46 resultados para entrepreneurial
Resumo:
Purpose: The paper analyzes the micro-angels investment behaviour, looking both to the criteria used in the selection of their investment projects and to the characteristics of their guidance role during the investment period. Design/Methodology/Approach: The paper focuses on a double bottom line movement of French micro-angels clubs that has been operating since 1983. Our primary source of data is an online survey carried out during March 2012, asking members of clubs all over France for different aspects of their procedures. Findings: Our findings suggest that micro-angels are interested in small, socially or environmentally friendly projects having the potential to contribute to the development of their neighbourhood. We find that women are even more interested than men in such projects. Educated micro-angels value entrepreneurial motivation and understanding of the project more than less-educated micro-angels. We also point out the factors that micro-angels consider important in accompanying enterprises. Here we find that gender makes little difference. However, retired micro-angels value financial diagnosis made conjointly with entrepreneurs, while both active micro-angels and educated micro-angels value more the use of their network to help micro-entrepreneurs. Practical/Social Implications: Given the potential benefits of micro-angels investing and guiding the development of micro-enterprises, a social micro-angel investment on a major scale in developing countries could help in tackling some of the problems faced by the development of microfinance, such as the over-indebtedness of micro-entrepreneurs. Practitioners and new initiatives would gain from understanding what adaptations need to be made. Originality/value: We expect to add to the venture capital theory to take into account non-economic motives.
Resumo:
We propose an adverse selection framework in which the financial sector has a dual role. It amplifies or dampens exogenous shocks and also generates endogenous fluctuations. We fully characterize constrained optimal contracts in a setting in which entrepreneurs need to borrow and are privately informed about the quality of their projects. Our characterization is novel in analyzing pooling and separating allocations in a context of multi-dimensional screening: specifically, the amounts of investment undertaken and of entrepreneurial net worth are used to screen projects. We then embed these results in a dynamic competitive economy. First, we show how endogenous regime switches in financial contracts may generate fluctuations in an economy that exhibits no dynamics under full information. Unlike previous models of endogenous cycles, our result does not rely on entrepreneurial net worth being counter-cyclical or inconsequential for determining investment. Secondly, the model shows the different implications of adverse selection as opposed to pure moral hazard. In particular, and contrary to standard results in the macroeconomic literature, the financial system may dampen exogenous shocks in the presence of adverse selection.
Resumo:
Excess entry refers to the high failure rate of new entrepreneurial ventures. Economic explanations suggest 'hit and run' entrants and risk-seeking behavior. A psychological explanation is that people (entrepreneurs) are overconfident in their abilities (Camerer & Lovallo, 1999). Characterizing entry decisions as ambiguous gambles, we alternatively suggest following Heath and Tversky (1991) that people seek ambiguity when the source of uncertainty is related to their competence. Overconfidence, as such, plays no role. This hypothesis is confirmed in an experimental study that also documents the phenomenon of reference group neglect. Finally, we emphasize the utility that people gain from engaging in activities that contribute to a sense of competence. This is an important force in economic activity that deserves more explicit attention.
Resumo:
This paper characterizes the relationship between entrepreneurial wealth and aggregate investment under adverse selection. Its main finding is that such a relationship need not be monotonic. In particular, three results emerge from the analysis: (i) pooling equilibria, in which investment is independent of entrepreneurial wealth, are more likely to arise when entrepreneurial wealth is relatively low; (ii) separating equilibria, in which investment is increasing in entrepreneurial wealth, are most likely to arise when entrepreneurial wealth is relatively high and; (iii) for a given interest rate, an increase in entrepreneurial wealth may generate a discontinuous fall in investment.
Resumo:
We investigate the determinants of regional development using a newly constructed database of 1569 sub-national regions from 110 countries covering 74 percent of the world s surface and 97 percent of its GDP. We combine the cross-regional analysis of geographic, institutional, cultural, and human capital determinants of regional development with an examination of productivity in several thousand establishments located in these regions. To organize the discussion, we present a new model of regional development that introduces into a standard migration framework elements of both the Lucas (1978) model of the allocation of talent between entrepreneurship and work, and the Lucas (1988) model of human capital externalities. The evidence points to the paramount importance of human capital in accounting for regional differences in development, but also suggests from model estimation and calibration that entrepreneurial inputs and possibly human capital externalities help understand the data.
Resumo:
I develop an overlapping-generations framework in which changes in lending standards generateendogenous cycles. In my economy, entrepreneurs who are privately informed about thequality of their projects need to borrow funds. Intermediaries screen entrepreneurs both throughthe amount of investment undertaken and through the level of entrepreneurial net worth.I show that endogenous regime switches in financial contracts from pooling to separatingand vice-versa may generate fluctuations even in the absence of exogenous shocks. Whenthe economy is in the pooling (separating) regime, lending standards seem lax ( tight ) andinvestment is high (low). Differently from the existing literature, my model does not requireentrepreneurial net worth to be counter cyclycal or inconsequential for determining aggregateinvestment.
Resumo:
Excess entry refers to the high failure rate of new entrepreneurial ventures. Economic explanations suggest 'hit and run' entrants and risk-seeking behavior. A psychological explanation is that people (entrepreneurs) are overconfident in their abilities (Camerer & Lovallo, 1999). Characterizing entry decisions as ambiguous gambles, we alternatively suggest following Heath and Tversky (1991) that people seek ambiguity when the source of uncertainty is related to their competence. Overconfidence, as such, plays no role. This hypothesis is confirmed in an experimental study that also documents the phenomenon of reference group neglect. Finally, we emphasize the utility that people gain from engaging in activities that contribute to a sense of competence. This is an important force in economic activity that deserves more explicit attention.
Resumo:
This paper characterizes the relationship between entrepreneurial wealth and aggregate investmentunder adverse selection. Its main finding is that such a relationship need not bemonotonic. In particular, three results emerge from the analysis: (i) pooling equilibria, in whichinvestment is independent of entrepreneurial wealth, are more likely to arise when entrepreneurialwealth is relatively low; (ii) separating equilibria, in which investment is increasing inentrepreneurial wealth, are most likely to arise when entrepreneurial wealth is relatively highand; (iii) for a given interest rate, an increase in entrepreneurial wealth may generate a discontinuousfall in investment.
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Sometimes, behind the entrepreneurial profit the degree of monopoly is concealed. What it occurs with the models of investments evaluation when the skill of the employer consists on having capacity to capture the regulator?
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Employment growth is strongly predicted by smaller average establishment size, both acrosscities and across industries within cities, but there is little consensus on why this relationshipexists. Traditional economic explanations emphasize factors that reduce entry costs or raiseentrepreneurial returns, thereby increasing net returns and attracting entrepreneurs. A secondclass of theories hypothesizes that some places are endowed with a greater supply of entrepreneurship. Evidence on sales per worker does not support the higher returns for entrepreneurshiprationale. Our evidence suggests that entrepreneurship is higher when fixed costs are lower andwhen there are more entrepreneurial people.
Resumo:
En la literatura sobre creació d’empreses, les dones empresàries són considerades un re· servori de desenvolupament econòmic i un model de gestió empresarial alternatiu. D’al· tra banda, els immigrants posseeixen un fort esperit emprenedor. El paper de les adminis· tracions locals per donar suport a aquests col· lectius en la creació d’empreses és rellevant. L’intens procés migratori viscut a Osona en els darrers anys mereix una anàlisi des de la perspectiva de l’emprenedoria de gènere. Aquest estudi fa una comparació de les em· presàries autòctones i immigrades de la co· marca, així com de les polítiques de suport realitzades pels ajuntaments.
Resumo:
[eng] This paper examines the quantitative effects of gender gaps in entrepreneurship and labor force participation on aggregate productivity and income per capita. We simulate an occupational choice model with heterogeneous agents in entrepreneurial ability, where agents choose to be workers, self-employed or employers. The model assumes that men and women have the same talent distribution, but we impose several frictions on women's opportunities and pay in the labor market. In particular, we restrict the fraction of women participating in the labor market.
Resumo:
This paper examines the quantitative effects of gender gaps in entrepreneurship and labor force participation on aggregate productivity and income per capita. We simulate an occupational choice model with heterogeneous agents in entrepreneurial ability, where agents choose to be workers, self-employed or employers. The model assumes that men and women have the same talent distribution, but we impose several frictions on women's opportunities and pay in the labor market. In particular, we restrict the fraction of women participating in the labor market.
Resumo:
This paper examines the quantitative effects of gender gaps in entrepreneurship and labor force participation on aggregate productivity and income per capita. We simulate an occupational choice model with heterogeneous agents in entrepreneurial ability, where agents choose to be workers, self-employed or employers. The model assumes that men and women have the same talent distribution, but we impose several frictions on women's opportunities and pay in the labor market. In particular, we restrict the fraction of women participating in the labor market.
Resumo:
Peer-reviewed