On the computational security of a distributed key distribution scheme

In a distributed key distribution scheme, a set of servers helps a set of users in a group to securely obtain a common key. Security means that an adversary who corrupts some servers and some users has no information about the key of a noncorrupted group. In this work, we formalize the security analysis of one such scheme which was not considered in the original proposal. We prove the scheme is secure in the random oracle model, assuming that the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem is hard to solve. We also detail a possible modification of that scheme and the one in which allows us to prove the security of the schemes without assuming that a specific hash function behaves as a random oracle. As usual, this improvement in the security of the schemes is at the cost of an efficiency loss.

Towards the automatic merging of language resources

Language Resources are a critical component for Natural Language Processing applications. Throughout the years many resources were manually created for the same task, but with different granularity and coverage information. To create richer resources for a broad range of potential reuses, nformation from all resources has to be joined into one. The hight cost of comparing and merging different resources by hand has been a bottleneck for merging existing resources. With the objective of reducing human intervention, we present a new method for automating merging resources. We have addressed the merging of two verbs subcategorization frame (SCF) lexica for Spanish. The results achieved, a new lexicon with enriched information and conflicting information signalled, reinforce our idea that this approach can be applied for other task of NLP.

Towards the Automatic Merging of Lexical Resources: Automatic Mapping

Lexical Resources are a critical component for Natural Language Processing applications. However, the high cost of comparing and merging different resources has been a bottleneck to have richer resources with a broad range of potential uses for a significant number of languages.With the objective of reducing cost byeliminating human intervention, we present a new method for automating the merging of resources,with special emphasis in what we call the mapping step. This mapping step, which converts the resources into a common format that allows latter the merging, is usually performed with huge manual effort and thus makes the whole process very costly. Thus, we propose a method to perform this mapping fully automatically. To test our method, we have addressed the merging of two verb subcategorization frame lexica for Spanish, The resultsachieved, that almost replicate human work, demonstrate the feasibility of the approach.

A Method Towards the Fully Automatic Merging of Lexical Resources

Lexical Resources are a critical component for Natural Language Processing applications. However, the high cost of comparing and merging different resources has been a bottleneck to obtain richer resources and a broader range of potential uses for a significant number of languages. With the objective of reducing cost by eliminating human intervention, we present a new method towards the automatic merging of resources. This method includes both, the automatic mapping of resources involved to a common format and merging them, once in this format. This paper presents how we have addressed the merging of two verb subcategorization frame lexica for Spanish, but our method will be extended to cover other types of Lexical Resources. The achieved results, that almost replicate human work, demonstrate the feasibility of the approach.

Sovereign Risk, Anonymous Markets, and the Effects of Globalization

The goal of this paper is to study the e¤ects of globalization on the workings of financial markets. We adopt a "technological" view of globalization, which consists of an exogenous reduction in the cost of shipping goods across di¤erent regions of the world. We model financial markets where agents anonymously trade securities issued by every other agent in the world. In the absence of frictions, we show how globalization creates trade opportunities among residents of different regions of the world, thereby raising welfare. In the presence of sovereign risk, however, there emerge two crucial interactions between trade among residents within a region and trade among residents of di¤erent regions. First, the more residents within a region trade with each other, the more they can trade with residents of other regions. Second, the possibility of trade with residents of other regions sometimes leads a government to not enforce payments by its residents, destroying trade opportunities among residents within the region. The net effect on welfare of this process of creation and destruction of trade opportunities is ambiguous. We argue that there are no policies governments can take to avoid the negative effects of globalization on trade among domestic residents. In a dynamic extension, we analyze how our results are a¤ected by reputational considerations.

Assessing the Political Viability of Labour Market Reform: The Case of Employment Protection

We analyze the political support for employment protection legislation. Unlike my previous work on the same topic, this paper pays a lot of attention to the role of obsolescence in the growth process. In voting in favour of employment protection, incumbent employees trade off lower living standards (because employment protection maintains workers in less productive activities) against longer job duration. The support for employment protection will then depend on the value of the latter relative to the cost of the former. We highlight two key deeterminants of this trade-off: first, the workers' bargaining power, second, the economy's growth rate-more precisely its rate of creative destruction.

On Globalization and the Growth of Governments

This paper investigates the relationship between trade openness and the size of government, both theoretically and empirically. We show that openness can increase the size of governments through two channels: (1) a terms of trade externality, whereby trade lowers the domestic cost of taxation and (2) the demand for insurance, whereby trade raises risk and public transfers. We provide a unified framework for studying and testing these two mechanisms. First, we show how their relative strength depends on a key parameter, the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods. Second, while the terms of trade externality leads to inefficiently large governments, the increase in public spending due to the demand for insurance is optimal. We show that large volumes of trade may result in welfare losses if the terms of trade externality is strong enough while small volumes of trade are always beneficial. Third, we provide new evidence on the positive association between openness and the size of government and test whether it is consistent with the terms of trade externality or the demand for insurance. Our findings suggest that the positive relationship is remarkably robust and that the terms of trade externality may be the driving force behind it, thus raising warnings that globalization may have led to inefficiently large governments.

The Simple Economics of Conglomeration with Bankruptcy Costs: Separate or Joint Financing?

Which projects should be financed through separate non-recourse loans (or limited- liability companies) and which should be bundled into a single loan? In the pres- ence of bankruptcy costs, this conglomeration decision trades off the benefit of co- insurance with the cost of risk contamination. This paper characterize this tradeoff for projects with binary returns, depending on the mean, variability, and skewness of returns, the bankruptcy recovery rate, the correlation across projects, the number of projects, and their heterogeneous characteristics. In some cases, separate financing dominates joint financing, even though it increases the interest rate or the probability of bankruptcy.

State capacity and military conflict

In 1500, Europe was composed of hundreds of statelets and principalities, with weak central authority,no monopoly over the legitimate use of violence, and overlapping jurisdictions. By 1800, only ahandful of powerful, centralized nation states remained. We build a model that explains both the emergenceof capable states and growing divergence between European powers. We argue that the impactof war was crucial for state building, and depended on: i) the financial cost of war, and ii) a country sinitial level of domestic political fragmentation. We emphasize the role of the "Military Revolution",which raised the cost of war. Initially, this caused more cohesive states to invest in state capacity, whilemore divided states rationally dropped out of the competition, causing divergence between Europeanstates. As the cost of war escalated further, all states engaged in a "race to the top" towards greater statebuilding.

Fair pricing of deposit insurance. Is it possible? Yes. Is it desirable? No

This note elaborates on a recent article by Chan, Greenbaum and Thakor(1992) who contend that fairly priced deposit insurance is incompatiblewithfree competition in the banking sector, in the presence of adverseselection.We show here that at soon as one introduces a real economic motivationfromprivate banks to manage the deposits from the public, then fairly priceddeposit insurance becomes possible. However, we also show that sucha fairlypriced insurance is never desirable, precisely because of adverseselection.We compute the characteristics of the optimal premium schedule, whichtradesoff between the cost of adverse selection and the cost of ``unfaircompetition ''.

Competing engines of growth: Innovation and standardization

We study a dynamic general equilibrium model where innovation takes theform of the introduction of new goods whose production requires skilled workers.Innovation is followed by a costly process of standardization, whereby these newgoods are adapted to be produced using unskilled labor. Our framework highlightsa number of novel results. First, standardization is both an engine of growth anda potential barrier to it. As a result, growth is an inverse U-shaped function ofthe standardization rate (and of competition). Second, we characterize the growthand welfare maximizing speed of standardization. We show how optimal protection of intellectual property rights affecting the cost of standardization vary withthe skill-endowment, the elasticity of substitution between goods and other parameters. Third, we show that, depending on how competition between innovatingand standardizing firms is modelled and on parameter values, a new type of multiplicity of equilibria may arise. Finally, we study the implications of our model forthe skill-premium and we illustrate novel reasons for linking North-South trade tointellectual property rights protection.

The wage effect of an indexation clause: Evidence from Spanish manufacturing firms

An endogenous switching model of ex-ante wage changes under indexed and non-indexed settlements is estimated for the Spanish manufacturing sector using collective bargaining firm data for the 1984-1991 period. The likelihood of indexing the settlement is higher for nationwide unions than for other union groups within the works council and increases with the expected level of inflation. For wage change equations, a common structure for indexed and non-indexed settlements is strongly rejected, showing a source of nominal rigidity. For indexed contracts, the expected ex-ante total inflation coverage is nearly complete. It is also shown that workers pay a significant ex-ante wage change premium (differential) to obtain a cost of living allowance clause. However, the realised contingent compensation exceeds such a premium for all industries. Finally, important spillover effects in wage setting and the decision to index the settlement have been detected.

Parallel scheduling of multiclass M/M/m queues: Approximate and heavy-traffic optimization of achievable performance

We address the problem of scheduling a multiclass $M/M/m$ queue with Bernoulli feedback on $m$ parallel servers to minimize time-average linear holding costs. We analyze the performance of a heuristic priority-index rule, which extends Klimov's optimal solution to the single-server case: servers select preemptively customers with larger Klimov indices. We present closed-form suboptimality bounds (approximate optimality) for Klimov's rule, which imply that its suboptimality gap is uniformly bounded above with respect to (i) external arrival rates, as long as they stay within system capacity;and (ii) the number of servers. It follows that its relativesuboptimality gap vanishes in a heavy-traffic limit, as external arrival rates approach system capacity (heavy-traffic optimality). We obtain simpler expressions for the special no-feedback case, where the heuristic reduces to the classical $c \mu$ rule. Our analysis is based on comparing the expected cost of Klimov's ruleto the value of a strong linear programming (LP) relaxation of the system's region of achievable performance of mean queue lengths. In order to obtain this relaxation, we derive and exploit a new set ofwork decomposition laws for the parallel-server system. We further report on the results of a computational study on the quality of the $c \mu$ rule for parallel scheduling.

Cost system design and cost management in the Spanish public sector

Cost systems have been shown to have developed considerably in recent years andactivity-based costing (ABC) has been shown to be a contribution to cost management,particularly in service businesses. The public sector is composed to a very great extentof service functions, yet considerably less has been reported of the use of ABC tosupport cost management in this sector.In Spain, cost systems are essential for city councils as they are obliged to calculate thecost of the services subject to taxation (eg. waste collection, etc). City councils musthave a cost system in place to calculate the cost of services, as they are legally requirednot to profit , from these services.This paper examines the development of systems to support cost management in theSpanish Public Sector. Through semi-structured interviews with 28 subjects within oneCity Council it contains a case study of cost management. The paper contains extractsfrom interviews and a number of factors are identified which contribute to thesuccessful development of the cost management system.Following the case study a number of other City Councils were identified where activity-based techniques had either failed or stalled. Based on the factors identified inthe single case study a further enquiry is reported. The paper includes a summary usingstatistical analysis which draws attention to change management, funding and politicalincentives as factors which had an influence on system success or failure.

Optimal regulation of a fully insured deposit banking system

We analyze risk sensitive incentive compatible deposit insurancein the presence of private information when the market value of depositinsurance can be determined using Merton's (1997) formula. We show that,under the assumption that transferring funds from taxpayers to financialinstitutions has a social cost, the optimal regulation combines differentlevels of capital requirements combined with decreasing premia on depositinsurance. On the other hand, it is never efficient to require the banksto hold riskless assets, so that narrow banking is not efficient. Finally,chartering banks is necessary in order to decrease the cost of asymmetricinformation.