The European Social Survey. Methodological aspects

From a scientific point of view, surveys are undoubtedly a valuable tool for the knowledge of the social and political reality. They are widely used in the social sciences research. However, the researcher's task is often disturbed by a series of deficiencies related to some technical aspects that make difficult both the inference and the comparison. The main aim of the present paper is to report and justify the European Social Survey's technical specifications addressed to avoid and/or minimize such deficiencies. The article also gives a characterization of the non-respondents in Spain obtained from the analysis of the 2002 fieldwork data file.

Social security, retirement, and the single-mindedness of the electorate

We propose a positive theory that is consistent with two important featuresof social security programs around the world: (1) they redistributeincome from young to old and (2) they induce retirement. We construct avoting model that includes a political campaign or debate prior to theelection. The model incorporates single-mindedness of the groups that donot work: while the workers divide their political capital between their age concerns and occupational concerns , the retired concentrate alltheir political capital to support their age group. In our model, theelderly end up getting transfers from the government (paid by the young)and distortionary labor income taxes induce the retirement of the elderly.In addition, our model predicts that occupational groups that work morewill tend to have more political power. The opposite is true fornon-occupational groups (such as the elderly). We provide some evidencethat supports these additional predictions.

Social security in theory and practice (II): Efficiency theories, narrative theories and implications for reform

166 countries have some kind of public old age pension. What economic forcescreate and sustain old age Social Security as a public program? Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999b) document several of the internationally and historically common features of social security programs, and explore "political" theories of Social Security. This paper discusses the "efficiency theories", which view creation of the SS program as a full of partial solution to some market failure. Efficiency explanations of social security include the "SS as welfare for the elderly" the "retirement increases productivity to optimally manage human capital externalities", "optimal retirement insurance", the "prodigal father problem", the "misguided Keynesian", the "optimal longevity insurance", the "governmenteconomizing transaction costs", and the "return on human capital investment". We also analyze four "narrative" theories of social security: the "chain letter theory", the "lump of labor theory", the "monopoly capitalism theory", and the "Sub-but-Nearly-Optimal policy response to private pensions theory".The political and efficiency explanations are compared with the international and historical facts and used to derive implications for replacing the typical pay-as-you-go system with a forced savings plan. Most of the explanations suggest that forced savings does not increase welfare, and may decrease it.

Social security and democracy

Many political economic theories use and emphasize the process of votingin their explanation of the growth of Social Security, governmentspending, and other public policies. But is there an empirical connectionbetween democracy and Social Security program size or design? Using somenew international data sets to produce both country-panel econometricestimates as well as case studies of South American and southern Europeancountries, we find that Social Security policy varies according toeconomic and demographic factors, but that very different politicalhistories can result in the same Social Security policy. We find littlepartial effect of democracy on the size of Social Security budgets, onhow those budgets are allocated, or how economic and demographic factorsaffect Social Security. If there is any observed difference, democraciesspend a little less of their GDP on Social Security, grow their budgetsa bit more slowly, and cap their payroll tax more often, than doeconomically and demographically similar nondemocracies. Democracies andnondemocracies are equally likely to have benefit formulas inducingretirement and, conditional on GDP per capita, equally likely to induceretirement with a retirement test vs. an earnings test.

What social security: Beveridgean or Bismarckian?

Why are Bismarckian social security systems associated with largerpublic pension expenditures, a smaller fraction of private pension andlower income in-equality than Beveridgean systems? These facts arepuzzling for political economy theories of social security whichpredict that Beveridgean systems, involving intra-generationalredistribution, should enjoy larger support among low-income people andthus be larger. This paper explains these features in a bidimensionalpolitical economy model. In an economy with three income groups,low-income support a large, redistributive system; middle-income favoran earning-related system, while high-income oppose any public system,since they have access to a superior saving technology, a privatesystem. We show that, if income inequality is large, the voting majorityof high-income and low-income supports a (small) Beveridgean system,and a large private pillar arises; the opposite occurs with lowinequality. Additionally, when the capital market provides higherreturns, a Beveridgean system is more likely to emerge.

Protestants and Catholics: Similar work ethic, different social ethic

This article develops two hypotheses about economically-relevant values of Christianbelievers, according to which Protestants should work more and more effectively, as in the work ethic argument of Max Weber, or display a stronger social ethic that would lead themto monitor each other s conduct, support political and legal institutions and hold morehomogeneous values. Tests using current survey data confirm substantial partial correlations andpossible different effects in mutual social control, institutional performance and homogeneityof values but no difference in work ethics. Protestantism therefore seems conducive to capitalisteconomic development, not by the direct psychological route of the Weberian work ethic butrather by promoting an alternative social ethic that facilitates impersonal trade.

Gerontocracy, retirement, and social security

Why are the old politically successful? We build a simple interest group model in which political pressure is time-intensive, showing that in the political competitive equilibrium each group lobbies for government policies that lower their own value of time but the old do so to a greater extent and as a result are net gainers from the political process. What distinguishes the elderly from other political groups (and what makes them more succesful) is that they have lower labor productivity and/or that we are all likely to become elderly at some point, while we are relatively unlikely to change gender, race, sexual orientation, or even ocupation, The model has a variety of implications for the design of social security programs, which we test using data from the Social Security Administration. For example, the model predicts that social security programs with retirement incentives are larger and that the old are more "single-minded" in their politics, implications which we verify using cross-country government finance data and cross-country political participation surveys. Finally, we show that the forced savings programs intended to "reform" the social security system may increase the amount of intergenerational redistribution. As a model for evaluating policy reforms, ours has the attractive feature that reforms must be time time consistent from a political point of view rather than a public interest point of view.

A positive theory of geographic mobility and social insurance

This paper presents a tractable dynamic general equilibrium model thatcan explain cross-country empirical regularities in geographical mobility,unemployment and labor market institutions. Rational agents vote overunemployment insurance (UI), taking the dynamic distortionary effects ofinsurance on the performance of the labor market into consideration.Agents with higher cost of moving, i.e., more attached to their currentlocation, prefer more generous UI. The key assumption is that an agent'sattachment to a location increases the longer she has resided there. UIreduces the incentive for labor mobility and increases, therefore, thefraction of attached agents and the political support for UI. The mainresult is that this self-reinforcing mechanism can give rise to multiplesteady-states-one 'European' steady-state featuring high unemployment,low geographical mobility and high unemployment insurance, and one'American' steady-state featuring low unemployment, high mobility andlow unemployment insurance.

La teoría de los clivajes y el conflicto social moderno

This article was delivered as an area-paper to the Critical Political Science Meeting of Bilbao, November the 15th 2008, which was organized by the Political Science Department of the UPV (University of the Basque Country). The paper introduces an updated and synthetic version of the model designed by S.M. Lipset and S. Rokkan in 1967 in order to identify the confrontational divides distinctive of European modernization and, in this way, trace the origins of modern party systems. The expanded model proposed is applied, on the one hand, to a variety of empirical cases, prominently the postransitional Spanish case; and on the other, shows its usefulness in order to better understand the distinctive structure of the social conflict of the globalization era.

Cuatro casos, cuatro historias de uso educativo de las TIC

[spa] Este informe presenta parte de los procesos y los resultados del proyecto de I+D+I: Políticas y prácticas en torno a las TIC en la enseñanza obligatoria: Implicaciones para la innovación y la mejora, parcialmente financiado por Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación. SEJ2007-67562. Recoge los cuatro estudios de caso llevados a cabo en dos Institutos de Enseñanza Secundaria Obligatoria y dos centros de educación primaria de Cataluña, que nos han posibilitado elucidar el impacto de las políticas de uso de las TIC y de otras iniciativas políticas para favorecer la innovación y la mejora en cada centro, prestando especial atención a: (a) los temas organizativos relacionados con el tiempo y el espacio; (b) el desarrollo del currículum en el centro (visiones sobre el conocimiento, el aprendizaje, el papel del alumnado y el profesorado, el lugar de las TIC, etc.); (c) las condiciones de trabajo del profesorado (acceso a formación, espacios y prácticas de colaboración; desarrollo profesional); (d) los resultados del aprendizaje (valor intelectual, social y personal de lo aprendido; capacidad de transferencia para seguir aprendiendo

Cuatro casos, cuatro historias de uso educativo de las TIC

[spa] Este informe presenta parte de los procesos y los resultados del proyecto de I+D+I: Políticas y prácticas en torno a las TIC en la enseñanza obligatoria: Implicaciones para la innovación y la mejora, parcialmente financiado por Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación. SEJ2007-67562. Recoge los cuatro estudios de caso llevados a cabo en dos Institutos de Enseñanza Secundaria Obligatoria y dos centros de educación primaria de Cataluña, que nos han posibilitado elucidar el impacto de las políticas de uso de las TIC y de otras iniciativas políticas para favorecer la innovación y la mejora en cada centro, prestando especial atención a: (a) los temas organizativos relacionados con el tiempo y el espacio; (b) el desarrollo del currículum en el centro (visiones sobre el conocimiento, el aprendizaje, el papel del alumnado y el profesorado, el lugar de las TIC, etc.); (c) las condiciones de trabajo del profesorado (acceso a formación, espacios y prácticas de colaboración; desarrollo profesional); (d) los resultados del aprendizaje (valor intelectual, social y personal de lo aprendido; capacidad de transferencia para seguir aprendiendo

Embodying feminist research: learning from action research, political practices, diffractions and collective knowledge.

In the past three decades, feminists and critical theorists have discussed and argued the importance of deconstructing and problematizing social science research methodology in order to question normalized hierarchies concerning the production of knowledge and the status of truth claims. Nevertheless, often, these ideas have basically remained theoretical propositions not embodied in research practices. In fact there is very little published discussion about the difficulties and limits of their practical application. In this paper we introduce some interconnected reflections starting from two different but related experiences of embodying 'feminist activist research'. Our aim is to emphasise the importance of attending to process, making mistakes and learning during fieldwork, as well as experimenting with personalized forms of analysis, such as the construction of narratives and the story-telling process.

Embodying feminist research: learning from action research, political practices, diffractions and collective knowledge.

In the past three decades, feminists and critical theorists have discussed and argued the importance of deconstructing and problematizing social science research methodology in order to question normalized hierarchies concerning the production of knowledge and the status of truth claims. Nevertheless, often, these ideas have basically remained theoretical propositions not embodied in research practices. In fact there is very little published discussion about the difficulties and limits of their practical application. In this paper we introduce some interconnected reflections starting from two different but related experiences of embodying 'feminist activist research'. Our aim is to emphasise the importance of attending to process, making mistakes and learning during fieldwork, as well as experimenting with personalized forms of analysis, such as the construction of narratives and the story-telling process.

Uncertainty, electoral incentives and political myopia

We study the determinants of political myopia in a rational model of electoral accountability where the key elements are informational frictions and uncertainty. We build aframework where political ability is ex-ante unknown and policy choices are not perfectlyobservable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politicians invest too little in costly policies withfuture returns in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reelection probability.Contrary to the conventional wisdom, uncertainty reduces political myopia and may, undersome conditions, increase social welfare. We use the model to study how political rewardscan be set so as to maximise social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limitto governments. The predictions of our theory are consistent with a number of stylised factsand with a new empirical observation documented in this paper: aggregate uncertainty, measured by economic volatility, is associated to better fiscal discipline in a panel of 20 OECDcountries.