Pharmaceutical Generics, Vertical Product Differentiation, and Public Policy

This paper studies oligopolistic competition in off-patent pharmaceutical markets using a vertical product differentiation model. This model can explain the observation that countries with stronger regulations have smaller generic market shares. It can also explain the differences in observed regulatory regimes. Stronger regulation may be due to a higher proportion of production that is done by foreign firms. Finally, a closely related model can account for the observed increase in prices by patent owners after entry of generic producers.

A New Model for Designing a Product Line Using TURF Analysis

This paper introduces the approach of using TURF analysis to design a product line through a binary linear programming model. This improves the efficiency of the search for the solution to the problem compared to the algorithms that have been used to date. Furthermore, the proposed technique enables the model to be improved in order to overcome the main drawbacks presented by TURF analysis in practice.

Network revenue management with product-specific no-shows

Revenue management practices often include overbooking capacity to account for customerswho make reservations but do not show up. In this paper, we consider the network revenuemanagement problem with no-shows and overbooking, where the show-up probabilities are specificto each product. No-show rates differ significantly by product (for instance, each itinerary andfare combination for an airline) as sale restrictions and the demand characteristics vary byproduct. However, models that consider no-show rates by each individual product are difficultto handle as the state-space in dynamic programming formulations (or the variable space inapproximations) increases significantly. In this paper, we propose a randomized linear program tojointly make the capacity control and overbooking decisions with product-specific no-shows. Weestablish that our formulation gives an upper bound on the optimal expected total profit andour upper bound is tighter than a deterministic linear programming upper bound that appearsin the existing literature. Furthermore, we show that our upper bound is asymptotically tightin a regime where the leg capacities and the expected demand is scaled linearly with the samerate. We also describe how the randomized linear program can be used to obtain a bid price controlpolicy. Computational experiments indicate that our approach is quite fast, able to scale to industrialproblems and can provide significant improvements over standard benchmarks.

What other sciences look like

In order to have references for discussing mathematical menus in political science, Ireview the most common types of mathematical formulae used in physics andchemistry, as well as some mathematical advances in economics. Several issues appearrelevant: variables should be well defined and measurable; the relationships betweenvariables may be non-linear; the direction of causality should be clearly identified andnot assumed on a priori grounds. On these bases, theoretically-driven equations onpolitical matters can be validated by empirical tests and can predict observablephenomena.

Product market deregulation and labor market outcomes

We consider the dynamic relationship between product market entry regulationand equilibrium unemployment. The main theoretical contribution is combininga Mortensen-Pissarides model with monopolistic competition in the goods marketand individual wage bargaining. Product market competition affects unemploymentvia two channels: the output expansion effect and a countervailing effect dueto a hiring externality. Competition is then linked to barriers to entry. Acalibrated model compares a high-regulation European regime to a low-regulationAnglo-American one. Our quantitative analysis suggests that under individualbargaining, no more than half a percentage point of European unemployment ratescan be attributed to entry regulation.

Performance assessment and league tables. Comparing like with like

We formulate performance assessment as a problem of causal analysis and outline an approach based on the missing data principle for its solution. It is particularly relevant in the context of so-called league tables for educational, health-care and other public-service institutions. The proposed solution avoids comparisons of institutions that have substantially different clientele (intake).

The effects of uncertainty avoidance on brand performance: Marketing creativity, product innovation and the brand duration

This paper investigates the link between brand performance and cultural primes in high-risk,innovation-based sectors. In theory section, we propose that the level of cultural uncertaintyavoidance embedded in a firm determine its marketing creativity by increasing the complexityand the broadness of a brand. It determines also the rate of firm product innovations.Marketing creativity and product innovation influence finally the firm marketingperformance. Empirically, we study trademarked promotion in the Software Security Industry(SSI). Our sample consists of 87 firms that are active in SSI from 11 countries in the period1993-2000. We use the data coming from SSI-related trademarks registered by these firms,ending up with 2,911 SSI-related trademarks and a panel of 18,213 observations. We estimatea two stage model in which first we predict the complexity and the broadness of a trademarkas a measure of marketing creativity and the rate of product innovations. Among severalcontrol variables, our variable of theoretical interest is the Hofstede s uncertainty avoidancecultural index. Then, we estimate the trademark duration with a hazard model using thepredicted complexity and broadness as well as the rate of product innovations, along with thesame control variables. Our evidence confirms that the cultural avoidance affects the durationof the trademarks through the firm marketing creativity and product innovation.

Country asymmetries, endogenous product choice and the speed of trade liberalization

In a world with two countries which differ in size, we study theimpact of (the speed of) trade liberalization on firms' profitsand total welfare of the countries involved. Firms correctlyanticipate the pace of trade liberalization and take it intoaccount when deciding on their product choices, which areendogenously determined at the beginning of the game. Competitionin the marketplace then occurs either on quantities or on prices.As long as the autarkic phase continues, local firms are nationalmonopolists. When trade liberalization occurs, firms compete in aninternational duopoly. We analyze trade effects by using twodifferent models of product differentiation. Across all thespecifications adopted (and independently of the price v. quantitycompetition hypothesis), total welfare always unambiguously riseswith the speed of trade liberalization: Possible losses by firmsare always outweighed by consumers' gains, which come under theform of lower prices, enlarged variety of higher average qualitiesavailable. The effect on profits depends on the type of industryanalyzed. Two results in particular seem to be worth of mention.With vertical product differentiation and fixed costs of qualityimprovements, the expected size of the market faced by the firmsdetermines the incentive to invest in quality. The longer the periodof autarky, the lower the possibility that the firm from the smallcountry would be producing the high quality and be the leader in theinternational market when it opens. On the contrary, when trade opensimmediately, national markets do not play any role and firms fromdifferent countries have the same opportunity to become the leader.Hence, immediate trade liberalization might be in the interest ofproducers in the small country. In general, the lower the size of thesmall country, the more likely its firm will gain from tradeliberalization. Losses from the small country firm can arise when itis relegated to low quality good production and the domestic marketsize is not very small. With horizontal product differentiation (thehomogeneous good case being a limit case of it when costs ofdifferentiation tend to infinity), investments in differentiationbenefit both firms in equal manner. Firms from the small country do notrun the risk of being relegated to a lower competitive position undertrade. As a result, they would never lose from it. Instead, firms fromthe large country may still incur losses from the opening of trade whenthe market expansion effect is low (i.e. when the country is very largerelative to the other).

Pharmaceutical generics, vertical product differentiation and public policy

This paper studies oligopolistic competition in off-patent pharmaceuticalmarkets using a vertical product differentiation model. This model canexplain the observation that countries with stronger regulations havesmaller generic market shares. It can also explain the differences inobserved regulatory regimes. Stronger regulation may be due to a higherproportion of production that is done by foreign firms. Finally, a closelyrelated model can account for the observed increase in prices by patentowners after entry of generic producers.

Product market deregulation and the U.S. employment miracle

We consider the dynamic relationship between product market entry regulation and equilibrium unemployment. The main theoretical contribution is combining a job matchingmodel with monopolistic competition in the goods market and individual wage bargaining.Product market competition affects unemployment by two channels: the output expansion effect and a countervailing effect due to a hiring externality. Competition is then linked to barriers to entry. We calibrate the model to US data and perform a policy experiment to assess whether the decrease in trend unemployment during the 1980 s and 1990 s could be attributed to product market deregulation. Our quantitative analysis suggests that under individual bargaining, a decrease of less than two tenths of a percentage point of unemployment rates can be attributed to product market deregulation, a surprisingly small amount.

Explaining movements in the labor share

In this paper we study the evolution of the labor share in the OECD since 1970. We show it is essentially related to the capital-output ratio; that this relationship is shifted by factors like the price of imported materials or the skill mix; and that discrepancies between the marginal product of labor and the real wage (due to, e.g., product market power, union bargaining, and labor adjustment costs) cause departures from it. We provide estimates of the model with panel data on 14 industries and 14 countries for 1973-93 and use them to compute the evolution of the wage gap in Germany and the US.

Effects of employment protection and product market regulations on the Italian labor market

Labor market regulations have often being blamed for high and persistentunemployment in Europe, but evidence on their impact remains mixed. Morerecently, attention has turned to the impact of product market regulationson employment growth. This paper analyzes how labor and product marketregulations interact to affect turnover and employment. We present a matchingmodel which illustrates how barriers to entry in the product market mitigatethe impact of labor market deregulation. We, then, use the Italian SocialSecurity employer-employee panel to study the interaction between barriersto entry and dismissal costs. We exploit the fact that costs for unjustdismissals in Italy increased for firms below 15 employees relative to biggerfirms after 1990. We find that the increase in dismissal costs after 1990decreased accessions and separations in small relative to big firms,especially for women. Moreover, consistent with our model, we find evidencethat the increase in dismissal costs had smaller effects on turnover for womenin sectors faced with strict product market regulations.

The growth and diffusion of knowlegde and the theory of the firm

We analyze the implications of a market imperfection related to the inability to establish intellectual property rights, that we label {\it unverifiable communication}. Employees are able to collude with external parties selling ``knowledge capital'' of the firm. The firm organizer engages in strategic interaction simultaneously with employees and competitors, as she introduces endogenous transaction costs in the market for information between those agents. Incentive schemes and communication costs are the key strategic variables used by the firm to induce frictions in collusive markets. Unverifiable communication introduces severe allocative distortions, both at internal product development and at intended sale of information (technology transfer). We derive implications of the model for observable decisions like characteristics of the employment relationship (full employment, incompatibility with other jobs), firms' preferences over cluster characteristics for location decisions, optimal size at entry, in--house development vs sale strategies for innovations and industry evolution.

Aplicación de realidad aumentada para dispositivos móviles destinada a espacios culturales. Ejemplo de desarrollo: Museu Episcopal de Vic

Proyecto de aplicación para dispositivos móviles que utiliza la Realidad Aumentada (RA) para contextualizar obras artísticas. Es un producto pensado para museos y galerías pero también para espacios exteriores que posean elementos de valor cultural. Sin embargo, y para servir de ejemplo se ha aplicado en seis piezas destacadas del Museo Episcopal de Vic. Aunque en Europa y EE.UU. los museos ya están innovando en este terreno, en España, que es donde se enmarca el proyecto, existe una carencia de elementos de mediación cultural como estos; sobre todo en los museos de arte donde las obras acostumbran a presentarse despojadas de cualquier herramienta que proporcione información complementaria. Existe, por tanto, una descontextualización del arte que crea barreras para el entendimiento del público general. De esta situación de carencia parte el objetivo principal del producto, el de aprovechar las posibilidades de la RA para mejorar la experiencia y el diálogo entre el visitante y la obra, aportando conocimiento y fomentando el aprendizaje.