Poverty and children's work in Spain and Latin America. Some preliminary remarks.

In the first part of this paper we try to test the relationship between mothers earnings, fertility and children's work in the Spanish (Catalan) context of the first third of the 20th century. Specific human capital investment of adult working women had as an outcome the sharp increase of their real wage and also the increase of the opportunity cost of time devoted to house work including child rearing. Fertility evolution is endogenous to the model and decreases as a result of women real wage increases. Human capital investment of labouring women and mandatory schooling of children shift the labour supply function to a new steady state in which the slope is steeper. According to recent papers this model applies to 20th century Spain and it causes the abolition of children's work. Nonetheless the model do not apply to 20th century Latin America. Despite the positive evolution of literacy and life expectancy in this region, other factors involved poor results of the educational human capital investment. In this paper we remark the role of the increasing share of the informal sector of the economy ruled on the bases of women's and children's work. Second we stress the role of high income inequality evolution and endogamic school supplies to explain the limits of increasing literacy on more remarkable human capital improvements.

Communication, Coordination, and Efficiency in Evolutionary One-population Models

We analyze the role of commitment in pre-play communication for ensuring efficient evolutionarily stable outcomes in coordination games. All players are a priori identical as they are drawn from the same population. In games where efficient outcomes can be reached by players coordinating on the same action we find commitment to be necessary to enforce efficiency. In games where efficienct outcomes only result from play of different actions, communication without commitment is most effective although efficiency can no longer be guaranteed. Only when there are many messages then inefficient outcomes are negligible as their basins of attraction become very small.

Heterogeneity as a coordination device

A model of directed search with a finite number of buyers and sellers is considered, where sellers compete in direct mechanisms. Buyer heterogeneity and Nash equilibrium results in perfect sorting. The restriction to complementary inputs, that the match value function Q is supermodular, in addition coordinates the sellers strategies. In that case, equilibrium implements positive assortative matching, which is efficient and consistent with the stable (cooperative equilibrium) outcome. This provides a non-cooperative and decentralizedsolution for the Assignment Game. Conversely, if buyers are identical, no such coordination is possible, and there is a continuum of equilibria, one of which exhibits price posting, another yields competition in auctions.

Do you work or do you study? Children's work in a comparative historical perspective

In this paper we compare two historical scenarios very different one to each other bothin institutional and geographical terms. What they have in common is the situation ofrelative poverty of most of the population. On the one side we are dealing withhistorical industrializing Catalonia in the North East of Spain, a country exhibiting pooreconomic yields in the context of European and non European industrializing nations inthe 19th century. We compare children s work patterns in 19th century Catalonia withthose of current developing countries in Latin America, Africa and South and East Asia.This kind of exercise in which the nexus of the comparison are the levels of wealth ofcountries that are unsuccessful to achieve high standards of economic growth allows usto combine the micro historical analysis (in the Catalan case) with the macrocomparative approach in current developing countries. By means of both, the microhistorical analysis and the macro regression analysis we obtain the result that adultwomen s skills and real wages are a key factor when we want to explain the patterns ofchildren work. While female real wages increased a sharp rate in 19th century Cataloniawe obtain very different results in the case of developing countries. This differentgender bias helps to explain why in some cases children continue to work and also whysome parts of the world continue to be poor according to our regression analysis.

Quality assurance mechanisms in agrifood: The case of the Spanish fresh meat sector

The largest fresh meat brand names in Spain are analyzed here to studyhow quality is signaled in agribusiness and how the underlying quality-assurance organizations work. Results show, first, that organizationalform varies according to the specialization of the brand name.Publicly-controlled brand names are grounded on market contracting withindividual producers, providing stronger incentives. In contrast,private brands rely more on hierarchy, taking advantage of itssuperiority in solving specific coordination problems. Second, theseemingly redundant coexistence of several quality indicators for agiven product is explained in efficiency terms. Multiple brands areshown to be complementary, given their specialization in guaranteeingdifferent attributes of the product.

The implicit theory of historical change in the work of Alan S. Milward

Alan S. Milward was an economic historian who developed an implicit theory ofhistorical change. His interpretation which was neither liberal nor Marxist positedthat social, political, and economic change, for it to be sustainable, had to be agradual process rather than one resulting from a sudden, cataclysmicrevolutionary event occurring in one sector of the economy or society. Benignchange depended much less on natural resource endowment or technologicaldevelopments than on the ability of state institutions to respond to changingpolitical demands from within each society. State bureaucracies were fundamentalto formulating those political demands and advising politicians of ways to meetthem. Since each society was different there was no single model of developmentto be adopted or which could be imposed successfully by one nation-state onothers, either through force or through foreign aid programs. Nor coulddevelopment be promoted simply by copying the model of a more successfuleconomy. Each nation-state had to find its own response to the political demandsarising from within its society. Integration occurred when a number of nation states shared similar political objectives which they could not meet individuallybut could meet collectively. It was not simply the result of their increasinginterdependence. It was how and whether nation-states responded to thesedomestic demands which determined the nature of historical change.

Measuring strategic uncertainty in coordination games

This paper explores three aspects of strategic uncertainty: its relation to risk, predictability of behavior and subjective beliefs of players. In a laboratory experiment we measure subjects certainty equivalents for three coordination games and one lottery. Behavior in coordination games is related to risk aversion, experience seeking, and age.From the distribution of certainty equivalents we estimate probabilities for successful coordination in a wide range of games. For many games, success of coordination is predictable with a reasonable error rate. The best response to observed behavior is close to the global-game solution. Comparing choices in coordination games with revealed risk aversion, we estimate subjective probabilities for successful coordination. In games with a low coordination requirement, most subjects underestimate the probability of success. In games with a high coordination requirement, most subjects overestimate this probability. Estimating probabilistic decision models, we show that the quality of predictions can be improved when individual characteristics are taken into account. Subjects behavior is consistent with probabilistic beliefs about the aggregate outcome, but inconsistent with probabilistic beliefs about individual behavior.

On the impact of fundamentals, liquidity and coordination on market stability

We develop a coordination game to model interactions betweenfundamentals and liquidity during unstable periods in financial markets.We then propose a flexible econometric framework for estimationof the model and analysis of its quantitative implications. The specificempirical application is carry trades in the yen dollar market, includingthe turmoil of 1998. We find a generally very deep market, withlow information disparities amongst agents. We observe occasionallyepisodes of market fragility, or turmoil with up by the escalator, downby the elevator patterns in prices. The key role of strategic behaviorin the econometric model is also confirmed.

The effect of intergroup competition on group coordination: An experimental study

We report an experiment on the effect of intergroup competition on group coordination in the minimal-effort game (Van Huyck et al., 1990). The competition was between two 7-person groups. Each player in each group independently chose an integer from 1 to 7. The group with the higher minimum won the competition and each of its members was paid according to the game s original payoff matrix. Members of the losing group were paid nothing. In case of a tie, each player was paid half the payoff in the original matrix. This treatment was contrasted with two control treatments where each of the two groups played an independent coordination game, either with or without information about the minimum chosen by the outgroup. Although the intergroup competition does not change the set of strict equilibria, we found that it improved collective rationality by moving group members in the direction of higher-payoff equilibria. Merely providing group members with information about the minimal-effort level in the other group was not sufficient to generate this effect.

Disability, capacity for work and the business cycle: An international perspective

An important policy issue in recent years concerns the number of people claimingdisability benefits for reasons of incapacity for work. We distinguish between workdisability , which may have its roots in economic and social circumstances, and healthdisability which arises from clear diagnosed medical conditions. Although there is a linkbetween work and health disability, economic conditions, and in particular the businesscycle and variations in the risk of unemployment over time and across localities, mayplay an important part in explaining both the stock of disability benefit claimants andinflows to and outflow from that stock. We employ a variety of cross?country andcountry?specific household panel data sets, as well as administrative data, to testwhether disability benefit claims rise when unemployment is higher, and also toinvestigate the impact of unemployment rates on flows on and off the benefit rolls. Wefind strong evidence that local variations in unemployment have an importantexplanatory role for disability benefit receipt, with higher total enrolments, loweroutflows from rolls and, often, higher inflows into disability rolls in regions and periodsof above?average unemployment. Although general subjective measures of selfreporteddisability and longstanding illness are also positively associated withunemployment rates, inclusion of self?reported health measures does not eliminate thestatistical relationship between unemployment rates and disability benefit receipt;indeed including general measures of health often strengthens that underlyingrelationship. Intriguingly, we also find some evidence from the United Kingdom and theUnited States that the prevalence of self?reported objective specific indicators ofdisability are often pro?cyclical that is, the incidence of specific forms of disability arepro?cyclical whereas claims for disability benefits given specific health conditions arecounter?cyclical. Overall, the analysis suggests that, for a range of countries and datasets, levels of claims for disability benefits are not simply related to changes in theincidence of health disability in the population and are strongly influenced by prevailingeconomic conditions. We discuss the policy implications of these various findings.

The role of institutions in the contractual process

Human beings increase their productivity by specializingtheir resources and exchanging their products. Theorganization of exchange is costly, however, becausespecialized activities need coordination and incentiveshave to be aligned. This work first describes how theseexchanges are organized in an institutional environment.It then focuses on the dual effect of this environment-as with any other specialized resource, institutions maybe used for expropriation purposes. They enjoyspecialization advantages in safeguarding exchange butthey also make possible new forms of opportunism,causing new costs of exchange. Three perverse tendenciesare identified:In the legal field, there is a surplus ofmandatory rules and, at the same time, a deficit in default rules. Second, courts activity is biased againstthe quasi-judicial role of the parties and the market. Third, Market enforcement is based on reputationalassets that are badly exposed to opportunism.

Take-the-best and other simple strategies: Why and when they work 'well' in binary choice

The effectiveness of decision rules depends on characteristics of bothrules and environments. A theoretical analysis of environments specifiesthe relative predictive accuracies of the lexicographic rule 'take-the-best'(TTB) and other simple strategies for binary choice. We identify threefactors: how the environment weights variables; characteristics of choicesets; and error. For cases involving from three to five binary cues, TTBis effective across many environments. However, hybrids of equal weights(EW) and TTB models are more effective as environments become morecompensatory. In the presence of error, TTB and similar models do not predictmuch better than a naïve model that exploits dominance. We emphasizepsychological implications and the need for more complete theories of theenvironment that include the role of error.

Protestants and Catholics: Similar work ethic, different social ethic

This article develops two hypotheses about economically-relevant values of Christianbelievers, according to which Protestants should work more and more effectively, as in the work ethic argument of Max Weber, or display a stronger social ethic that would lead themto monitor each other s conduct, support political and legal institutions and hold morehomogeneous values. Tests using current survey data confirm substantial partial correlations andpossible different effects in mutual social control, institutional performance and homogeneityof values but no difference in work ethics. Protestantism therefore seems conducive to capitalisteconomic development, not by the direct psychological route of the Weberian work ethic butrather by promoting an alternative social ethic that facilitates impersonal trade.

How binding are legal limits? Transitions from temporary to permanent work in Spain

This paper studies the duration pattern of xed-term contracts and the determinantsof their conversion into permanent ones in Spain, where the share of xed-termemployment is the highest in Europe. We estimate a duration model for temporaryemployment, with competing risks of terminating into permanent employment versusalternative states, and exible duration dependence. We nd that conversion rates aregenerally below 10%. Our estimated conversion rates roughly increase with tenure,with a pronounced spike at the legal limit, when there is no legal way to retain theworker on a temporary contract. We argue that estimated di¤erences in conversionrates across categories of workers can stem from di¤erences in worker outside optionsand thus the power to credibly threat to quit temporary jobs.

Ex post bargaining, labor coordination and wage formation at the firm level

We lay out a model of wage bargaining with two leading features:bargaining is ex post to relevant investments and there isindividual bargaining in firms without a Union. We compareindividual ex post bargaining to coordinated ex post bargainingand we analyze the effects on wage formation. As opposed to exante bargaining models, the costs of destroying the employmentrelationship play a crucial role in determining wages. Highfiring costs in particular yield a rent for employees. Ourtheory points to a employer size-wage effect that is independentof the production function and market power. We derive a simpleleast squares specification from the theoretical model thatallow us to estimate components of the wage premium fromcoordination. We reject the hypothesis that labor coordinationdoes not alter the extensive form of the bargaining game. Laborcoordination substantially increases bargaining power butdecreases labor's ability to pose costly threats to the firm.