The role of institutions in the contractual process

Human beings increase their productivity by specializingtheir resources and exchanging their products. Theorganization of exchange is costly, however, becausespecialized activities need coordination and incentiveshave to be aligned. This work first describes how theseexchanges are organized in an institutional environment.It then focuses on the dual effect of this environment-as with any other specialized resource, institutions maybe used for expropriation purposes. They enjoyspecialization advantages in safeguarding exchange butthey also make possible new forms of opportunism,causing new costs of exchange. Three perverse tendenciesare identified:In the legal field, there is a surplus ofmandatory rules and, at the same time, a deficit in default rules. Second, courts activity is biased againstthe quasi-judicial role of the parties and the market. Third, Market enforcement is based on reputationalassets that are badly exposed to opportunism.

A process approach to the utility for gambling

This paper argues that any specific utility or disutility for gamblingmust be excluded from expected utility because such a theory is consequentialwhile a pleasure or displeasure for gambling is a matter of process, notof consequences. A (dis)utility for gambling is modeled as a process utilitywhich monotonically combines with expected utility restricted to consequences.This allows for a process (dis)utility for gambling to be revealed. Asan illustration, the model shows how empirical observations in the Allaisparadox can reveal a process disutility of gambling. A more general modelof rational behavior combining processes and consequences is then proposedand discussed.

Monitoring the university admissions process in Spain

The examinations taken by high-school graduates in Spain and the role ofthe examination in the university admissions process are described. Thefollowing issues arising in the assessment of the process are discussed:reliability of grading, comparability of the grades and scores(equating),maintenance of standards, and compilation and use of the grading process,and their integration in the operational grading are proposed. Variousschemes for score adjustment are reviewed and feasibility of theirimplementation discussed. The advantages of pretesting of items and ofempirical checks of experts' judgements are pointed out. The paperconcludes with an outline of a planned reorganisation of the highereducation in Spain, and with a call for a comprehensive programme ofempirical research concurrent with the operation of the examination andscoring system.

The provision on non-audit services by auditors: Let the market evolve and decide

The provision of non-audit services by auditors to their auditclients reduces total costs, increases technical competence and motivates more intense competition. Furthermore, theseservices do not necessarily damage auditor independence nor the quality of non-audit services. This assessment leads to recommending that legislative policy should aim at facilitating the development and use of the safeguardsprovided by the free action of market forces. Regulation should thus aim to enable the parties-audit firms, self-regulatory bodies and audit clients-to discover through competitive market interaction both the most efficient mix of services and the corresponding quality safeguards, adjusting for the costs and benefits of each possibility. Particular emphasis is placed on the role played by fee income diversification and the enhancement, through disclosurerules, of market incentives to diversify.

Audit quality: Attributes, private safeguards and the role of regulation

This article examines the private mechanisms used to safeguard quality in auditing, with a view to defining rules capable of facilitating the performance of market forces. An outline is given of a general theory of private quality assurance in auditing, based on the use of quasi-rents to self-enforce quality dimensions. Particular attention is paid to the role of fee income diversification as the key ingredient of private incentives for audit quality. The role of public regulation is then situated in the context defined by the presence of these safeguard mechanisms. This helps in defining the content of rules and the function of regulatory bodies in facilitating and strengthening the protective operation of the market. By making sense of the interaction between regulation, quality attributes and private safeguards, the analysis helps to evaluate the relative merits of different regulatory options.