All assignment games with the same core have the same nucleolus

There exist coalitional games with transferable utility which have the same core but different nucleoli. We show that this cannot happen in the case of assignment games. Whenever two assignment games have the same core, their nucleoli also coincide. To show this, we prove that the nucleolus of an assignment game coincides with that of its buyer-seller exact representative

On the monotonic core

The monotonic core of a cooperative game with transferable utility (T.U.-game) is the set formed by all its Population Monotonic Allocation Schemes. In this paper we show that this set always coincides with the core of a certain game associated to the initial game.

On the dimension of the core of the assignment game

The set of optimal matchings in the assignment matrix allows to define a reflexive and symmetric binary relation on each side of the market, the equal-partner binary relation. The number of equivalence classes of the transitive closure of the equal-partner binary relation determines the dimension of the core of the assignment game. This result provides an easy procedure to determine the dimension of the core directly from the entries of the assignment matrix and shows that the dimension of the core is not as much determined by the number of optimal matchings as by their relative position in the assignment matrix.

Multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment markets: the nucleolus and the core-center

En aquest treball mostrem que, a diferència del cas bilateral, per als mercats multilaterals d'assignació coneguts amb el nom de Böhm-Bawerk assignment games, el nucleolus i el core-center, i. e. el centre de masses del core, no coincideixen en general. Per demostrar-ho provem que donant un m-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game les dues solucions anteriors poden obtenir-se respectivament del nucleolus i el core-center d'un joc convex definit en el conjunt format pels m sectors. Encara més, provem que per calcular el nucleolus d'aquest últim joc només les coalicions formades per un jugador o m-1 jugadors són importants. Aquests resultats simplifiquen el càlcul del nucleolus d'un multi-sided ¿¿ohm-Bawerk assignment market amb un número molt elevat d'agents.

The Lorenz-maximal core allocations and the kernel in some classes of assignment games

En aquest treball demostrem que en la classe de jocs d'assignació amb diagonal dominant (Solymosi i Raghavan, 2001), el repartiment de Thompson (que coincideix amb el valor tau) és l'únic punt del core que és maximal respecte de la relació de dominància de Lorenz, i a més coincideix amb la solucié de Dutta i Ray (1989), també coneguda com solució igualitària. En segon lloc, mitjançant una condició més forta que la de diagonal dominant, introduïm una nova classe de jocs d'assignació on cada agent obté amb la seva parella òptima almenys el doble que amb qualsevol altra parella. Per aquests jocs d'assignació amb diagonal 2-dominant, el repartiment de Thompson és l'únic punt del kernel, i per tant el nucleolo.

On the coincidence between the Shimomura's bargaining sets and the core

[cat] En l'article es dona una condició necessària per a que els conjunts de negociació definits per Shimomura (1997) i el nucli d'un joc cooperatiu amb utilitat transferible coincideixin. A tal efecte, s'introdueix el concepte de vectors de màxim pagament. La condició necessària consiteix a verificar que aquests vectors pertanyen al nucli del joc.

The assignment game: core bounds for mixed-pair coalitions

In the assignment game framework, we try to identify those assignment matrices in which no entry can be increased without changing the coreof the game. These games will be called buyer¿seller exact games and satisfy the condition that each mixed¿pair coalition attains the corresponding matrix entry in the core of the game. For a given assignment game, a unique buyerseller exact assignment game with the same core is proved to exist. In order to identify this matrix and to provide a characterization of those assignment games which are buyer¿seller exact in terms of the assignment matrix, attainable upper and lower core bounds for the mixed¿pair coalitions are found. As a consequence, an open question posed in Quint (1991) regarding a canonical representation of a ¿45o¿lattice¿ by means of the core of an assignment game can now be answered

On the coincidence of the Mas-Colell bargaining set and the core

In this paper we prove that the Mas-Colell bargaining set coincides with the core for three-player balanced and superadditive cooperative games. This is no longer true without the superadditivity condition or for games with more than three-players. Furthermore, under the same assumptions, the coincidence between the Mas-Collel and the individual rational bargaining set (Vohra (1991)) is revealed. Keywords: Cooperative game, Mas-Colell bargaining set, balancedness, individual rational bargaining set. JEL classi fication: C71, D63, D71.

The equity core and the core

In this paper we study the equity core (Selten, 1978) and compare it with the core. A payo vector is in the equity core if no coalition can divide its value among its members proportionally to a given weight system and, in this way, give more to each member than the amount he or she receives in the payo vector. We show that the equity core is a compact extension of the core and that, for non-negative games, the intersection of all equity cores with respect to all weights coincides with the core of the game. Keywords: Cooperative game, equity core, equal division core, core. JEL classi cation: C71

Effects of erythropoietin on muscle O2 transport during exercise in patients with chronic renal failure.

Erythropoietin (rHuEPO) has proven to be effective in the treatment of anemia of chronic renal failure (CRF). Despite improving the quality of life, peak oxygen uptake after rHuEPO therapy is not improved as much as the increase in hemoglobin concentration ([Hb)] would predict. We hypothesized that this discrepancy is due to failure of O2 transport rates to rise in a manner proportional to [Hb]. To test this, eight patients with CRF undergoing regular hemodialysis were studied pre- and post-rHuEPO ([Hb] = 7.5 +/- 1.0 vs. 12.5 +/- 1.0 g x dl-1) using a standard incremental cycle exercise protocol. A group of 12 healthy sedentary subjects of similar age and anthropometric characteristics served as controls. Arterial and femoral venous blood gas data were obtained and coupled with simultaneous measurements of femoral venous blood flow (Qleg) by thermodilution to obtain O2 delivery and oxygen uptake (VO2). Despite a 68% increase in [Hb], peak VO2 increased by only 33%. This could be explained largely by reduced peak leg blood flow, limiting the gain in O2 delivery to 37%. At peak VO2, after rHuEPO, O2 supply limitation of maximal VO2 was found to occur, permitting the calculation of a value for muscle O2 conductance from capillary to mitochondria (DO2). While DO2 was slightly improved after rHuEPO, it was only 67% of that of sedentary control subjects. This kept maximal oxygen extraction at only 70%. Two important conclusions can be reached from this study. First, the increase in [Hb] produced by rHuEPO is accompanied by a significant reduction in peak blood flow to exercising muscle, which limits the gain in oxygen transport. Second, even after restoration of [Hb], O2 conductance from the muscle capillary to the mitochondria remains considerably below normal.

The Determinants of Exit in Argentina: Core and Peripheral Regions

This paper analyses the regional determinants of exit in Argentina. We find evidence of a dynamic revolving door by which past entrants increase current exits, particularly in the peripheral regions. In the central regions, current and past incumbents cause an analogous displacement effect. Also, exit shows a U-shaped relationship with respect to the informal economy, although the positive effect is weaker in the central regions. These findings point to the existence of a core-periphery structure in the spatial distribution of exits. Key words: firm exit, count data models, Argentina JEL: R12; R30; C33

A security layer for JXTA core protocols

JXTA define un conjunto de seis protocolos básicos especialmente adecuados para una computación ad hoc, permanente, multi-hop, peer-to-peer (P2P). Estos protocolos permiten que los iguales cooperen y formen grupos autónomos de pares. Este artículo presenta un método que proporciona servicios de seguridad en los protocolos básicos: protección de datos, autenticidad, integridad y no repudio. Los mecanismos que se presentan son totalmente distribuidos y basados ¿¿en un modelo puro peer-to-peer, que no requieren el arbitraje de un tercero de confianza o una relación de confianza establecida previamente entre pares, que es uno de los principales retos en este tipo de entornos.