Do market conditions affect preferences? Evidence from experimental markets with excess supply and excess demand

We study whether people's preferences in an unbalanced market are affected by whether they are on the excess supply side or the excess demand side of the market. Our analysis is based on the comparison of behavior between two types of experimental gift exchange markets, which vary only with respect to whether first or second movers are on the long side of the market. The direction of market imbalance could influence subjects' motivation, as second movers, workers, might react differently to favorable actions by first movers, firms, in the two cases. Our data show strong deviations from the standard game-theoretic prediction. However, we only find secondary treatment effects. First movers are not more generous when they are in excess supply and second movers do not respond less favorably when they are in excess demand. Competition has only minor psychological effects in our data.

Optimal regulation of a fully insured deposit banking system

We analyze risk sensitive incentive compatible deposit insurancein the presence of private information when the market value of depositinsurance can be determined using Merton's (1997) formula. We show that,under the assumption that transferring funds from taxpayers to financialinstitutions has a social cost, the optimal regulation combines differentlevels of capital requirements combined with decreasing premia on depositinsurance. On the other hand, it is never efficient to require the banksto hold riskless assets, so that narrow banking is not efficient. Finally,chartering banks is necessary in order to decrease the cost of asymmetricinformation.

Designing institutions for financial stability: Regulation and supervision by objective for the Euro area

In this paper, we discuss pros and cons ofdifferent models for financial market regulationand supervision and we present a proposal forthe re-organisation of regulatory and supervisoryagencies in the Euro Area. Our arguments areconsistent with both new theories and effectivebehaviour of financial intermediaries inindustrialized countries. Our proposed architecturefor financial market regulation is based on theassignment of different objectives or "finalities"to different authorities, both at the domesticand the European level. According to thisperspective, the three objectives of supervision- microeconomic stability, investor protectionand proper behaviour, efficiency and competition- should be assigned to three distinct Europeanauthorities, each one at the centre of a Europeansystem of financial regulators and supervisorsspecialized in overseeing the entire financialmarket with respect to a single regulatoryobjective and regardless of the subjective natureof the intermediaries. Each system should bestructured and organized similarly to the EuropeanSystem of Central Banks and work in connectionwith the central bank which would remain theinstitution responsible for price and macroeconomicstability. We suggest a plausible path to buildour 4-peak regulatory architecture in the Euro area.

Quality safeguards and regulation of online pharmacies

Using econometric evidence, this article confirms that distribution ofmedicines online is split into two market segments of very diversequality, and identifies the factors that drive quality and qualityassurance in this activity. Unlike fraudulent, rogue, websites, whichoffer scant guarantees and usually sell just a few medicines withoutprescription, online pharmacies offering insurance coverage and linkedto conventional pharmacies typically sell a wholerange of drugs, require third-party medical prescriptions and provideabundant information to patients. It is shown that, where onlinepharmacies are allowed to act legally, market forces enhance quality,as private insurers require professional standards, and specialized thirdparties make a business of certifying them. Furthermore, older onlinepharmacies and those running conventional operations offer higherquality, probably because of reputational investments. Overall, this evidence supports licensing online pharmacies, especiallyconsidering that prohibiting them is ineffective against fraudulent sites.

Corporate finance and the monetary transmission mechanism

This paper analyzes the transmission mechanisms of monetarypolicy in a general equilibrium model of securities marketsand banking with asymmetric information. Banks' optimal asset/liability policy is such that in equilibrium capital adequacy constraints are always binding. Asymmetric information about banks' net worth adds a cost to outside equity capital, which limits the extent to which banks can relax their capital constraint. In this context monetarypolicy does not affect bank lending through changes in bank liquidity. Rather, it has the effect of changing theaggregate composition of financing by firms. The model also produces multiple equilibria, one of which displays all the features of a "credit crunch". Thus, monetary policy can also have large effects when it induces a shift from one equilibrium to the other.

How enforcement institutions affect markets

In an experiment we study market outcomes under alternative incentive structures for third-party enforcers. Our transactions resemble an anonymous credit market where lenders can give loans and borrowers can repay them. When borrowers default, judges are free to enforce repayment but are themselves paid differently in each of three treatments. First, paying judges according to lenders votes maximizes surplus and the equality of earnings. In contrast, paying judges according to borrowers votes triggers insufficient enforcement, destroying the market and producing the lowest surplus and the most unequal distribution of earnings. Lastly, judges paid the average earnings of borrowers and lenders achieve results close to those based on lender voting. We employ a steps-of-reasoning argument to interpret the performances of different institutions. When voting and enforcement rights are allocated to different classes of actors, the difficulty of their task changes, and arguably as a consequence they focus on high or low surplus equilibria.

Price regulation of plastic money: A critical assessment of Spanish rules

Recent decisions by the Spanish national competition authority (TDC) mandate paymentsystems to include only two costs when setting their domestic multilateral interchange fees(MIF): a fixed processing cost and a variable cost for the risk of fraud. This artificiallowering of MIFs will not lower consumer prices, because of uncompetitive retailing; but itwill however lead to higher cardholders fees and, likely, new prices for point of saleterminals, delaying the development of the immature Spanish card market. Also, to the extent that increased cardholders fees do not offset the fall in MIFs revenue, the task of issuing new cards will be underpaid relatively to the task of acquiring new merchants, causing an imbalance between the two sides of the networks. Moreover, the pricing scheme arising from the decisions will cause unbundling and underprovision of those services whose costs are excluded. Indeed, the payment guarantee and the free funding period will tend to be removed from the package of services currently provided, to be either provided by third parties, by issuers for a separate fee, or not provided at all, especially to smaller and medium-sized merchants. Transaction services will also suffer the consequences that the TDC precludes pricing them in variable terms.

Do institutional changes affect business cycles? Evidence from Europe

We study the effects that the Maastricht treaty, the creation of the ECB, andthe Euro changeover had on the dynamics of European business cycles using a panelVAR and data from ten European countries - seven from the Euro area and threeoutside of it. There are changes in the features of European business cycles and in thetransmission of shocks. They precede the three events of interest and are more linkedto a general process of European convergence and synchronization.

Audit quality: Attributes, private safeguards and the role of regulation

This article examines the private mechanisms used to safeguard quality in auditing, with a view to defining rules capable of facilitating the performance of market forces. An outline is given of a general theory of private quality assurance in auditing, based on the use of quasi-rents to self-enforce quality dimensions. Particular attention is paid to the role of fee income diversification as the key ingredient of private incentives for audit quality. The role of public regulation is then situated in the context defined by the presence of these safeguard mechanisms. This helps in defining the content of rules and the function of regulatory bodies in facilitating and strengthening the protective operation of the market. By making sense of the interaction between regulation, quality attributes and private safeguards, the analysis helps to evaluate the relative merits of different regulatory options.

Estimates of patient costs related with population morbidity: Can indirect costs affect the results?

A number of health economics works require patient cost estimates as a basic information input.However the accuracy of cost estimates remains in general unspecified. We propose to investigate howthe allocation of indirect costs or overheads can affect the estimation of patient costs in order to allow forimprovements in the analysis of patient costs estimates. Instead of focusing on the costing method, thispaper proposes to highlight changes in variance explained observed when a methodology is chosen. Wecompare three overhead allocation methods for a specific Spanish population adjusted using the ClinicalRisk Groups (CRG), and we obtain different series of full-cost group estimates. As a result, there aresignificant gains in the proportion of the variance explained, depending upon the methodology used.Furthermore, we find that the global amount of variation explained by risk adjustment models dependsmainly on direct costs and is independent of the level of aggregation used in the classification system.

Post crisis challenges to bank regulation

The current crisis has swept aside not only the whole of the US investment banking industry butalso the consensual perception of banking risks, contagion and their implication for bankingregulation. As everyone agrees now, risks where mispriced, they accumulated in neuralgic pointsof the financial system, and where amplified by procyclical regulation as well as by the instabilityand fragility of financial institutions.The use of ratings as carved in stone and lack of adequate procedure to swiftly deal withsystemic institutions bankruptcy (whether too-big-to-fail, too complex to fail or too-many to fail).The current paper will not deal with the description and analysis of the crisis, already covered inother contributions to this issue will address the critical choice regulatory authorities will face. Inthe future regulation has to change, but it is not clear that it will change in the right direction. Thismay occur if regulatory authorities, possibly influenced by public opinion and political pressure,adopt an incorrect view of financial crisis prevention and management. Indeed, there are twoapproaches to post-crisis regulation. One is the rare event approach, whereby financial crises willoccur infrequently, but are inescapable.

Nanotechnology: What is it and how will it affect us?

A non-technical review of nanotechnology from a Catalan perspective – its potential economic and social impacts and the potential role of public policy.

Regulation of GABA(A) and glutamate receptor expression, synaptic facilitation and long-term potentiation in the hippocampus of prion mutant mice

Background: Prionopathies are characterized by spongiform brain degeneration, myoclonia, dementia, and periodic electroencephalographic (EEG) disturbances. The hallmark of prioniopathies is the presence of an abnormal conformational isoform (PrP(sc)) of the natural cellular prion protein (PrP(c)) encoded by the Prnp gene. Although several roles have been attributed to PrP(c), its putative functions in neuronal excitability are unknown. Although early studies of the behavior of Prnp knockout mice described minor changes, later studies report altered behavior. To date, most functional PrP(c) studies on synaptic plasticity have been performed in vitro. To our knowledge, only one electrophysiological study has been performed in vivo in anesthetized mice, by Curtis and coworkers. They reported no significant differences in paired-pulse facilitation or LTP in the CA1 region after Schaffer collateral/commissural pathway stimulation. Principal Findings: Here we explore the role of PrP(c) expression in neurotransmission and neural excitability using wild-type, Prnp -/- and PrP(c)-overexpressing mice (Tg20 strain). By correlating histopathology with electrophysiology in living behaving mice, we demonstrate that both Prnp -/- mice but, more relevantly Tg20 mice show increased susceptibility to KA, leading to significant cell death in the hippocampus. This finding correlates with enhanced synaptic facilitation in paired-pulse experiments and hippocampal LTP in living behaving mutant mice. Gene expression profiling using Illumina microarrays and Ingenuity pathways analysis showed that 129 genes involved in canonical pathways such as Ubiquitination or Neurotransmission were co-regulated in Prnp -/- and Tg20 mice. Lastly, RT-qPCR of neurotransmission-related genes indicated that subunits of GABA(A) and AMPA-kainate receptors are co-regulated in both Prnp -/- and Tg20 mice. Conclusions/Significance: Present results demonstrate that PrP(c) is necessary for the proper homeostatic functioning of hippocampal circuits, because of its relationships with GABA(A) and AMPA-Kainate neurotransmission. New PrP(c) functions have recently been described, which point to PrP(c) as a target for putative therapies in Alzheimer's disease. However, our results indicate that a "gain of function" strategy in Alzheimer's disease, or a "loss of function" in prionopathies, may impair PrP(c) function, with devastating effects. In conclusion, we believe that present data should be taken into account in the development of future therapies.

ß-Catenin Regulation during the Cell Cycle: Implications in G2/M and Apoptosis

ß-catenin is a multifunctional protein involved in cell-cell adhesion and Wnt signal transduction. ß-Catenin signaling has been proposed to act as inducer of cell proliferation in different tumors. However, in some developmental contexts and cell systems ß-catenin also acts as a positive modulator of apoptosis. To get additional insights into the role of ß-Catenin in the regulation of the cell cycle and apoptosis, we have analyzed the levels and subcellular localization of endogenous ß-catenin and its relation with adenomatous polyposis coli (APC) during the cell cycle in S-phase¿synchronized epithelial cells. ß-Catenin levels increase in S phase, reaching maximum accumulation at late G2/M and then abruptly decreasing as the cells enter into a new G1 phase. In parallel, an increased cytoplasmic and nuclear localization of ß-catenin and APC is observed during S and G2 phases. In addition, strong colocalization of APC with centrosomes, but not ß-catenin, is detected in M phase. Interestingly, overexpression of a stable form of ß-catenin, or inhibition of endogenous ß-catenin degradation, in epidermal keratinocyte cells induces a G2 cell cycle arrest and leads to apoptosis. These results support a role for ß-catenin in the control of cell cycle and apoptosis at G2/M in normal and transformed epidermal keratinocytes.

Regulation of protein transport from the Golgi complex to the endoplasmic reticulum by CDC42 and N-WASP.

Actin is involved in the organization of the Golgi complex and Golgi-to-ER protein transport in mammalian cells. Little, however, is known about the regulation of the Golgi-associated actin cytoskeleton. We provide evidence that Cdc42, a small GTPase that regulates actin dynamics, controls Golgi-to-ER protein transport. We located GFP-Cdc42 in the lateral portions of Golgi cisternae and in COPI-coated and noncoated Golgi-associated transport intermediates. Overexpression of Cdc42 and its activated form Cdc42V12 inhibited the retrograde transport of Shiga toxin from the Golgi complex to the ER, the redistribution of the KDEL receptor, and the ER accumulation of Golgi-resident proteins induced by the active GTP-bound mutant of Sar1 (Sar1[H79G]). Coexpression of wild-type or activated Cdc42 and N-WASP also inhibited Golgito-ER transport, but this was not the case in cells expressing Cdc42V12 and N-WASP(AWA), a mutant form of N-WASP that lacks Arp2/3 binding. Furthermore, Cdc42V12 recruited GFP-NWASP to the Golgi complex. We therefore conclude that Cdc42 regulates Golgi-to-ER protein transport in an N-WASP¿dependent manner.