Monopolistic competition and different wage setting systems

In this paper we match the static disequilibrium unemployment model without frictions in the labor market and monopolistic competition with an infinite horizon model of growth. We compare the wages set at the firm, sector and national (centralized) levels, their unemployment rates and growth of the economic variables, for the Cobb-Douglas production function, in order to see under wich conditions the inverse U hypothesis between unemployment and centralization of wage bargain is confirmed. We also analyze, in the three wage setting systems, the effect of an increase in the monopoly power on employment and growth.

Trade, firm selection, and innovation: the competition channel

The availability of rich firm-level data sets has recently led researchers to uncover new evidence on the effects of trade liberalization. First, trade openness forces the least productive firms to exit the market. Secondly, it induces surviving firms to increase their innovation efforts and thirdly, it increases the degree of product market competition. In this paper we propose a model aimed at providing a coherent interpretation of these findings. We introducing firm heterogeneity into an innovation-driven growth model, where incumbent firms operating in oligopolistic industries perform cost-reducing innovations. In this framework, trade liberalization leads to higher product market competition, lower markups and higher quantity produced. These changes in markups and quantities, in turn, promote innovation and productivity growth through a direct competition effect, based on the increase in the size of the market, and a selection effect, produced by the reallocation of resources towards more productive firms. Calibrated to match US aggregate and firm-level statistics, the model predicts that a 10 percent reduction in variable trade costs reduces markups by 1:15 percent, firm surviving probabilities by 1 percent, and induces an increase in productivity growth of about 13 percent. More than 90 percent of the trade-induced growth increase can be attributed to the selection effect.

Multi-level SLA-driven resource management on Cloud Providers

Nowadays, service providers in the Cloud offer complex services ready to be used as it was a commodity like water or electricity to their customers with any other extra effort for them. However, providing these services implies a high management effort which requires a lot of human interaction. Furthermore, an efficient resource management mechanism considering only provider's resources is, though necessary, not enough, because the provider's profit is limited by the amount of resources it owns. Dynamically outsourcing resources to other providers in response to demand variation avoids this problem and makes the provider to get more profit. A key technology for achieving these goals is virtualization which facilitates provider's management and provides on-demand virtual environments, which are isolated and consolidated in order to achieve a better utilization of the provider's resources. Nevertheless, dealing with some virtualization capabilities implies an effort for the user in order to take benefit from them. In order to avoid this problem, we are contributing the research community with a virtualized environment manager which aims to provide virtual machines that fulfils with the user requirements. Another challenge is sharing resources among different federated Cloud providers while exploiting the features of virtualization in a new approach for facilitating providers' management. This project aims for reducing provider's costs and at the same time fulfilling the quality of service agreed with the customers while maximizing the provider's revenue. It considers resource management at several layers, namely locally to each node in the provider, among different nodes in the provider, and among different federated providers. This latter layer supports the novel capabilities of outsourcing when the local resources are not enough to fulfil the users demand, and offering resources to other providers when the local resources are underused.

Party competition in regional elections: a framework for analysis

Whilst scholars have long recognised that processes of decentralisation create new regional arenas where distinct patterns of party competition are likely to emerge, there has been little systematic analysis of the dynamics of such competition. This working paper thus proposes a framework for analysing party competition between regional branches of state-wide parties, and autonomist parties, in regional arenas. Firstly, the different strategies political parties may adopt in response to their perceptions of voter preferences and to the strategies pursued by their competitors are identified. Secondly, different factors that impact on parties' strategic choices, and which may constrain a party's ability to select electorally optimal strategies in a given political context, are proposed.

What if there was a stronger pharmaceutical price competition in Spain? When regulation has a similar effect to collusion

This paper examines statins competition in the Spanish pharmaceutical market, where prices are highly regulated, and simulates a situation in which there is unrestricted price competition. A nested logit demand model is estimated with a panel of monthly data for pharmaceuticals prescribed from 1997 to 2005. The simulation indicates that the regulation of prices is similar in its effects to cooperation among producers, since the regulated prices are close to those that would be observed in a scenario of perfect collusion. Freedom to set prices and a regulatory framework with appropriate incentives would result in a general reduction in prices and may make the current veiled competition in the form of discounts to pharmacists become more visible. The decrease in prices would be partially offset by an increase in consumption but the net effect would be an overall decrease in expenditure. The counterfactual set-up would also lead to important changes in the market shares of both manufacturers and active ingredients, and a reversal of generic drugs. Therefore, pro-competitive regulation would be welfare-enhancing but would imply winners and losers.

Generic drugs in Spain: price competition vs. moral hazard

This paper examines competition between generic and brand-name drugs in the regulated Spanish pharmaceutical market. A nested logit demand model is specified for the three most consumed therapeutic subgroups in Spain: statins (anticholesterol), selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (antidepressants) and proton pump inhibitors (antiulcers). The model is estimated with instrumental variables from a panel of monthly prescription data from 1999 to 2005. The dataset distinguishes between three different levels of patients’ copayments within the prescriptions and the results show that the greater the level of insurance that the patient has (and therefore the lower the patient’s copayment), the lower the proportion of generic prescriptions made by physicians. It seems that the low level of copayment has delayed the penetration of generics into the Spanish market. Additionally, the estimation of the demand model suggests that the substitution rules and promotional efforts associated with the reference pricing system have increased generic market share, and that being among the first generic entrants has an additional positive effect.

Competition for Procurement Shares

We propose a new procurement procedure which allocates shares of the total amount to be procured depending on the bids of suppliers. Among the properties of the mechanism are: (i) Bidders have an incentive to par- ticipate in the procurement procedure, as equilibrium payoffs are strictly positive. (ii) The mechanism allows to vary the extent to which affirma- tive action objectives, like promoting local industries, are pursued. (iii) Surprisingly, even accomplishing affirmative action goals, procurement ex- penditures might be lower than under a classical auction format. Keywords: Procurement Auction, Affirmative Action. JEL: C72, D44, H57

Un cop d’ull a Resource description & acces (RDA) i al seu futur

Es tracta d’una sessió introductòria que se centra en els aspectes més generals de la nova normativa: el marc conceptual en el qual es fonamenta la RDA (els models FRBR i FRAD), els objectius, l’organització de les normes, el nou vocabulari, la continuïtat amb les AACR2 i els punts de divergència, els beneficis que s’espera obtenir del nou codi, etc. El seu objectiu principal és fer una primera introducció de les regles per sensibilitzar els catalogadors dels canvis que tindran lloc a mig termini.

Driving competition in local gasoline markets

Relevant market definition is still a key element of economic analysis of competition in the gasoline market. It is particularly difficult to handle when competition is local and market power is geographically constrained like is the case in the gasoline market. We analyse how the application of the hypothetical monopolist or Small but Significant Non-Transitory Increase in Prices (SSNIP) test performs for defining isochrones using only information on prices and distance among competitors. We conclude that geographic information systems can be very successfully used to define more precisely relevant geographic market in the gasoline retailing. The application to the Spanish gasoline market concludes that geographic relevant market is composed by 5-6 minutes of travel time. Localised market power should be taken into account when analysing the adverse effects of mergers and entry regulations in gasoline retailing. Only drawing small enough isochrones will drive competition in local markets because it is just close rivals that compete effectively with each other.

Political Competition in Hard Times

This paper analyzes a spatial model of political competition between two policy- motivated parties in hard times of crisis. Hard times are modeled in terms of policy- making costs carried by a newly elected party. The results predict policy divergence in equilibrium. If the ideological preferences of parties are quite diverse and extreme, there is a unique equilibrium in which the parties announce symmetric platforms and each party wins with probability one half. If one party is extreme while the other is more moderate, there is a unique equilibrium in which the parties announce asymmetric platforms. If the preferred policies of the parties are not very distinct, there are two equilibria with asymmetric platforms. An important property of equilibrium with asymmetric platforms is that a winning party necessarily announces its most preferred policy as a platform. JEL classification: D72. Keywords: Spatial model; Political competition; Two-party system; Policy-motivated parties; Hard times; Crisis.

Resource dimensioning aspect of heterogeneous traffic with different service requirements: Integration versus segregation

In this paper, we consider the ATM networks in which the virtual path concept is implemented. The question of how to multiplex two or more diverse traffic classes while providing different quality of service requirements is a very complicated open problem. Two distinct options are available: integration and segregation. In an integration approach all the traffic from different connections are multiplexed onto one VP. This implies that the most restrictive QOS requirements must be applied to all services. Therefore, link utilization will be decreased because unnecessarily stringent QOS is provided to all connections. With the segregation approach the problem can be much simplified if different types of traffic are separated by assigning a VP with dedicated resources (buffers and links). Therefore, resources may not be efficiently utilized because no sharing of bandwidth can take place across the VP. The probability that the bandwidth required by the accepted connections exceeds the capacity of the link is evaluated with the probability of congestion (PC). Since the PC can be expressed as the CLP, we shall simply carry out bandwidth allocation using the PC. We first focus on the influence of some parameters (CLP, bit rate and burstiness) on the capacity required by a VP supporting a single traffic class using the new convolution approach. Numerical results are presented both to compare the required capacity and to observe which conditions under each approach are preferred

ICTINEUAUV wins the First SAUC-E competition

A pioneer team of students of the University of Girona decided to design and develop an autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV) called ICTINEU-AUV to face the Student Autonomous Underwater Challenge-Europe (SAUC-E). The prototype has evolved from the initial computer aided design (CAD) model to become an operative AUV in the short period of seven months. The open frame and modular design principles together with the compatibility with other robots previously developed at the lab have provided the main design philosophy. Hence, at the robot's core, two networked computers give access to a wide set of sensors and actuators. The Gentoo/Linux distribution was chosen as the onboard operating system. A software architecture based on a set of distributed objects with soft real time capabilities was developed and a hybrid control architecture including mission control, a behavioural layer and a robust map-based localization algorithm made ICTINEU-AUV the winning entry

Cohesion, competition and contradiction: INTERREG and Franco-British Cross border co-operation

Aquest article resumeix el desenvolupament del programa INTERREG i la cooperació a la frontera franc-britànica en els últims vint anys. Això és seguit per una anàlisi de la forma transfronterera cooperació pot entendre recorrent a les discussions conceptuals de canviar la governança europea i les relacions de poder entre els diferents nivells de govern. Aquestes idees conceptuals proporcionen un context per a un examen en profunditat de la iniciativa INTERREG IIIA, a la frontera franc-britànica que es destaquen alguns dels principals problemes i les contradiccions de la cooperació transfronterera.

Electoral competition through issue selection

Politics must tackle multiple issues at once. In a first-best world, political competition constrains parties to prioritize issues according to the voters' true concerns. In the real world, the opposite also happens: parties manipulate voter priorities by emphasizing issues selectively during the political campaign. This phenomenon, known as priming, should allow parties to pay less attention to the issues that they intend to mute. We develop a model of endogenous issue ownership in which two vote-seeking parties (i) invest to attract voters with "better" policy proposals and (ii) choose a communication campaign to focus voter attention on specific issues. We identify novel feedbacks between communication and investment. In particular, we find that stronger priming effects can backfire by constraining parties to invest more resources in all issues, including the ones they would otherwise intend to mute. We also identify under which conditions parties prefer to focus on their "historical issues" or to engage in issue stealing. Typically, the latter happens when priming effects are strong, and historical reputations differentiates parties less.

The Impact of advice on women's and men's selection into competition

We conduct a laboratory experiment to study how advice affects the gender gap in the entry into a real-effort tournament. Our experiment is motivated by the concerns raised by approaching the gender gap through affirmative action. Advice is given by subjects who have already had some experience with the participation decision. We show that advice improves the entry decision of subjects, in that forgone earnings due to wrong entry decisions go significantly down. This is mainly driven by significantly increased entry of strong performing women, who also become significantly more confident, and reduced entry of weak performing men.