Cloud code test IDE

L'objectiu principal d'aquest projecte final de carrera consisteix en desenvolupar una aplicació web que oferisca un entorn simplificat de desenvolupament integrat (IDE) en el llenguatge C/C++, on els estudiants de batxillerat (o secundària en general) puguen iniciar-se en el seu estudi. La finalitat és proveir un entorn agradable a l'alumnat perquè puga seguir correctament les pràctiques que proposa el professor independentment de les circumstàncies pròpies d'aquest (ubicació temporal o permanentde l'alumnat, sistema operatiu que utilitza, dispositiu emprat per a fer les pràctiques, etc..).

XMNS, aplicació web per a la correcció automàtica de proves tipus test

Aplicació web per a la correcció automàtica de proves tipus test realitzada amb un framework PHP MVC propi i no comercial.

Motivation, Test Scores, and Economic Success

This paper argues that low-stakes test scores, available in surveys, may be partially determined by test-taking motivation, which is associated with personality traits but not with cognitive ability. Therefore, such test score distributions may not be informative regarding cognitive ability distributions. Moreover, correlations, found in survey data, between high test scores and economic success may be partially caused by favorable personality traits. To demonstrate these points, I use the coding speed test that was administered without incentives to National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY) participants. I suggest that due to its simplicity its scores may especially depend on individuals' test-taking motivation. I show that controlling for conventional measures of cognitive skills, the coding speed scores are correlated with future earnings of male NLSY participants. Moreover, the coding speed scores of highly motivated, though less educated, population (potential enlists to the armed forces) are higher than NLSY participants' scores. I then use controlled experiments to show that when no performance-based incentives are provided, participants' characteristics, but not their cognitive skills, affect effort invested in the coding speed test. Thus, participants with the same ability (measured by their scores on an incentivized test) have significantly different scores on tests without performance- based incentives.

Prime Property Institutions for a Subprime Era: Exploring Innovative Models of Residential Development and Finance

This paper breaks new ground toward contractual and institutional innovation in models of homeownership, equity building, and mortgage enforcement. Inspired by recent developments in the affordable housing sector and in other types of public financing schemes, this paper suggests extending institutional and financial strategies such as timeand place-based division of property rights, conditional subsidies, and credit mediation to alleviate the systemic risks of mortgage foreclosure. Alongside a for-profit shared equity scheme that would be led by local governments, we also outline a private market shared equity model, one of bootstrapping home buying with purchase options.

Behavioral Assumptions and Management Ability: A Tentative Test

The paper explores the consequences that relying on different behavioral assumptions in training managers may have on their future performance. We argue that training with an emphasis on the standard assumptions used in economics (rationality and self-interest) leads future managers to rely excessively on rational and explicit safeguarding, crowding out instinctive contractual heuristics and signaling a 'bad' type to potential partners. In contrast, human assumptions used in management theories, because of their diverse, implicit and even contradictory nature, do not conflict with the innate set of cooperative tools and may provide a good training ground for such tools. We present tentative confirmatory evidence by examining how the weight given to behavioral assumptions in the core courses of the top 100 business schools influences the average salaries of their MBA graduates. Controlling for the average quality of their students and some other schools' characteristics, average salaries are significantly greater for those schools whose core MBA courses contain a higher proportion of management courses as opposed to courses based on economics or technical disciplines.

Intellectual property rights and efficient firm organization

I show that intellectual property rights yield static efficiency gains, irrespective oftheir dynamic role in fostering innovation. I develop a property-rights model of firmorganization with two dimensions of non-contractible investment. In equilibrium, thefirst best is attained if and only if ownership of tangible and intangible assets is equallyprotected. If IP rights are weaker, firm structure is distorted and efficiency declines:the entrepreneur must either integrate her suppliers, which prompts a decline in theirinvestment; or else risk their defection, which entails a waste of her human capital. Mymodel predicts greater prevalence of vertical integration where IP rights are weaker,and a switch from integration to outsourcing over the product cycle. Both empiricalpredictions are consistent with evidence on multinational companies. As a normativeimplication, I find that IP rights should be strong but narrowly defined, to protect abusiness without holding up its potential spin-offs.

Property as an economic concept: Reconciling legal and economic conceptions of property rights in a Coasean framework

Adopting a simplistic view of Coase (1960), most economic analyses of property rightsdisregard both the key advantage that legal property rights (that is, in rem rights) provide torightholders in terms of enhanced enforcement, and the difficulties they pose to acquirers interms of information asymmetry about legal title. Consequently, these analyses tend to overstatethe role of "private ordering" and disregard the two key elements of property law: first, theessential conflict between property (that is, in rem) enforcement and transaction costs; and,second, the institutional solutions created to overcome it, mainly contractual registries capable ofmaking truly impersonal (that is, asset-based) trade viable when previous relevant transactionson the same assets are not verifiable by judges. This paper fills this gap by reinterpreting bothelements within the Coasean framework and thus redrawing the institutional foundations of bothproperty and corporate contracting.

A simple permutation test for clusteredness

Hierarchical clustering is a popular method for finding structure in multivariate data,resulting in a binary tree constructed on the particular objects of the study, usually samplingunits. The user faces the decision where to cut the binary tree in order to determine the numberof clusters to interpret and there are various ad hoc rules for arriving at a decision. A simplepermutation test is presented that diagnoses whether non-random levels of clustering are presentin the set of objects and, if so, indicates the specific level at which the tree can be cut. The test isvalidated against random matrices to verify the type I error probability and a power study isperformed on data sets with known clusteredness to study the type II error.

Pre-play communication and credibility: A test of Aumann's conjecture

The effectiveness of pre-play communication in achieving efficientoutcomes has long been a subject of controversy. In some environments,cheap talk may help to achieve coordination. However, Aumannconjectures that, in a variant of the Stag Hunt game, a signal forefficient play is not self-enforcing and concludes that an "agreementto play [the efficient outcome] conveys no information about what theplayers will do." Harsanyi and Selten (1988) cite this example as anillustration of risk-dominance vs. payoff-dominance. Farrell and Rabin(1996) agree with the logic, but suspect that cheap talk willnonetheless achieve efficiency. The conjecture is tested with one-waycommunication. When the sender first chooses a signal and then anaction, there is impressive coordination: a 94% probability for thepotentially efficient (but risky) play, given a signal for efficientplay. Without communication, efforts to achieve efficiency wereunsuccessful, as the proportion of B moves is only 35%. I also test ahypothesis that the order of the action and the signal affects theresults, finding that the decision order is indeed important. WhileAumann s conjecture is behaviorally disconfirmed when the signal isdetermined initially, the signal s credibility seems to be much moresuspect when the sender is known to have first chosen an action, andthe results are not statistically distinguishable from those whenthere is no signal. Some applications and issues in communication andcoordination are discussed.

Some hypothesis tests for the covariance matrix when the dimension is large compared to the sample size

This paper analyzes whether standard covariance matrix tests work whendimensionality is large, and in particular larger than sample size. Inthe latter case, the singularity of the sample covariance matrix makeslikelihood ratio tests degenerate, but other tests based on quadraticforms of sample covariance matrix eigenvalues remain well-defined. Westudy the consistency property and limiting distribution of these testsas dimensionality and sample size go to infinity together, with theirratio converging to a finite non-zero limit. We find that the existingtest for sphericity is robust against high dimensionality, but not thetest for equality of the covariance matrix to a given matrix. For thelatter test, we develop a new correction to the existing test statisticthat makes it robust against high dimensionality.

Motivation, test scores and economic success

This paper argues that low-stakes test scores, available in surveys, may be partially determinedby test-taking motivation, which is associated with personality traits but not with cognitiveability. Therefore, such test score distributions may not be informative regarding cognitiveability distributions. Moreover, correlations, found in survey data, between high test scoresand economic success may be partially caused by favorable personality traits. To demonstratethese points, I use the coding speed test that was administered without incentives to NationalLongitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY) participants. I suggest that due to its simplicityits scores may especially depend on individuals' test-taking motivation. I show that controllingfor conventional measures of cognitive skills, the coding speed scores are correlated with futureearnings of male NLSY participants. Moreover, the coding speed scores of highly motivated,though less educated, population (potential enlists to the armed forces) are higher than NLSYparticipants' scores. I then use controlled experiments to show that when no performance-basedincentives are provided, participants' characteristics, but not their cognitive skills, affect effortinvested in the coding speed test. Thus, participants with the same ability (measured by theirscores on an incentivized test) have significantly different scores on tests without performance-based incentives.

Prime property institutions for a subprime era: Toward innovative models of homeownership

This Article breaks new ground toward contractual and institutional innovation in models of homeownership, equity building, and mortgage enforcement. Inspired by recent developments in the affordable housing sector and other types of public financing schemes, we suggest extending institutional and financial strategies such as time- and place-based division of property rights, conditional subsidies, and credit mediation to alleviate the systemic risks of mortgage foreclosure. Two new solutions offer a broad theoretical basis for such developments in the economic and legal institution of homeownership: a for-profit shared equity scheme led by local governments alongside a private market shared equity model, one of "bootstrapping home buying with purchase options".

Property titling and conveyancing

This chapter analyzes titling institutions and the regulation of supporting conveyancingservices. After examining the tradeoff of enforcement benefits and consent costs posed byproperty rights, it explains how different public titling systems (privacy, recording andregistration) try to solve this tradeoff, and what the consequences are for the nature andregulation of private conveyancing services. The chapter ends with a discussion of someempirical issues and data which are useful for comparing, designing and managing titlingand conveyancing systems.

Property enforcement as organized consent

This article develops and tests a theory of the institutions that makeproperty rights viable, ensuring their enforcement, mobilizing thecollateral value of assets and promoting growth. In contrast tocontractual rights, property rights are enforced in rem, being affectedonly with the consent of the right holder. This ensures enforcement butis costly when multiple, potentially colliding rights are held in thesame asset. Different institutions reduce the cost of gathering consentsto overcome this trade-off of enforcement benefits for consent costs:recording of deeds with title insurance, registration of rights and evena regimen of purely private transactions. All three provide functionallysimilar services, but their relative performance varies with the numberof transactions, the risk of political opportunism and regulatoryconsistency. The analysis also shows the rationality of allowingcompetition in the preparation and support of private contractswhile requiring territorial monopoly in recording and registrationactivities, this to ensure independence and protect third parties.