Delegation and information sharing in oligopoly

Information sharing in oligopoly has been analyzed by assuming that firms behave as a sole economic agent. In this paper I assume that ownership and management are separated. Managers are allowed to falsely report their costs to owners and rivals. Under such circumstances, if owners want to achieve information sharing they must use managerial contracts that implement truthful cost reporting by managers as a dominant strategy. I show that, contrary to the classical result, without the inclusion of message-dependent payments in managerial contracts there will be no information sharing. On the other hand, with the inclusion of such publicly observable payments and credible ex-ante commitment by owners not to modify these payments, there will be perfect information sharing without the need for third parties. Keywords: Information sharing, Delegation, Managerial contracts. JEL classification numbers: D21, D82, L13, L21

Creating and using a non-dedicated HPC cluster with ParallelKnoppix

This note describes ParallelKnoppix, a bootable CD that allows econometricians with average knowledge of computers to create and begin using a high performance computing cluster for parallel computing in very little time. The computers used may be heterogeneous machines, and clusters of up to 200 nodes are supported. When the cluster is shut down, all machines are in their original state, so their temporary use in the cluster does not interfere with their normal uses. An example shows how a Monte Carlo study of a bootstrap test procedure may be done in parallel. Using a cluster of 20 nodes, the example runs approximately 20 times faster than it does on a single computer.

ParallelKnoppix - Rapid deployment of a linux cluster for MPI parallel processing using non-dedicated computers

This note describes ParallelKnoppix, a bootable CD that allows creation of a Linux cluster in very little time. An experienced user can create a cluster ready to execute MPI programs in less than 10 minutes. The computers used may be heterogeneous machines, of the IA-32 architecture. When the cluster is shut down, all machines except one are in their original state, and the last can be returned to its original state by deleting a directory. The system thus provides a means of using non-dedicated computers to create a cluster. An example session is documented.

A cooperative appproach to queue allocation of indivisible objects

We consider the allocation of a finite number of indivisible objects to the same number of agents according to an exogenously given queue. We assume that the agents collaborate in order to achieve an efficient outcome for society. We allow for side-payments and provide a method for obtaining stable outcomes.

Distribution center consolidation games

We study the location-inventory model as introduced by Teo et al. (2001) to analyze the impact of consolidation of distribution centers on facility and inventory costs. We extend their result on profitability of consolidation. We associate a cooperative game with each location-inventory situation and prove that this game has a non-empty core for identical and independent demand processes. This illustrates that consolidation does not only lower joint costs (which was shown by Teo et al. (2001)), but it allows for a stable division of the minimal costs as well.

Rational sabotage in cooperative production

In this paper we consider a model of cooperative production in which rational agents have the possibility to engage in sabotage activities that decrease output. It is shown that sabotage depends on the interplay between the degree of congestion, the technology of sabotage, the number of agents the degree of meritocracy and the form of the sharing rule. In particular it is shown that, ceteries paribus, meritocratic systems give more incentives to sabotage than egalitarian systems. We address two questions: The degree of meritocracy that is compatible with absence of sabotage and the existence of a Nash equilibrium with and without sabotage.

Non compact euclidean cone 3-manifolds with cone angles less than 2∏

We study of noncompact Euclidean cone manifolds with cone angles less than c&2π and singular locus a submanifold. More precisely, we describe its structure outside a compact set. As a corol lary we classify those with cone angles & 2π/3 and those with cone angles = 2π/3.

Cooperative Transmission and Radio Resources Management for Wireless Networks

Report for the scientific sojourn at the Multimedia Communications Laboratory, University of Texas at Dallas, USA, from September to December 2005. The cooperative transmission has been analyzed taking a broadcast relay channel which assumes a scenario with one source and multiple destinations. Moreover, in order to improve the performance in terms of mutual information, it has been considered that for each destination there is another nearby terminal (called relay) which will help to improve the performance of the destination. This scheme combines different types of channels considered in the information theory, such as the relay channel, broadcast channel and interference channel (if the relays transmit information intended only to its associated destination). In this work, the author has studied the optimal way to encode the signals for the different users, known as capacity region (i.e. related to radio resources management ), of the broadcast relay channel.

Payoff-dependent balancedness and cores (revised version)

We prove the non-emptiness of the core of an NTU game satisfying a condition of payoff-dependent balancedness, based on transfer rate mappings. We also define a new equilibrium condition on transfer rates and we prove the existence of core payoff vectors satisfying this condition. The additional requirement of transfer rate equilibrium refines the core concept and allows the selection of specific core payoff vectors. Lastly, the class of parametrized cooperative games is introduced. This new setting and its associated equilibrium-core solution extend the usual cooperative game framework and core solution to situations depending on an exogenous environment. A non-emptiness result for the equilibrium-core is also provided in the context of a parametrized cooperative game. Our proofs borrow mathematical tools and geometric constructions from general equilibrium theory with non convexities. Applications to extant results taken from game theory and economic theory are given.

Tropical varieties for non-archimedean analytic spaces

"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt."

Catalan Policies and Experiences on Cooperative Repositories

The Centre de Supercomputació de Catalunya (CESCA) together with the Consorci de Biblioteques Universitàries de Catalunya (CBUC) started in 1999 a cooperative repository, named TDR, to file in digital format the full-text of the read thesis at the universities of our country to spread them worldwide in open access preserving the intellectual copyright of the authors. This became operational in 2001 and today it is a service fully consolidated not only among the Catalan universities, but also used by other Spanish universities. Since then, there are four additional cooperative repositories which have been created: RECERCAT, for research papers; RACO, for scientific, cultural and erudite Catalan magazines; PADICAT, for archiving Catalan web sites; and MDC, for Catalan digital collections of pictures, maps, posters, old magazines... These five repositories have some common characteristics: they are open access, that is, they are accessible on the internet for free; they mostly comply with the Open Archive Initiative interoperability protocol for facilitating the efficient dissemination of content; and they have been built in a cooperative manner so that it is easy to adopt common procedures and to share the repository developing and managing costs, it permits more visibility of the indexed documents throughout the search engines, and a better provision for long-term preservation can be made. In this paper we present the common policy established for the Catalan cooperative repositories, we describe the five of them briefly, and we comment on the results obtained of our 6-year experience since the first one became operational.

Cooperative production and efficiency

We characterize the sharing rule for which a contribution mechanism achieves efficiency in a cooperative production setting when agents are heterogeneous. The sharing rule bears no resemblance to those considered by the previous literature. We also show for a large class of sharing rules that if Nash equilibrium yields efficient allocations, the production function displays constant returns to scale, a case in which cooperation in production is useless.

The Difficult and tortuous path of agricultural cooperative networks in spain, 1890-1935

The rural associationism developed from the last decades of the XIX century could be consider as an answer of the agriculturists to the increasing integration of agriculture in the market, and to the effects of the Great Depression. In the case of Spain, the initiatives in this sense arose with certain delay in relation to the countries of Western Europe. The beginning of the Spanish cooperativism is closely bound to the Law of 1906. It granted the agrarian cooperatives with fiscal exemptions and other types of supports to the associates, although the process did not really accelerate until the promulgation of the law regulation in 1908.