Strong exceptional sequences of vector bundles on certain Fano varieties

"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt."

Positive solutions of nonlinear problems involving the square root of the Laplacian

We consider nonlinear elliptic problems involving a nonlocal operator: the square root of the Laplacian in a bounded domain with zero Dirichlet boundary conditions. For positive solutions to problems with power nonlinearities, we establish existence and regularity results, as well as a priori estimates of Gidas-Spruck type. In addition, among other results, we prove a symmetry theorem of Gidas-Ni-Nirenberg type.

The Commons and anti-commons problems in the tourism economy

Countries specialised in tourism tend to face two problems with contradictory effects: the commons and the anti-commons, which lead to tourism over- and under-production, respectively. This paper develops a two-period model to analyse the joint effects of both problems on a small and remote tourism economy. Congestion and the complementariness between foreign transport and local tourism services are key features in this type of markets. As a result, direct selling and the presence of foreign tour-operators emerge as possible market arrangements with different implications in terms of welfare and public intervention. Four main results are obtained. First, in the direct selling situation the optimal policy depends on the relative importance of the problems. Second, the existence of tour-operators always leads to tourism over-production. Third, the presence of a single tour-operator does not solve the congestion problem. Lastly, the switch from several tour-operators to a single one is welfare reducing.

Some variational problems from image processing

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Information Dispersion and Equilibrium Multiplicity

This paper studies the implications of correlation of private signals about the liquidation value of a risky asset in a variation of a standard noisy rational expectations model in which traders receive endowment shocks which are private information and have a common component. We …nd that a necessary condition to generate multiple linear partially revealing rational expectations equilibria is the existence of several sources of information dispersion. In this context equilibrium multiplicity tends to occur when information is more dispersed. A necessary condition to have strategic complementarity in information acquisition is to have mul- tiple equilibria. When the equilibrium is unique there is strategic substi- tutability in information acquisition, corroborating the result obtained in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). JEL Classi…cation: D82, D83, G14 Keywords: Multiplicity of equilibria, strategic complementarity, asym- metric information.

Lobbying of Firms by Voters

A firm may induce voters or elected politicians to support a policy it favors by suggesting that it is more likely to invest in a district whose voters or representatives support the policy. In equilibrium, no one vote may be decisive, and the policy may gain strong support though the majority of districts suffer from adoption of the program. When votes reveal information about the district, the firm's implicit promise or threat can be credible.

An Introduction to parametric and non-parametric models for bivariate positive insurance claim severity distributions

We present a real data set of claims amounts where costs related to damage are recorded separately from those related to medical expenses. Only claims with positive costs are considered here. Two approaches to density estimation are presented: a classical parametric and a semi-parametric method, based on transformation kernel density estimation. We explore the data set with standard univariate methods. We also propose ways to select the bandwidth and transformation parameters in the univariate case based on Bayesian methods. We indicate how to compare the results of alternative methods both looking at the shape of the overall density domain and exploring the density estimates in the right tail.

The analysis of approximate quickselect and related problems

Approximate Quickselect, a simple modification of the well known Quickselect algorithm for selection, can be used to efficiently find an element with rank k in a given range [i..j], out of n given elements. We study basic cost measures of Approximate Quickselect by computing exact and asymptotic results for the expected number of passes, comparisons and data moves during the execution of this algorithm. The key element appearing in the analysis of Approximate Quickselect is a trivariate recurrence that we solve in full generality. The general solution of the recurrence proves to be very useful, as it allows us to tackle several related problems, besides the analysis that originally motivated us. In particular, we have been able to carry out a precise analysis of the expected number of moves of the ith element when selecting the jth smallest element with standard Quickselect, where we are able to give both exact and asymptotic results. Moreover, we can apply our general results to obtain exact and asymptotic results for several parameters in binary search trees, namely the expected number of common ancestors of the nodes with rank i and j, the expected size of the subtree rooted at the least common ancestor of the nodes with rank i and j, and the expected distance between the nodes of ranks i and j.

A numerical algorithm for finding solutions of a generalized Nash equilibrium problem

A family of nonempty closed convex sets is built by using the data of the Generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP). The sets are selected iteratively such that the intersection of the selected sets contains solutions of the GNEP. The algorithm introduced by Iusem-Sosa (2003) is adapted to obtain solutions of the GNEP. Finally some numerical experiments are given to illustrate the numerical behavior of the algorithm.

Optimal exponent heat balance and refined integral methods applied to Stefan problems

When using a polynomial approximating function the most contentious aspect of the Heat Balance Integral Method is the choice of power of the highest order term. In this paper we employ a method recently developed for thermal problems, where the exponent is determined during the solution process, to analyse Stefan problems. This is achieved by minimising an error function. The solution requires no knowledge of an exact solution and generally produces significantly better results than all previous HBI models. The method is illustrated by first applying it to standard thermal problems. A Stefan problem with an analytical solution is then discussed and results compared to the approximate solution. An ablation problem is also analysed and results compared against a numerical solution. In both examples the agreement is excellent. A Stefan problem where the boundary temperature increases exponentially is analysed. This highlights the difficulties that can be encountered with a time dependent boundary condition. Finally, melting with a time-dependent flux is briefly analysed without applying analytical or numerical results to assess the accuracy.

Nash equilibrium strategies in discrete-time finite-horizon dynamic games with risk-and effort-averse players

The objective of this paper is to re-examine the risk-and effort attitude in the context of strategic dynamic interactions stated as a discrete-time finite-horizon Nash game. The analysis is based on the assumption that players are endogenously risk-and effort-averse. Each player is characterized by distinct risk-and effort-aversion types that are unknown to his opponent. The goal of the game is the optimal risk-and effort-sharing between the players. It generally depends on the individual strategies adopted and, implicitly, on the the players' types or characteristics.

The Role of supply constraints in multiplier analysis

Multiplier analysis based upon the information contained in Leontief's inverse is undoubtedly part of the core of the input-output methodology and numerous applications an extensions have been developed that exploit its informational content. Nonetheless there are some implicit theoretical assumptions whose implications have perhaps not been fully assessed. This is the case of the 'excess capacity' assumption. Because of this assumption resources are available as needed to adjust production to new equilibrium states. In real world applications, however, new resources are scarce and costly. Supply constraints kick in and hence resource allocation needs to take them into account to really assess the effect of government policies. Using a closed general equilibrium model that incorporates supply constraints, we perform some simple numerical exercises and proceed to derive a 'constrained' multiplier matrix that can be compared with the standard 'unrestricted' multiplier matrix. Results show that the effectiveness of expenditure policies hinges critically on whether or not supply constraints are considered.

The Multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multi-unit demands: competitive equilibria

A multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multiunit demands consists of a set of sellers that own a given number of indivisible units of (potentially many different) goods and a set of buyers who value those units and want to buy at most an exogenously fixed number of units. We define a competitive equilibrium for this generalized assignment game and prove its existence by using only linear programming. In particular, we show how to compute equilibrium price vectors from the solutions of the dual linear program associated to the primal linear program defined to find optimal assignments. Using only linear programming tools, we also show (i) that the set of competitive equilibria (pairs of price vectors and assignments) has a Cartesian product structure: each equilibrium price vector is part of a competitive equilibrium with all optimal assignments, and vice versa; (ii) that the set of (restricted) equilibrium price vectors has a natural lattice structure; and (iii) how this structure is translated into the set of agents' utilities that are attainable at equilibrium.

Application of standard and refined heat balance integral methods to one-dimensional Stefan problems

The work in this paper concerns the study of conventional and refined heat balance integral methods for a number of phase change problems. These include standard test problems, both with one and two phase changes, which have exact solutions to enable us to test the accuracy of the approximate solutions. We also consider situations where no analytical solution is available and compare these to numerical solutions. It is popular to use a quadratic profile as an approximation of the temperature, but we show that a cubic profile, seldom considered in the literature, is far more accurate in most circumstances. In addition, the refined integral method can give greater improvement still and we develop a variation on this method which turns out to be optimal in some cases. We assess which integral method is better for various problems, showing that it is largely dependent on the specified boundary conditions.

Public and private learning from prices, strategic substitutability and complementarity, and equilibrium multiplicity

We study a general static noisy rational expectations model where investors have private information about asset payoffs, with common and private components, and about their own exposure to an aggregate risk factor, and derive conditions for existence and uniqueness (or multiplicity) of equilibria. We find that a main driver of the characterization of equilibria is whether the actions of investors are strategic substitutes or complements. This latter property in turn is driven by the strength of a private learning channel from prices, arising from the multidimensional sources of asymmetric information, in relation to the usual public learning channel. When the private learning channel is strong (weak) in relation to the public we have strong (weak) strategic complementarity in actions and potentially multiple (unique) equilibria. The results enable a precise characterization of whether information acquisition decisions are strategic substitutes or complements. We find that the strategic substitutability in information acquisition result obtained in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) is robust. JEL Classification: D82, D83, G14 Keywords: Rational expectations equilibrium, asymmetric information, risk exposure, hedging, supply information, information acquisition.