefficient outcomes are negligible as their basins of attraction become very small.

Cooperative games in strategic form

In this paper we view bargaining and cooperation as an interaction superimposed on a strategic form game. A multistage bargaining procedure for N players, the proposer commitment procedure, is presented. It is inspired by Nash s two-player variable-threat model; a key feature is the commitment to threats. We establish links to classical cooperative game theory solutions, such as the Shapley value in the transferable utility case. However, we show that even in standard pure exchange economies the traditional coalitional function may not be adequate when utilities are not transferable.

A foundation for strategic agenda voting

We offer complete characterizations of the equilibrium outcomesof two prominent agenda voting institutions that are widely used in the democraticworld: the amendment, also known as the Anglo-American procedure,and the successive, or equivalently the Euro-Latin procedure. Our axiomaticapproach provides a proper understanding of these voting institutions, and allowscomparisons between them, and with other voting procedures.

On payoff heterogeneity in games with strategic complementarities

Payoff heterogeneity weakens positive feedback in binary choice models intwo ways. First, heterogeneity drives individuals to corners where theyare unaffected by strategic complementarities. Second, aggregate behaviouris smoother than individual behaviour when individuals are heterogeneous.However, this smoothing does not necessarily eliminate positive feedbackor guarantee a unique equilibrium. In games with an unbounded, continuouschoice space, heterogeneity may either weaken or strengthen positive feedback,depending on a simple convexity/concavity condition. We conclude that positivefeedback phenomena derived in representative agent models will often be robustto heterogeneity.

Measuring strategic uncertainty in coordination games

This paper explores three aspects of strategic uncertainty: its relation to risk, predictability of behavior and subjective beliefs of players. In a laboratory experiment we measure subjects certainty equivalents for three coordination games and one lottery. Behavior in coordination games is related to risk aversion, experience seeking, and age.From the distribution of certainty equivalents we estimate probabilities for successful coordination in a wide range of games. For many games, success of coordination is predictable with a reasonable error rate. The best response to observed behavior is close to the global-game solution. Comparing choices in coordination games with revealed risk aversion, we estimate subjective probabilities for successful coordination. In games with a low coordination requirement, most subjects underestimate the probability of success. In games with a high coordination requirement, most subjects overestimate this probability. Estimating probabilistic decision models, we show that the quality of predictions can be improved when individual characteristics are taken into account. Subjects behavior is consistent with probabilistic beliefs about the aggregate outcome, but inconsistent with probabilistic beliefs about individual behavior.

Pre-play communication and credibility: A test of Aumann's conjecture

The effectiveness of pre-play communication in achieving efficientoutcomes has long been a subject of controversy. In some environments,cheap talk may help to achieve coordination. However, Aumannconjectures that, in a variant of the Stag Hunt game, a signal forefficient play is not self-enforcing and concludes that an "agreementto play [the efficient outcome] conveys no information about what theplayers will do." Harsanyi and Selten (1988) cite this example as anillustration of risk-dominance vs. payoff-dominance. Farrell and Rabin(1996) agree with the logic, but suspect that cheap talk willnonetheless achieve efficiency. The conjecture is tested with one-waycommunication. When the sender first chooses a signal and then anaction, there is impressive coordination: a 94% probability for thepotentially efficient (but risky) play, given a signal for efficientplay. Without communication, efforts to achieve efficiency wereunsuccessful, as the proportion of B moves is only 35%. I also test ahypothesis that the order of the action and the signal affects theresults, finding that the decision order is indeed important. WhileAumann s conjecture is behaviorally disconfirmed when the signal isdetermined initially, the signal s credibility seems to be much moresuspect when the sender is known to have first chosen an action, andthe results are not statistically distinguishable from those whenthere is no signal. Some applications and issues in communication andcoordination are discussed.

Strategic behavior and price discovery

The paper analyzes the effects of strategic behavior by an insider in a price discovery process, akin to an information tatonnement, in the presence of a competitive informed sector. Such processes are used in the preopening period of continuous trading systems in several exchanges. It is found that the insider manipulates the market using a contrarian strategy in order to neutralize the effect of the trades of competitive informed agents. Furthermore, consistently with the empirical evidence available, we find that information revelation accelerates close to the opening, that the market price does not converge to the fundamental value no matter how many rounds the tatonnement has, and that the expected trading volume displays a U-shaped pattern. We also find that a market with a larger competitive sector (smaller insider) has an improved informational efficiency and an increased trading volume. The insider provides a public good (a lower informativeness of the price) for the competitive informed sector.

Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty

This paper introduces a new solution concept, a minimax regret equilibrium, which allows for the possibility that players are uncertain about the rationality and conjectures of their opponents. We provide several applications of our concept. In particular, we consider pricesetting environments and show that optimal pricing policy follows a non-degenerate distribution. The induced price dispersion is consistent with experimental and empirical observations (Baye and Morgan (2004)).

Strategic delegation in monetary unions

In monetary unions, monetary policy is typically made by delegates of the member countries. This procedure raises the possibility of strategic delegation - that countries may choose the types of delegates to influence outcomes in their favor. We show that without commitment in monetary policy, strategic delegation arises if and only if three conditions are met: shocks affecting individual countries are not perfectly correlated, risk-sharing across countries is imperfect, and the Phillips Curve is nonlinear. Moreover, inflation rates are inefficiently high. We argue that ways of solving the commitment problem, including the emphasis on price stability in the agreements constituting the European Union are especially valuable when strategic delegation is a problem.

Communication, coordination and efficiency in evolutionary one-population models

We analyze the role of commitment in pre-play communication for ensuringefficient evolutionarily stable outcomes in coordination games. All players are a priori identical as they are drawn from the same population. In games where efficient outcomes can be reached by players coordinating on the same action we find commitment to be necessary to enforce efficiency. In games where efficienct outcomes only result from play of different actions, communication without commitment is most effective although efficiency can no longer be guaranteed. Only when there are many messages then inefficient outcomes are negligible as their basins of attraction become very small.