A retail benchmarking approach to efficient two-way access pricing

We study a retail benchmarking approach to determine access prices for interconnected networks. Instead of considering fixed access charges as in the existing literature, we study access pricing rules that determine the access price that network i pays to network j as a linear function of the marginal costs and the retail prices set by both networks. In the case of competition in linear prices, we show that there is a unique linear rule that implements the Ramsey outcome as the unique equilibrium, independently of the underlying demand conditions. In the case of competition in two-part tariffs, we consider a class of access pricing rules, similar to the optimal one under linear prices but based on average retail prices. We show that firms choose the variable price equal to the marginal cost under this class of rules. Therefore, the regulator (or the competition authority) can choose one among the rules to pursue additional objectives such as consumer surplus, network coverage or investment: for instance, we show that both static and dynamic e±ciency can be achieved at the same time.

The pricing of academic journals: A two-sided market perspective

More and more academic journals adopt an open-access policy, by which articlesare accessible free of charge, while publication costs are recovered through authorfees. We study the consequences of this open access policy on a journal s qualitystandard. If the journal s objective was to maximize social welfare, open accesswould be optimal as long as the positive externalities generated by its diffusionexceed the marginal cost of distribution. However, we show that if an open accessjournal has a different objective (such as maximizing readers payoffs, the impactof the journal or its profit), it tends to choose a quality standard below the sociallyefficient level.

Access by Capacity and Peak-Load Pricing

Several European telecommunications regulatory agencies have recently introduced a fixed capacity charge (flat rate) to regulate access to the incumbent's network. The purpose of this paper is to show that the optimal capacity charge and the optimal access-minute charge analysed by Armstrong, Doyle, and Vickers (1996) have a similar structure and imply the same payment for the entrant. I extend the analysis tothe case where there is a competitor with market power. In this case, the optimalcapacity charge should be modified to avoid that the entrant cream-skims the market,fixing a longer or a shorter peak period than the optimal. Finally, I consider a multiproduct setting, where the effect of the product differentiation is exacerbated.

Access by Capacity and Peak-Load Pricing

Several European telecommunications regulatory agencies have recently introduced a fixed capacity charge (flat rate) to regulate access to the incumbent's network. The purpose of this paper is to show that the optimal capacity charge and the optimal access-minute charge analysed by Armstrong, Doyle, and Vickers (1996) have a similar structure and imply the same payment for the entrant. I extend the analysis tothe case where there is a competitor with market power. In this case, the optimalcapacity charge should be modified to avoid that the entrant cream-skims the market,fixing a longer or a shorter peak period than the optimal. Finally, I consider a multiproduct setting, where the effect of the product differentiation is exacerbated.

Renewal equations for option pricing

In this paper we will develop a methodology for obtaining pricing expressions for financial instruments whose underlying asset can be described through a simple continuous-time random walk (CTRW) market model. Our approach is very natural to the issue because it is based in the use of renewal equations, and therefore it enhances the potential use of CTRW techniques in finance. We solve these equations for typical contract specifications, in a particular but exemplifying case. We also show how a formal general solution can be found for more exotic derivatives, and we compare prices for alternative models of the underlying. Finally, we recover the celebrated results for the Wiener process under certain limits.

Effects of unit - based pricing on the waste collection demand : a meta - regression analysis

We perform a meta - analysis of 21 studies that estimate the elasticity of the price of waste collection demand upon waste quantities, a prior literature review having revealed that the price elasticity differs markedly. Based on a meta - regression with a total of 65 observations, we find no indication that municipal data give higher estimates for price elasticities than those associated with household data. Furthermore, there is no evidence that treating prices as exogenous underestimates the price elasticity. We find that much of the variation can be explained by sample size, the use of a weight - based as opposed to a volume - based pricing system, and the pricing of compostable waste. We also show that price elasticities determined in the USA and point estimations of elasticities are more elastic, but these effects are not robust to the changing of model specifications. Finally, our tests show that there is no evidence of publication bias while there is some evidence of the existence of genuine empirical effect.

Platform pricing and consumer foresight: The case of airports

Airports have become platforms that derive revenues from both aeronautical and commercial activities. The demand for these services is characterized by a one-way complementarity in that only air travelers can purchase retail goods at the airport terminals. We analyze a model of optimal airport behavior in which this one-way complementarity is subject to consumer foresight, i.e., consumers may not anticipate in full the ex post retail surplus when purchasing a flight ticket. An airport sets landing fees, and, in addition, also chooses the retail market structure by selecting the number of retail concessions to be awarded. We find that, with perfectly myopic consumers, the airport chooses to attract more passengers via low landing fees, and also sets the minimum possible number of retailers in order to increase the concessions’ revenues, from which it obtains the largest share of profits. However, even a very small amount of anticipation of the consumer surplus from retail activities changes significantly the airport’s choices: the optimal airport policy is dependent on the degree of differentiation in the retail market. When consumers instead have perfect foresight, the airport establishes a very competitive retail market, where consumers enjoy a large surplus. This attracts passengers and it is exploited by the airport by charging higher landing fees, which then constitute the largest share of its profits. Overall, the airport’s profits are maximal when consumers have perfect foresight. Keywords: two-sided markets, platform pricing, one-way demand complementarity, consumer foresight. JEL classification: L1, L2, L93.

A Grid Supercomputing Enviroment for High Demand Computational Applications

Despite the huge increase in processor and interprocessor network performace, many computational problems remain unsolved due to lack of some critical resources such as floating point sustained performance, memory bandwidth, etc... Examples of these problems are found in areas of climate research, biology, astrophysics, high energy physics (montecarlo simulations) and artificial intelligence, among others. For some of these problems, computing resources of a single supercomputing facility can be 1 or 2 orders of magnitude apart from the resources needed to solve some them. Supercomputer centers have to face an increasing demand on processing performance, with the direct consequence of an increasing number of processors and systems, resulting in a more difficult administration of HPC resources and the need for more physical space, higher electrical power consumption and improved air conditioning, among other problems. Some of the previous problems can´t be easily solved, so grid computing, intended as a technology enabling the addition and consolidation of computing power, can help in solving large scale supercomputing problems. In this document, we describe how 2 supercomputing facilities in Spain joined their resources to solve a problem of this kind. The objectives of this experience were, among others, to demonstrate that such a cooperation can enable the solution of bigger dimension problems and to measure the efficiency that could be achieved. In this document we show some preliminary results of this experience and to what extend these objectives were achieved.

Endogenous integration and welfare in complementary goods markets

This paper analyzes the strategic decision to integrate by firms that produce complementary products. Integration entails bundling pricing. We find out that integration is privately profitable for a high enough degree of product differentiation, that profits of the non-integrated firms decrease, and that consumer surplus need not necessarily increase when firms integrate despite the fact that prices diminish. Thus, integration of a system is welfare-improving for a high enough degree of product differentiation combined with a minimum demand advantage relative to the competing system. Overall, and from a number of extensions undertaken, we conclude that bundling need not be anti-competitive and that integration should be permitted only under some circumstances.

Collusion and fights in an experiment with price-setting firms and production in advance

We present results from 50-round market experiments in which firms decide repeatedly both on price and quantity of a completely perishable good. Each firm has capacity to serve the whole market. The stage game does not have an equilibrium in pure strategies. We run experiments for markets with two and three identical firms. Firms tend to cooperate to avoid fights, but when they fight bankruptcies are rather frequent. On average, pricing behavior is closer to that for pure quantity than for pure price competition and price and efficiency levels are higher for two than for three firms. Consumer surplus increases with the number of firms, but unsold production leads to higher efficiency losses with more firms. Over time prices tend to the highest possible one for markets both with two and three firms.

Valuation of defaultable bonds and debt restructuring

In this paper we develop a contingent valuation model for zero-coupon bonds with default. In order to emphasize the role of maturity time and place of the lender’s claim in the hierarchy of debt of a firm, we consider a firm that issues two bonds with different maturities and different seniorage. The model allows us to analyze the implications of both debt renegotiation and capital structure of a firm on the prices of bonds. We obtain that renegotiation brings about a significant change in the bond prices and that the effect is dispersed through different channels: increasing the value of the firm, reallocating payments, and avoiding costly liquidation. Moreover, the presence of two creditors leads to qualitatively different implications for pricing, while emphasizing the importance of bond covenants and renegotiation of the entire debt.

Price competition under cost uncertainty: A laboratory analysis

We study the relation between the number of firms and price-cost margins under price competition with uncertainty about competitors' costs. We present results of an experiment in which two, three and four identical firms repeatedly interact in this environment. In line with the theoretical prediction, market prices decrease with the number of firms, but on average stay above marginal costs. Pricing is less aggressive in duopolies than in triopolies and tetrapolies. However, independently from the number of firms, pricing is more aggressive than in the theoretical equilibrium. Both the absolute and the relative surpluses increase with the number of firms. Total surplus is close to the equilibrium level, since enhanced consumer surplus through lower prices is counteracted by occasional displacements of the most efficient firm in production.

Asymmetric demand information in uniform and discriminatory call auctions: an experimental analysis motivated by electricity markets

We study the outcomes of experimental multi-unit uniform and discriminatory auctions with demand uncertainty. Our study is motivated by the ongoing debate about market design in the electricity industry. Our main aim is to compare the effect of asymmetric demand-information between sellers on the performance of the two auction institutions. In our baseline conditions all sellers have the same information, whereas in our treatment conditions some sellers have better information than others. In both information conditions we find that average transaction prices and price volatility are not significantly different under the two auction institutions. However, when there is asymmetric information among sellers the discriminatory auction is significantly less efficient. These results are not in line with the typical arguments made in favor of discriminatory pricing in electricity industries; namely, lower consumer prices and less price volatility. Moreover, our results provide some indication that discriminatory auctions reduce technical efficiency relative to uniform auctions.

Estudi sobre equalització electrònica per a sistemes de comunicació per fibra òptica

Estudi realitzat a partir d’una estada a Bell Labs (Lucent Technologies), New Jersey (Estats Units), entre el 15 de setembre de 2005 i el 15 de gener de 2006. Els sistemes de transmissió per fibra òptica fonamenten les principals xarxes de comunicacions. A mesura que la demanda d’ample de banda per usuari creixi, seran necessaris nous sistemes que siguin capaços de cobrir les necessitats a curt i llarg termini. La tecnologia dels sistemes òptics limita fortament la complexitat dels sistemes de transmissió / recepció en comparació, per exemple, als sistemes d’ones de ràdio. La tendència és la de dissenyar sistemes avançats amb detecció directa i mirar d’aplicar tècniques bàsiques de processat del senyal. Una d’aquestes tècniques és l’equalització electrònica, és a dir, fer ús de les tècniques de processament del senyal per tal de compensar la distorsió introduïda pel canal, deguda per una o diverses degradacions típiques: dispersió cromàtica, efectes no lineals, dispersió del mode de polarització (PMD) ... Dins d’un entorn comercial d’empresa, s’ha avaluat el funcionament dels sistemes d’equalització FFE-DFE aixi com MLSE en presència de dispersió cromàtica i/o dispersió del mode de polarització (PMD) en transmissions NRZ/RZ.

Variational inequalities in Hilbert spaces with measures and optimal stopping problems

We study the existence theory for parabolic variational inequalities in weighted L2 spaces with respect to excessive measures associated with a transition semigroup. We characterize the value function of optimal stopping problems for finite and infinite dimensional diffusions as a generalized solution of such a variational inequality. The weighted L2 setting allows us to cover some singular cases, such as optimal stopping for stochastic equations with degenerate diffusion coeficient. As an application of the theory, we consider the pricing of American-style contingent claims. Among others, we treat the cases of assets with stochastic volatility and with path-dependent payoffs.