On the origins of electoral systems and political parties. The role of elections in multi-member districts

The old, understudied electoral system composed of multi-member districts, open ballot and plurality rule is presented as the most remote scene of the origin of both political parties and new electoral systems. A survey of the uses of this set of electoral rules in different parts of the world during remote and recent periods shows its wide spread. A model of voting by this electoral system demonstrates that, while it can produce varied and pluralistic representation, it also provides incentives to form factional or partisan candidacies. Famous negative reactions to the emergence of factions and political parties during the 18th and 19th centuries are reinterpreted in this context. Many electoral rules and procedures invented since the second half of the 19th century, including the Australian ballot, single-member districts, limited and cumulative ballots, and proportional representation rules, derived from the search to reduce the effects of the originating multi-member district system in favor of a single party sweep. The general relations between political parties and electoral systems are restated to account for the foundational stage here discussed.

Negativity effect in multiparty electoral competition

We construct a dynamic voting model of multiparty competition in order to capture the following facts: voters base their decision on past economicperformance of the parties, and parties and candidates have different objectives. This model may explain the emergence of parties' ideologies,and shows the compatibility of the different objectives of parties and candidates. Together, these results give rise to the formation ofpolitical parties, as infinetely-lived agents with a certain ideology, out of the competition of myopic candidates freely choosing policy positions. We also show that in multicandidate elections held under the plurality system, Hotelling's principle of minimum differentiation is no longer satisfied.

Electoral platforms, implemented policies and abstention

Recent studies of American politics evidence that political polarization of both the electorate and the political elite have moved 'almost in tandem for the past half century' (McCarty et al., 2003, p.2), and that party polarization has steadily increased since the 1970s. On the other hand, the empirical literature on party platforms and implemented policies has consistently found an imperfect but nonnegligible correlation between electoral platforms and governmental policies: while platforms tend to be polarized, policies are moderate or centrist. However, existing theoretical models of political competition are not manifestly compatible with these observations.In this paper, we distinguish between electoral platforms and implemented policies by incorporating a non-trivial policy-setting process. It follows that voters may care not only about the implemented policy but also about the platform they support with their vote. We find that while parties tend to polarize their positions, the risk of alienating their constituency prevents them from radicalizing. The analysis evidences that the distribution of the electorate, and not only the (expected) location of a pivotal voter, matters in determining policies. Our results are consistent with the observation of polarized platforms and moderate policies, and the alienation and indifference components of abstention.

Estimating parliamentary composition through electoral polls

Any electoral system has an electoral formula that converts voteproportions into parliamentary seats. Pre-electoral polls usually focuson estimating vote proportions and then applying the electoral formulato give a forecast of the parliament's composition. We here describe theproblems arising from this approach: there is always a bias in theforecast. We study the origin of the bias and some methods to evaluateand to reduce it. We propose some rules to compute the sample sizerequired for a given forecast accuracy. We show by Monte Carlo simulationthe performance of the proposed methods using data from Spanish electionsin last years. We also propose graphical methods to visualize how electoralformulae and parliamentary forecasts work (or fail).

Electoral competition under the threat of political unrest

We study elections in which one party (the strong party) controls a source of political unrest; e.g., this party could instigate riots if it lost the election. We show that the strong party is more likely to win the election when there is less information about its ability to cause unrest. This is because when theweak party is better informed, it can more reliably prevent political unrest by implementing a ``centrist'' policy. When there is uncertainty over the credibility of the threat, ``posturing'' by the strong party leads to platform divergence.

Voto dual y abstención diferencial. Un estudio sobre el comportamiento electoral en Cataluña

En este trabajo se presentan los resultados de un estudio empírico sobre los motivos del cambio sistemático de resultados electorales que se da en Cataluña según el ámbito de la convocatoria electoral de que se trate. La hipótesis, contrastada positivamente con datos del período 1982-1993, es que la victoria del partido nacionalista de centro derecha en las elecciones autonómicas en un territorio donde vencen siempre los socialistas en las elecciones legislativas se debe a la combinación de los fenómenos del voto dual y del abstencionismo diferencial. La aproximación metodológica de la elección racional permite construir grupos de electores que tienen distintas percepciones del espacio en el que se dirime la competición política, hecho que les induce a un comportamiento electoral diferenciado. Combinando estos resultados con los obtenidos del análisis con datos socioestructurales agregados, se establece un cierto perfil de los votantes duales y de los abstencionistas diferenciales. Finalmente, se realiza una interpretación de los resultados de las elecciones catalanas de 1995 y 1999 a la luz de los resultados de este estudio.This article presents the results of an empirical study about the reasons of the systematic change in the electoral results in Catalonia according to the type of elections. The hypothesis, positively tested with data from the period 1982-1993, is that the victory of the nationalist centre-right party in the autonomous elections in a region where always wins the socialist party in general elections, is due to the combination of the dual vote and differential abstention phenomena. The rational choice methodological approach allow to construct groups of electors with different perceptions about the space in which the political race takes place, fact that induces them different electoral behaviour. In combining these results with those obtained from the analysis with aggregated social and structural data, it is defined a certain the profile of the dual voters and the differential non-voters. Finally, it is given an interpretation of the Catalan election results in 1995 and 1999 using as a clue the results of this study.

Improving college access and success for low-income students: Evidence from a large need-based grant program

Using comprehensive administrative data on France's single largest financialaid program, this paper provides new evidence on the impact of large-scaleneed-based grant programs on the college enrollment decisions, persistenceand graduation rates of low-income students. We exploit sharp discontinuitiesin the grant eligibility formula to identify the impact of aid on student outcomesat different levels of study. We find that eligibility for an annual cashallowance of 1,500 euros increases college enrollment rates by up to 5 percentagepoints. Moreover, we show that need-based grants have positive effectson student persistence and degree completion.

Does partisan alignment affect the electoral reward of intergovernmental transfers?

[spa] En este trabajo analizamos la hipótesis que las transferencias asignadas a los municipios políticamente alineados generan un mayor apoyo político que las transferencias asignada a los municipios gobernados por la oposición. Para contrastar esta hipótesis utilizamos datos de las transferencias recibidas por 617 municipios españoles procedentes de dos niveles de gobierno superiores (Regional o Autonómico y Supra-Local o Diputaciones) durante el período 1993-2003, así como datos de los votos obtenidos en las tres elecciones celebradas en los diferentes niveles de gobierno durante este período.

The international competitiveness of cava : success of a particular firm or the district?

[spa] En primer lugar el autor se pregunta qué es lo que exactamente significa la palabra éxito aplicada al caso de la evolución reciente de la industria catalana del cava. La comparación de las trayectorias seguidas por la industria italiana del spumante y la del más reputado vino espumoso del mundo, el champagne, muestran una trayectoria muy positiva del volumen de producción y de las exportaciones. En segundo lugar el papel se pregunta por el agente responsable de este éxito. ¿Se debe a una empresa en particular o, por el contrario, al distrito en su conjunto, atendiendo que nos hallamos ante un sector muy concentrado geográficamente en torno a Sant Sadurní d’Anoia? La concentración de las exportaciones en más de dos tercios en manos de una sola empresa justificaría atribuir a dicha empresa el éxito. Sin embargo el análisis histórico de la formación del distrito industrial del cava en la zona del Penedés muestra como los productores se han podido beneficiar de las economías externas marshallianas inherentes a este tipo de concentraciones. El papel muestra que el éxito de la empresa exportadora líder se explica por la existencia de este tipo de ventajas invisibles derivadas de la concentración.

Does partisan alignment affect the electoral reward of intergovernmental transfers?

[spa] En este trabajo analizamos la hipótesis que las transferencias asignadas a los municipios políticamente alineados generan un mayor apoyo político que las transferencias asignada a los municipios gobernados por la oposición. Para contrastar esta hipótesis utilizamos datos de las transferencias recibidas por 617 municipios españoles procedentes de dos niveles de gobierno superiores (Regional o Autonómico y Supra-Local o Diputaciones) durante el período 1993-2003, así como datos de los votos obtenidos en las tres elecciones celebradas en los diferentes niveles de gobierno durante este período.

The international competitiveness of cava : success of a particular firm or the district?

[spa] En primer lugar el autor se pregunta qué es lo que exactamente significa la palabra éxito aplicada al caso de la evolución reciente de la industria catalana del cava. La comparación de las trayectorias seguidas por la industria italiana del spumante y la del más reputado vino espumoso del mundo, el champagne, muestran una trayectoria muy positiva del volumen de producción y de las exportaciones. En segundo lugar el papel se pregunta por el agente responsable de este éxito. ¿Se debe a una empresa en particular o, por el contrario, al distrito en su conjunto, atendiendo que nos hallamos ante un sector muy concentrado geográficamente en torno a Sant Sadurní d’Anoia? La concentración de las exportaciones en más de dos tercios en manos de una sola empresa justificaría atribuir a dicha empresa el éxito. Sin embargo el análisis histórico de la formación del distrito industrial del cava en la zona del Penedés muestra como los productores se han podido beneficiar de las economías externas marshallianas inherentes a este tipo de concentraciones. El papel muestra que el éxito de la empresa exportadora líder se explica por la existencia de este tipo de ventajas invisibles derivadas de la concentración.

Effects of math anxiety on student success in higher education

This study examines whether math anxiety and negative attitudes toward mathematics have an effect on university students" academic achievement in a methodological course forming part of their degree. A total of 193 students were presented with a math anxiety test and some questions about their enjoyment, self-confidence and motivation regarding mathematics, and their responses were assessed in relation to the grades they had obtained during continuous assessment on a course entitled"Research Design". Results showed that low performance on the course was related to math anxiety and negative attitudes toward mathematics. We suggest that these factors may affect students" performance and should therefore be taken into account in attempts to improve students" learning processes in methodological courses of this kind.

Uncertainty, electoral incentives and political myopia

We study the determinants of political myopia in a rational model of electoral accountability where the key elements are informational frictions and uncertainty. We build aframework where political ability is ex-ante unknown and policy choices are not perfectlyobservable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politicians invest too little in costly policies withfuture returns in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reelection probability.Contrary to the conventional wisdom, uncertainty reduces political myopia and may, undersome conditions, increase social welfare. We use the model to study how political rewardscan be set so as to maximise social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limitto governments. The predictions of our theory are consistent with a number of stylised factsand with a new empirical observation documented in this paper: aggregate uncertainty, measured by economic volatility, is associated to better fiscal discipline in a panel of 20 OECDcountries.

El sistema electoral de les Corts Valencianes: orígens i reforma

[cat] Aquest article vol refutar la hipòtesi que els partits decideixen sistemes electorals majoritaris i que decideixen també mantenir-los invariables, sempre que el sistema de partits s"aproximi al bipartidisme i cap dels dos grans partits pugui perdre la seva posició a favor d"un nou competidor. De manera inversa, els sistemes electorals proporcionals són la conseqüència del multipartidisme, en el qual cap partit té opcions de rebre la majoria dels vots. El cas valencià, però, confirma només parcialment la hipòtesi: els partits van aprovar el 1982 regles proporcionals perquè les eleccions dels parlaments autonòmics eren considerades secundàries, no només pel multipartidisme existent aleshores. En canvi, sí que es confirma que el canvi iniciat el 2006 amb la reforma estatutària manté, de moment, l"status quo per no alterar la formació de majories parlamentàries. Encara queda pendent, però, que es modifiqui la Llei Electoral, de la qual depèn quin mínim de vots per entrar a les Corts s"establirà.