Cronyism in Business, Public Sector and Politics

This paper contrasts the incentives for cronyism in business, the public sector and politics within an agency problem model with moral hazard. The analysis is focused on the institutional differences between private, public and political organizations. In business, when facing a residual claimant contract, a chief manager ends up with a relatively moderate …rst-best level of cronyism within a …firm. The institutional framework of the public sector does not allow explicit contracting, which leads to a more severe cronyism problem within public organizations. Finally, it is shown that the nature of political appointments (such that the subordinate's reappointment is conditioned on the chief's re-election) together with implicit contracting makes political cronyism the most extreme case. JEL classifi…cation: D72, D73, D86. Keywords: Cronyism; Meritocracy; Manager; Bureaucrat; Politician.

How much risk is mitigated by LTC Insurance? A case study of the public system in Spain

We present a methodology that allows to calculate the impact of a given Long-Term Care (LTC) insurance protection system on the risk of incurring extremely large individual lifetime costs. Our proposed methodology is illustrated with a case study. According to our risk measure, the current Spanish public LTC system mitigates individual risk by more than 30% compared to the situation where no public protection were available. We show that our method can be used to compare risk reduction of alternative LTC insurance plans.

The link between public support and private R&D effort: What is the optimal subsidy?

The effectiveness of R&D subsidies can vary substantially depending on their characteristics. Specifically, the amount and intensity of such subsidies are crucial issues in the design of public schemes supporting private R&D. Public agencies determine the intensities of R&D subsidies for firms in line with their eligibility criteria, although assessing the effects of R&D projects accurately is far from straightforward. The main aim of this paper is to examine whether there is an optimal intensity for R&D subsidies through an analysis of their impact on private R&D effort. We examine the decisions of a public agency to grant subsidies taking into account not only the characteristics of the firms but also, as few previous studies have done to date, those of the R&D projects. In determining the optimal subsidy we use both parametric and nonparametric techniques. The results show a non-linear relationship between the percentage of subsidy received and the firms’ R&D effort. These results have implications for technology policy, particularly for the design of R&D subsidies that ensure enhanced effectiveness.

A never-ending debate: Demand versus supply water policies. A CGE analysis for Catalonia

Water scarcity is a long-standing problem in Catalonia, as there are significant differences in the spatial and temporal distribution of water through the territory. There has consequently been a debate for many years about whether the solution to water scarcity must be considered in terms of efficiency or equity, the role that the public sector must play and the role that market-based instruments should play in water management. The aim of this paper is to use a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model to analyze the advantages and disadvantages associated with different policy instruments, from both a supply and a demand viewpoint, which can be applied to water management in Catalonia. We also introduce an ecological sector in our CGE model, allowing us to analyze the environmental impact of the alternative policies simulated. The calibration of the exogenous variables of the CGE model is performed by using a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for the Catalan economy with 2001 data. The results suggest that taking into account the principle of sustainability of the resource, the policy debate between supply and demand in water policies is obsolete, and a new combination of policies is required to respect the different values associated with water. Keywords: Water Policies; Computable General Equilibrium Model; Economic Effects; Environmental Effects.

Public Monitoring with Uncertainty in the Time Repetitions

This paper study repeated games where the time repetitions of the stage game are not known or controlled by the players. We call this feature random monitoring. Kawamori's (2004) shows that perfect random monitoring is always better than the canonical case. Surprisingly, when the monitoring is public, the result is less clear-cut and does not generalize in a straightforward way. Unless the public signals are sufficiently informative about player's actions and/or players are patient enough. In addition to a discount effect, that tends to consistently favor the provision of incentives, we found an information effect, associated with the time uncertainty on the distribution of public signals. Whether payoff improvements are or not possible, depends crucially on the direction and strength of these effects. JEL: C73, D82, D86. KEYWORDS: Repeated Games, Frequent Monitoring, Random Public Monitoring, Moral Hazard, Stochastic Processes.

Abortion in public reason

What abortion laws a liberal political community ought to have? Much has been said about the moral problem of abortion, but there has not been yet (to my knowledge) a fully articulate account of the bearing of the competing answers to this ethical problem on liberal public reason. The first part of my project consists in a critical review of the different attempts to solve the various philosophical puzzles, both metaphysical and moral, posed by the abortion problem. Why is it wrong to kill beings like you and me? By answering this question we shall gain a better insight into those properties we have that give us such strong reasons against killing beings like us. Here we face a tremendous philosophical diffuculty, for it is not possible to determine what the robustest account of the wrongness of killing is without dealing with deeper metaethical and metaphysical problems. Indeed, consequentialist and nonconsequentialist moral theories differ in what it is that makes an action morally wrong -is it just the outcome of the action as compared with the outcomes of its alternatives? Or is it something else? Also, what are we essentially? Is the foetus merely our precursor? Then killing a foetus is relevantly similar to contraception. Or is the foetus one of us? If so, when we kill it, are we depriving it of a future as valuable as ours? Perhaps the relation of identity (the fact that it is its future as opposed to someone else's) doesn't matter. That may be because the foetus is an aggregate of biological and psychological facts and perhaps aggregates are not substances. Or maybe it is a substance but only psychological realtions matter, not personal identity. The second part of my project has to do with the different status these metaphisical and ethical positions ought to have in liberal public reason. Though this is the part in which most research is still needed, my own intuition is that, given the depth of the philosphical views in competition, restrictive abortion laws ought to be considered unrespectful to citizens' autonomy.

Neither Private nor Public: The Effects of Communal Provision of Water on Child Health in Peru

The literature on local services has focused on the effects of privatization and, if anything, has compared the effects of private and mixed public-private systems versus public provision. However, alternative forms of provision such as cooperatives, which can be very prevalent in many developing countries, have been completely ignored. In this paper, we investigate the effects of communal water provison (Comités Vecinales and Juntas Administrativas de Servicios de Saneamiento) on child health in Peru. Using detailed survey data at the household- and child-level for the years 2006-2010, we exploit the cross-section variability to assess the differential impact of this form of provision. Despite controlling for a wide range of household and local characteristics, the municipalities served by communal organizations are more likely to have poorer health indicators, what would result in a downward bias on the absolute magnitude of the effect of cooperatives. We rely on an instrumental variable strategy to deal with this potential endogeneity problem, and use the personnel resources and the administrative urban/rural classi fication of the municipalities as instruments for the provision type. The results show a negative and signi cant effect of comunal water provision on diarrhea among under- five year old children. Keywords: water utilities, cooperatives, child health, regulation, Peru. JEL Classi fication Numbers: L33; L50; L95