The Generational contract in the family : explaining regime differences in financial transfers from parents to children in Europe

The exchange of social and economic support between the generationsis one of the main pillars of both family life and welfare systems. Thedebate on how to reform the generational contract is still truncated, however, by focusing on its public dimension only, especially on pensions and health care provisions. For a full account, the transfer of resources between adult generations in the family needs to be included as well. In our previous research we have shown that intergenerationalexchange is more likely to take place but less intense in the Nordicwelfare regime than in the Continental and Southern ones. In thepresent paper we analyze the social mechanisms that create and explain this nexus between patterns of intergenerational transfers and welfare regimes. The notion that Southern European family support networksare stronger and more effective than those of Continental and Northern European countries is only partially confirmed. In Southern (and partly in Continental) countries, children are mostly supported by means of co-residence with their parents till their complete economicindependence. However, once they have left the parental home thereare fewer transfers; support tends to be restricted to children who have special needs (such as for the formation of their own family), and depends more on their parents’ resources. In the Nordic countries, in contrast, transfers are less driven by children’s needs and parentalresources.

Political mobilisation and models of trade unionism : Southern Europe in comparative perspective

The relationship between union membership and political mobilization has been studied under many perspectives, but quantitative cross-national analyses have been hampered by the absence of international comparable survey data until the first round of the European Social Survey (ESS-2002) was made available. Using different national samples from this survey in four moments of time (2002, 2004 and 2006), our paper provides evidence of cross-country divergence in the empirical association between political mobilisation and trade union membership. Cross-national differences in union members’ political mobilization, we argue, can be explained by the existence of models of unionism that in turn differ with respect to two decisive factors: the institutionalisation of trade union activity and the opportunities left-wing parties have available for gaining access to executive power.

The Impact of Trade on Technology and Skill Upgrading Evidence from Argentina

In the last 20 years, wage inequality has increased in many developing countries. Most research on this topic focuses on two alternative causes: trade or skill-biased technical change. Several empirical studies in both developed and developing countries document increases in skill intensity within all sectors, favoring the technological change explanation over trade. Instead, I present and test a model where bilateral trade liberalization increases exporting revenues inducing more firms to enter the export market and to adopt skilled-biased new technologies. I find that the increase in the relative demand of skilled labor does not come from labor reallocation across sectors or firms but from skill upgrading within firms. Firms that upgrade technology faster also upgrade skill faster. Finally, firms entering the export market after liberalization become more skill and technology-intensive than non exporters.

Economic Booms, Trade Deficits, and Economic Policy

Many economic booms have been accompanied by real exchange rate appreciations, large trade defcits -which have sometimes persisted after the return to the initial exchange rate parity- and a deteriorating traded sector. Those circumstances have typically raised the question of the de-sirability of some stabilization policy. We show that the dynamics induced by an expected productivity shock in an economy where the capital stock is non-mobile across sectors, match those circumstances. Furthermore, we obtain that credit market imperfections tend to exacerbate trade deficits, and to cause an inefficient capacity reduction in the traded sector. Some stabilization policies are explored.

Procompetitive Losses from Trade

We argue that the procompetitive effect of international trade may bring about significant welfare costs that have not been recognized. We formulate a stylized general equilibrium model with a continuum of imperfectly competitive industries to show that, under plausible conditions, a trade-induced increase in competition can actually amplify monopoly distortions. This happens because trade, while lowering the average level of market power, may increase its cross-sectoral dispersion. Using data on US industries, we document a dramatic increase in the dispersion of market power overtime. We also show evidence that trade might be responsible for it and provide some quantifications of the induced welfare cost. Our results suggest that, to avoid some unpleasant effects of globalization, trade integration should be accompanied by procompetitive reforms (i.e., deregulation) in the nontraded sectors.

Asymmetric information and trade policy

Economists understand protectionism as a costly mechanism to redistribute from the average citizen to special-interest groups; yet political platforms that deviate from free trade have surprising popular appeal. I present an explanation based on heterogeneous information across citizens whose voting decision has an intensive margin. For each politician and each sector, the optimal trade-policy choice caters to the preferences of those voters who are more likely to be informed of that proposal. An overall protectionist bias emerges because in every industry producers are better informed than consumers. This asymmetry emerges in equilibrium because co-workers share industry-specific knwoledge, and because producers have greater incentives to engage in costly learning about their sector. My model implies that more widespread information about trade policy for an industry is associated with lower protection. Cross-sectoral evidence on U.S. non-tariff barriers and newspaper coverage is consistent with this prediction.

Trade, Extent of the Market, and Economic Growth 1960-1996

We find that trade and domestic market size are robust determinants of economic growth over the 1960-1996 period when trade openness is measured as the US dollar value of imports and exports relative to GDP in PPP US$ ('real openness'). When trade openness is measured as the US dollar value of imports and exports relative to GDP in exchange rate US$ ('nominal openness') however, trade and the size of domestic markets are often non-robust determinants of growth. We argue that real openness is the more appropriate measure of trade and that our empirical results should be seen as evidence in favor of the extent-of-the-market hypothesis.

The Three Horsemen of Growth: Plague, War and Urbanization in Early Modern Europe

How did Europe overtake China? We construct a simple Malthusian model with two sectors, and use it to explain how European per capita incomes and urbanization rates could surge ahead of Chinese ones. That living standards could exceed subsistence levels at all in a Malthusian setting should be surprising. Rising fertility and falling mortality ought to have reversed any gains. We show that productivity growth in Europe can only explain a small fraction of rising living standards. Population dynamics - changes of the birth and death schedules - were far more important drivers of the longrun Malthusian equilibrium. The Black Death raised wages substantially, creating important knock-on effects. Because of Engel's Law, demand for urban products increased, raising urban wages and attracting migrants from rural areas. European cities were unhealthy, especially compared to Far Eastern ones. Urbanization pushed up aggregate death rates. This effect was reinforced by more frequent wars (fed by city wealth) and disease spread by trade. Thus, higher wages themselves reduced population pressure. Without technological change, our model can account for the sharp rise in European urbanization as well as permanently higher per capita incomes. We complement our calibration exercise with a detailed analysis of intra-European growth in the early modern period. Using a panel of European states in the period 1300-1700, we show that war frequency can explain a good share of the divergent fortunes within Europe.

The capital gains from trade are not enough: Evidence from the environmental accounts of Venezuela and Mexico

In principle, a country can not endure negative genuine savings for longperiods of time without experiencing declining consumption. Nevertheless,theoreticians envisage two alternatives to explain how an exporter ofnon-renewable natural resources could experience permanent negativegenuine savings and still ensure sustainability. The first one allegesthat the capital gains arising from the expected improvement in theterms of trade would suffice to compensate for the negative savings ofthe resource exporter. The second alternative points at technologicalchange as a way to avoid economic collapse. This paper uses the dataof Venezuela and Mexico to empirically test the first of these twohypotheses. The results presented here prove that the terms oftrade do not suffice to compensate the depletion of oil reservesin these two open economies.

The impact of trade liberalization on skill upgrading. Evidence from Argentina

In this paper I study the effects of a regional free trade agreement on the demand for skill.I start by documenting a series of facts to shed light on the determinants of a steep increasein the relative demand of skilled labor in a panel of Argentinean industrial firms covering thetrade liberalization period. First, this is not explained by labor reallocation across industriesor firms but by skill upgrading within firms. Second, exporters upgrade skill faster than nonexporters. Third, firms upgrading skill also upgrade technology. These findings are consistentwith a model where a reduction in trading partner s tariffs induces the most productive firms(exporters) to adopt skill-intensive production technologies. Indeed, I find that the reduction inBrazil s tariffs induces the most productive Argentinean firms to upgrade skill, while the leastproductive ones downgrade. One third of the increase in the relative demand for skill can beattributed to the reduction in Brazil s tariffs.

The skill bias of world trade

Under plausible assumptions about preferences and technology, the model in this papersuggests that the entire volume of world trade matters for wage inequality. Therefore,trade integration, even among identical countries, is likely to increase the skill premium.Further, we argue that empirical evidence of a falling relative price of skill-intensive goods can be reconciled with the fast growth of world trade and that the intersectoral mobility of capital exacerbates the effect of trade on inequality. We provide new empirical evidence in support of our results and a quantitative assessment of the skill bias of world trade.

The economic effects of a Spanish trade boycott against Catalan products

We study the potential consequences of a hypothetical trade boycott against Catalan products organized by some sectors of the Spanish society mainly for political reasons. A symmetric trade boycott would have two effects: a reduction of Catalan exports to Spain and a partial process of import substitution in Catalonia. In order to quantify the economic impact of the boycott, we compare the "actual" Catalan economy, as described in the input-output table for 2005, with a "simulated" Catalan economy that takes into account the effects of a boycott on the trade exchanges between Catalonia and Spain.

Heterogeneous information and trade policy

Protectionism enjoys surprising popular support, in spite of deadweight losses. At thesame time, trade barriers appear to decline with public information about protection.This paper develops an electoral model with heterogeneously informed voters whichexplains both facts and predicts the pattern of trade policy across industries. In themodel, each agent endogenously acquires more information about his sector of employment. As a result, voters support protectionism, because they learn more about thetrade barriers that help them as producers than those that hurt them as consumers.In equilibrium, asymmetric information induces a universal protectionist bias. Thestructure of protection is Pareto inefficient, in contrast to existing models. The modelpredicts a Dracula effect: trade policy for a sector is less protectionist when there ismore public information about it. Using a measure of newspaper coverage across industries, I find that cross-sector evidence from the United States bears out my theoreticalpredictions.

The impact of "early" nineteenth-century globalization on foreign trade in the Southern Cone: A study of British trade statistics

This paper deals with the impact of "early" nineteenth-century globalization (c.1815-1860) on foreign trade in the Southern Cone (SC). Most of the evidence is drawn from bilateral trades between Britain and the SC, at a time when Britain was the main commercial partner of the new republics. The main conclusion drawn is that early globalization had a positive impact on foreign trade in the SC, and this was due to: improvements in the SC's terms of trade during this period; the SC's per capita consumption of textiles (the main manufacture traded on world markets at that time) increased substantially during this period, at a time when clothing was one of the main items of SC household budgets; British merchants brought with them capital, shipping, insurance, and also facilitated the formation of vast global networks, which further promoted the SC's exports to a wider range of outlets.

On the role of retaliation in trade agreements

This paper analyzes the role of retaliation in trade agreements. It shows that, in the presenceof private information, retaliation can always be used to increase the welfare derived from suchagreements by the participating governments. In particular, it is shown that retaliation is anecessary feature of any efficient equilibrium.We argue that retaliation would not be necessary if governments could resort to internationaltransfers or export subsidies to compensate for terms-of-trade externalities. Within the currentworld trading system, though, in which transfers are seldom observed whereas export subsidiesare prohibited, the use of the remaining trade instruments in a retaliatory fashion might beoptimal. The model is used to interpret the retaliatory use of antidumping observed in the lastdecades, and the proliferation of these measures relative to other trade remedies.