LdShake: learning design solutions sharing and co-edition

Two important challenges that teachers are currently facing are the sharing and the collaborative authoring of their learning design solutions, such as didactical units and learning materials. On the one hand, there are tools that can be used for the creation of design solutions and only some of them facilitate the co-edition. However, they do not incorporate mechanisms that support the sharing of the designs between teachers. On the other hand, there are tools that serve as repositories of educational resources but they do not enable the authoring of the designs. In this paper we present LdShake, a web tool whose novelty is focused on the combined support for the social sharing and co-edition of learning design solutions within communities of teachers. Teachers can create and share learning designs with other teachers using different access rights so that they can read, comment or co-edit the designs. Therefore, each design solution is associated to a group of teachers able to work on its definition, and another group that can only see the design. The tool is generic in that it allows the creation of designs based on any pedagogical approach. However, it can be particularized in instances providing pre-formatted designs structured according to a specific didactic method (such as Problem-Based Learning, PBL). A particularized LdShake instance has been used in the context of Human Biology studies where teams of teachers are required to work together in the design of PBL solutions. A controlled user study, that compares the use of a generic LdShake and a Moodle system, configured to enable the creation and sharing of designs, has been also carried out. The combined results of the real and controlled studies show that the social structure, and the commenting, co-edition and publishing features of LdShake provide a useful, effective and usable approach for facilitating teachers' teamwork.

Consistent solutions in exchange economies: A characterization of the price mechanism

We characterize the Walrasian allocations correspondence by means offour axioms: consistency, replica invariance, individual rationality andPareto optimality. It is shown that for any given class of exchange economiesany solution that satisfies the axioms is a selection from the Walrasianallocations with slack. Preferences are assumed to be smooth, but may besatiated and non--convex. A class of economies is defined as all economieswhose agents' preferences belong to an arbitrary family (finite or infinite)of types. The result can be modified to characterize equal budget Walrasianallocations with slack by replacing individual rationality with individualrationality from equal division. The results are valid also for classes ofeconomies in which core--Walras equivalence does not hold.

Small-area estimation with spatial similarity

A class of composite estimators of small area quantities that exploit spatial (distancerelated)similarity is derived. It is based on a distribution-free model for the areas, but theestimators are aimed to have optimal design-based properties. Composition is applied alsoto estimate some of the global parameters on which the small area estimators depend.It is shown that the commonly adopted assumption of random effects is not necessaryfor exploiting the similarity of the districts (borrowing strength across the districts). Themethods are applied in the estimation of the mean household sizes and the proportions ofsingle-member households in the counties (comarcas) of Catalonia. The simplest version ofthe estimators is more efficient than the established alternatives, even though the extentof spatial similarity is quite modest.

Periodic Solutions in Low-Dimensional Climatic Models

Classic climatic models use constitutive laws without any response time. A more realistic approach to the natural processes governing climate dynamics must introduce response time for heat and radiation fluxes. Extended irreversible thermodynamics (EIT) is a good thermodynamical framework for introducing nonclassical constitutive laws. In the present study EIT has been used to analyze a Budyko–Sellers one-dimensional energybalance model developed by G. R. North. The results present self-sustained periodic oscillations when the response time is greater than a critical value. The high-frequency (few kiloyears) damped and nondamped oscillations obtained can be related to abrupt climatic changes without any variation in the external forcing of the system

Evaluating solutions to process, view and listen mathematical formula within an accessible context

Proves de conversió de fòrmules matemàtiques des d'editors de text ofimàtics i des de Làtex. Visionat en HTML i MathML. El millor resultat s'aconsegueix amb MSWord+MathType i IE+MathPlayer.

Single-valued solutions for the Böhm-Bawerk horse market game

Single-valued solutions for the case of two-sided market games without product differentiation, also known as Böhm-Bawerk horse market games, are analyzed. The nucleolus is proved to coincide with the tau-value, and is thus the midpoint of the core. Moreover a characterization of this setof games in terms of the assignment matrix is provided.

Time consistent Pareto solutions in common access resource gameswith asymmetric players

In the analysis of equilibrium policies in a di erential game, if agents have different time preference rates, the cooperative (Pareto optimum) solution obtained by applying the Pontryagin's Maximum Principle becomes time inconsistent. In this work we derive a set of dynamic programming equations (in discrete and continuous time) whose solutions are time consistent equilibrium rules for N-player cooperative di erential games in which agents di er in their instantaneous utility functions and also in their discount rates of time preference. The results are applied to the study of a cake-eating problem describing the management of a common property exhaustible natural resource. The extension of the results to a simple common property renewable natural resource model in in nite horizon is also discussed.

Heterogeneous discounting in consumption-investment problems. Time consistent solutions

[cat] En aquest treball s'analitza un model estocàstic en temps continu en el que l'agent decisor descompta les utilitats instantànies i la funció final amb taxes de preferència temporal constants però diferents. En aquest context es poden modelitzar problemes en els quals, quan el temps s'acosta al moment final, la valoració de la funció final incrementa en comparació amb les utilitats instantànies. Aquest tipus d'asimetria no es pot descriure ni amb un descompte estàndard ni amb un variable. Per tal d'obtenir solucions consistents temporalment es deriva l'equació de programació dinàmica estocàstica, les solucions de la qual són equilibris Markovians. Per a aquest tipus de preferències temporals, s'estudia el model clàssic de consum i inversió (Merton, 1971) per a les funcions d'utilitat del tipus CRRA i CARA, comparant els equilibris Markovians amb les solucions inconsistents temporalment. Finalment es discuteix la introducció del temps final aleatori.

Aggregate monotonic stable single-valued solutions for cooperative games

[cat] En aquest treball caracteritzem les solucions puntuals de jocs cooperatius d'utilitat transferible que compleixen selecció del core i monotonia agregada. També mostrem que aquestes dues propietats són compatibles amb la individualitat racional, la propietat del jugador fals i la propietat de simetria. Finalment, caracteritzem les solucions puntuals que compleixen les cinc propietats a l'hora.

Coalitionally monotonic set-solutions for cooperative TU games

A static comparative study on set-solutions for cooperative TU games is carried out. The analysis focuses on studying the compatibility between two classical and reasonable properties introduced by Young (1985) in the context of single valued solutions, namely core-selection and coalitional monotonicity. As the main result, it is showed that coalitional monotonicity is not only incompatible with the core-selection property but also with the bargaining-selection property. This new impossibility result reinforces the tradeoff between these kinds of interesting and intuitive economic properties. Positive results about compatibility between desirable economic properties are given replacing the core selection requirement by the core-extension property.

Nucleation in supersaturated solutions 3He in 4He at negative pressure.

Depending on the 3He concentration, thermal nucleation in 3-4He supersaturated liquid mixtures at negative pressures may be originated either by bubble or by 3rich drop formation. We have investigated this phenomenon within a density-functional approach, determining the regions in the pressure¿3He-concentration plane where bubbles or drops likely drive the nucleation process. As an illustrative example, we also give the homogeneous nucleation pressure corresponding to 50 and 100 mK temperature.

Classical solutions of the leading-logarithm approximation with non-trivial topology

Exact solutions of the classical equations corresponding to the leading-logarithm approximation are obtained. They are classified by an (integer) topological number.