New ideas need new space

We develop a setting with weak intellectual property rights, where firms' boundaries, location and knowledge spillovers are endogenous. We have two main results. The first one is that, if communication costs increase with distance, entrepreneurs concerned about information leakage have a benefit from locating away from the industry center: distance is an obstacle to collusive trades between members andnon-members. The second result is that we identify a trade-off for the entrepreneur between owning a facility (controlling all its characteristics) and sharing a facility with a {\it non-member} (an agent not involved in production), therefore losing control over some of its characteristics. We focus on ``location" as the relevant characteristic of the facility, but location can be used as a spatial metaphor for other relevant characteristics of the facility. For theentrepreneur, sharing the facility with non-members implies that the latter, as co-owners, know the location (even if they do not have access to it). Knowledge of the location for the co-owners facilitates collusion with employees, what increases leakage. The model yields a benefit for new plants from spatial dispersion (locating at the periphery of the industry), particularly so for new plants of new firms.We relate this result with recent empirical findings on the dynamics of industry location.

The persistence of abnormal returns at industry and firm levels

The present paper proposes a model for the persistence of abnormal returnsboth at firm and industry levels, when longitudinal data for the profitsof firms classiffied as industries are available. The model produces a two-way variance decomposition of abnormal returns: (a) at firm versus industrylevels, and (b) for permanent versus transitory components. This variancedecomposition supplies information on the relative importance of thefundamental components of abnormal returns that have been discussed in theliterature. The model is applied to a Spanish sample of firms, obtainingresults such as: (a) there are significant and permanent differences betweenprofit rates both at industry and firm levels; (b) variation of abnormal returnsat firm level is greater than at industry level; and (c) firm and industry levelsdo not differ significantly regarding rates of convergence of abnormal returns.

Subcontracting and vertical integration in the Spanish cotton industry

This paper examines changes in the organization of the Spanish cotton industry from 1720 to 1860 in its core region of Catalonia. As the Spanish cotton industry adopted the most modern technology and experienced the transition to the factory system, cotton spinning and weaving mills became increasingly vertically integrated. Asset specificity more than other factors explained this tendency towards vertical integration. The probability for a firm of being vertically integrated was higher among firms located in districts with high concentration ratios and rose with size and the use of modern machinery. Simultaneously, subcontracting predominated in other phases of production and distribution where transaction costs appears to be less important.

Prime property institutions for a subprime era: Toward innovative models of homeownership

This Article breaks new ground toward contractual and institutional innovation in models of homeownership, equity building, and mortgage enforcement. Inspired by recent developments in the affordable housing sector and other types of public financing schemes, we suggest extending institutional and financial strategies such as time- and place-based division of property rights, conditional subsidies, and credit mediation to alleviate the systemic risks of mortgage foreclosure. Two new solutions offer a broad theoretical basis for such developments in the economic and legal institution of homeownership: a for-profit shared equity scheme led by local governments alongside a private market shared equity model, one of "bootstrapping home buying with purchase options".

Property titling and conveyancing

This chapter analyzes titling institutions and the regulation of supporting conveyancingservices. After examining the tradeoff of enforcement benefits and consent costs posed byproperty rights, it explains how different public titling systems (privacy, recording andregistration) try to solve this tradeoff, and what the consequences are for the nature andregulation of private conveyancing services. The chapter ends with a discussion of someempirical issues and data which are useful for comparing, designing and managing titlingand conveyancing systems.

Wage structures and family economies in the Catalan textile industry in an age of nascent capitalism

This paper deals with changes in managerial practices in Catalonia in anage of nascent capitalism (1830-1925) and adaptive family strategies inorder to face the absence of state welfare. During the 19 t h Century andin the absence of recorded labor contracts, human resources of the firmwere organized by means of implicit contracts and informal labor markets.With the advent of scientific organization of labor, wage per hour workedbegan to be recorded. This is why in the 1920s the perfect competitionmodel applies to our case. On the other hand, in the same period, and inthe absence of state welfare, ideas stemming from cooperative game theoryapply to the pattern of household income formation. Kin related networkswere used to improve the living standards of the household. In thisparticular direction we also show that there was a demonstration effectby means of which migrant s living standards were higher than those ofnatives.

Property enforcement as organized consent

This article develops and tests a theory of the institutions that makeproperty rights viable, ensuring their enforcement, mobilizing thecollateral value of assets and promoting growth. In contrast tocontractual rights, property rights are enforced in rem, being affectedonly with the consent of the right holder. This ensures enforcement butis costly when multiple, potentially colliding rights are held in thesame asset. Different institutions reduce the cost of gathering consentsto overcome this trade-off of enforcement benefits for consent costs:recording of deeds with title insurance, registration of rights and evena regimen of purely private transactions. All three provide functionallysimilar services, but their relative performance varies with the numberof transactions, the risk of political opportunism and regulatoryconsistency. The analysis also shows the rationality of allowingcompetition in the preparation and support of private contractswhile requiring territorial monopoly in recording and registrationactivities, this to ensure independence and protect third parties.

On the throughput-WIP trade-off in queueing systems, diminishing returns and the threshold property: A linear programming approach

We present a new unifying framework for investigating throughput-WIP(Work-in-Process) optimal control problems in queueing systems,based on reformulating them as linear programming (LP) problems withspecial structure: We show that if a throughput-WIP performance pairin a stochastic system satisfies the Threshold Property we introducein this paper, then we can reformulate the problem of optimizing alinear objective of throughput-WIP performance as a (semi-infinite)LP problem over a polygon with special structure (a thresholdpolygon). The strong structural properties of such polygones explainthe optimality of threshold policies for optimizing linearperformance objectives: their vertices correspond to the performancepairs of threshold policies. We analyze in this framework theversatile input-output queueing intensity control model introduced byChen and Yao (1990), obtaining a variety of new results, including (a)an exact reformulation of the control problem as an LP problem over athreshold polygon; (b) an analytical characterization of the Min WIPfunction (giving the minimum WIP level required to attain a targetthroughput level); (c) an LP Value Decomposition Theorem that relatesthe objective value under an arbitrary policy with that of a giventhreshold policy (thus revealing the LP interpretation of Chen andYao's optimality conditions); (d) diminishing returns and invarianceproperties of throughput-WIP performance, which underlie thresholdoptimality; (e) a unified treatment of the time-discounted andtime-average cases.

The Spanish motor industry in the first third of the 20th Century: A lost opportunity

The Spanish automobile industry had a late start. Although the country proved capable of short production runs of high-quality vehicles during the first third of the century it never managed to build up its own industry, unlike Great Britain, France, or Italy. What then, were the critical shortcomings that prevented the establishment of large Spanish motor manufacturers? Put another way, why did all of the companies set up during the first half-century fail to survive? This paper attempts to shed some light on these questions, employing a wide-ranging analysis of both internal and external factors affecting the industry. A feeble internal market, lack of resources and production factors are usually adduced as reasons, as are Spain's general economic backwardness and the role played by the public authorities. However, this paper mainly focuses on the internal factors concerning company strategy and organisation. A comparison with the Italian case helps put the traditional arguments in proper perspective and highlights those covering business strategies. Finally, we argue that a broad range of factors needs to be analysed to fully understand why Spain failed to establish a motor industry.

Bank versus venture capital

Why do some start-up firms raise funds from banks andothers from venture capitalists? To answer this question,I develop a model of start-up financing when intellectualproperty rights are not well protected. The upside of VCfinancing is that the VC understands the business betterthan a bank. The downside, however, is that the VC maysteal the idea and use it himself. The results of themodel are consistent with empirical regularities onstart-up financing. The model implies that thecharacteristics of the firms financing from venturecapitalists are low-collateral, high-growth and high-profitability. The model also suggests that thetighter protection of intellectual property rightscontributes to the recent dramatic growth of the USventure capital industry.

The use of derivatives in the Spanish mutual fund industry

We study the use of derivatives in the Spanish mutual fund industry. The picture that emerges from our analysis is rather negative. In general, the use of derivatives does not improve the performance of the funds. In only one out of eight categories we find some (very weak and not robust) evidence of superior performance. In most of the cases users significantly underperform non users. Furthermore, users do not seem to exhibit superior timing or selectivity skills either, but rather the contrary. This bad performance is only partially explained by the larger fees funds using derivatives charge. Moreover,we do not find evidence of derivatives being used for hedging purposes. We do find evidence of derivatives being used for speculation. But users in only one category exhibit skills as speculators. Finally, we find evidence of derivatives being used to manage the funds cash inflows and outflows more efficiently.

State and industry in the 1940s: The Spanish automobile industry

The decade of the 1940s was one of the darkest periods in the country's history, with years of famine, repression, general misery, and impoverishment of all aspects of national life ranging from culture to the economy. During those years plans were made to establish a Spanish motor industry once the Civil War had come to an end in 1939. It seemed a propitious moment for private enterprise and various foreign motor companies presented proposals for manufacturing their entire vehicle range, from cars to trucks. However, the government plans were for a State monopoly, a policy which meant that any private projects which did not contemplate the regime taking management decisions were rejected out of hand. From 1941 onwards, any new initiative was required to meet the plans set by INI. The main argument running through this paper is that one can only understand the development of the modern Spanish motor industry if one grasps the haggling between motor companies and government regarding market entry and the impact of the regime's autarchic policies in the 1940s.

The growth and diffusion of knowlegde and the theory of the firm

We analyze the implications of a market imperfection related to the inability to establish intellectual property rights, that we label {\it unverifiable communication}. Employees are able to collude with external parties selling ``knowledge capital'' of the firm. The firm organizer engages in strategic interaction simultaneously with employees and competitors, as she introduces endogenous transaction costs in the market for information between those agents. Incentive schemes and communication costs are the key strategic variables used by the firm to induce frictions in collusive markets. Unverifiable communication introduces severe allocative distortions, both at internal product development and at intended sale of information (technology transfer). We derive implications of the model for observable decisions like characteristics of the employment relationship (full employment, incompatibility with other jobs), firms' preferences over cluster characteristics for location decisions, optimal size at entry, in--house development vs sale strategies for innovations and industry evolution.

R&D in the pharmaceutical industry: A world of small innovations

It is commonly argued that in recent years pharmaceutical companies have directed theirR&D towards small improvements of existing compounds instead of more risky drastic innovations. In this paper we show that the proliferation of these small innovations is likely to be linked to the lack of market sensitivity of a part of the demand to changes in prices. Compared to their social contribution, small innovations are relatively more profitable than large ones because they are targeted to the smaller but more inelastic part of the demand. We also study the effect of regulatory instruments such as price ceilings, copayments and reference prices and extend the analysis to competition in research.

Perceptual mapping of practical ethics along the value chain: A multiple correspondence analysis with industry and cultural indices as supplementary variables

This paper presents findings from a study investigating a firm s ethical practices along the value chain. In so doing we attempt to better understand potential relationships between a firm s ethical stance with its customers and those of its suppliers within a supply chain and identify particular sectoral and cultural influences that might impinge on this. Drawing upon a database comprising of 667 industrial firms from 27 different countries, we found that ethical practices begin with the firm s relationship with its customers, the characteristics of which then influence the ethical stance with the firm s suppliers within the supply chain. Importantly, market structure along with some key cultural characteristics were also found to exert significant influence on the implementation of ethical policies in these firms.