40 resultados para Socialist Party
Resumo:
A l’actualitat trobem nombrosos sistemes aquàtics alterats per diferents efectes d’origen antropogènic. Per tal d’evitar i/o disminuir aquests efectes va sorgir la Directiva Marc de l’Aigua (2000/60/CE) essent aquest un dels seus objectius. Aquest article descriu el funcionament hidrogeològic i l’estat ecològic de la riera de Santa Coloma, afluent de la Tordera (NE Catalunya), des de pràcticament el seu inici a Santa Coloma de Farners (Girona) fins a Riudarenes (Girona). S’intenta establir les possibles influències del funcionament hidrogeològic en l’estat ecològic a partir de dades piezomètriques, de cabal, fisicoquímiques i biològiques. Per aquesta última part s’han utilitzat indicadors biològics com l’índex d’hàbitat fluvial (IHF), avaluant l’hàbitat físic; l’índex de Qualitat del Bosc de Ribera (QBR), per determinar la qualitat ecològica de la zona de ribera; l’índex Biological Monitorig Working Party per a conques internes de Catalunya (BMWPC), per avaluar les diferents famílies de macroinvertebrats que hi viuen i l’índex ECOSTRIMED, una síntesi dels dos índex anteriors.
Resumo:
Imaginemos que un observador quiere analizar el sistema político de los países de Europa Occidental. Si compara el sistema de partidos que hay a nivel nacional con los presentes en cada uno de los distritos de esta elección, apreciará notables diferencias entre países. Por ejemplo, si repara en Alemania, verá como los mismos cinco partidos presentes en el Bundestag compiten también en todos los distritos. Si por otra parte se fija en España, comprobará como en las Elecciones Generales españolas algunos partidos se presentan en todas las circunscripciones pero otros sólo lo hacen en una o en un puñado de ellas. Por lo tanto, mientras que en el primer caso tenemos que el sistema político nacional se reproduce de manera idéntica en cada distrito, en el segundo hay diferencias entre los partidos a nivel nacional y los presentes en determinados distritos. ¿Por qué existen estas divergencias? ¿Qué es lo que explica que esta situación sea estática o que cambie a lo largo del tiempo? En este anexo presento una memoria para justificar los principales avances en la investigación doctoral durante el periodo en que he disfrutado de la beca FI.
Resumo:
Este proyecto consiste en el estudio previo que se tiene que llevar a cabo para implantar un ERP en una empresa. En este caso, la empresa se trata de una PYME del sector de la restauración/hostelería. El estudio que se ha realizado sobre los tres ERP's son productos que se encuentran en el mercado, concretamente se han estudiado los ERP's de Openbravo, SAP y Datisa. El motivo de porque estos tres se debe a que el primero es open source, el segundo consiste en un producto de una empresa líder en el sector de los ERP's y el tercero porque es una solución de hostelería realizada por una mediana empresa.
Resumo:
In this paper, I provide a formal justi cation for a well-established coattail effect, when a popular candidate at one branch of government attracts votes to candidates from the same political party for other branches of government. A political agency frame- work with moral hazard is applied to analyze coattails in simultaneous presidential and congressional elections. I show that coattail voting is a natural outcome of the optimal reelection scheme adopted by a representative voter to motivate politicians' efforts in a retrospective voting environment. I assume that an office-motivated politician (executive or congressman) prefers her counterpart to be affiliated with the same political party. This correlation of incentives leads the voter to adopt a joint performance evaluation rule, which is conditioned on the politicians belonging to the same party or different parties. The two-sided coattail effects then arise. On the one hand, the executive's suc- cess/failure props up/drags down her partisan ally in congressional election, which implies presidential coattails. On the other hand, the executive's reelection itself is affected by the congressman's performance, which results in reverse coattails. JEL classi fication: D72, D86. Keywords: Coattail voting; Presidential coattails; Reverse coattails; Simultaneous elections; Political Agency; Retrospective voting.
Resumo:
This paper studies a dynamic principal-monitor-agent relation where a strategic principal delegates the task of monitoring the effort of a strategic agent to a third party. The latter we call the monitor, whose type is initially unknown. Through repeated interaction the agent might learn his type. We show that this process damages the principal's payoffs. Compensation is assumed exogenous, limiting to a great extent the provision of incentives. We go around this difficulty by introducing costly replacement strategies, i.e. the principal replaces the monitor, thus disrupting the agent's learning. We found that even when replacement costs are null, if the revealed monitor is strictly preferred by both parties, there is a loss in efficiency due to the impossibility of bene…tting from it. Nonetheless, these strategies can partially recover the principal's losses. Additionally, we establish upper and lower bounds on the payoffs that the principal and the agent can achieve. Finally we characterize the equilibrium strategies under public and private monitoring (with communication) for different cost and impatience levels.
Resumo:
We present a formal model of intra-party politics to explain candidate selection within parties. We think of parties as heterogeneous groups of individuals who aim to implement a set of policies but who differ in their priorities. When party heterogeneity is too large, parties are in danger of splitting into smaller yet more homogeneous groups. In this context we argue that primaries can have a unifying role if the party elite cannot commit to policy concessions. Our model shows how alignment in the preferred policies of various factions within a party, the relative weight of each of these factions and the electoral system interact to create incentives for the adoption of primary elections. We discuss the existing empirical literature in the light of our theoretical predictions to provide a new, structured perspective on the adoption of primary elections.
Resumo:
We propose and analyze a new solution concept, the R solution, for three-person, transferable utility, cooperative games. In the spirit of the Nash Bargaining Solution, our concept is founded on the predicted outcomes of simultaneous, two-party negotiations that would be the alternative to the grand coalition. These possibly probabilistic predictions are based on consistent beliefs. We analyze the properties of the R solution and compare it with the Shapley value and other concepts. The R solution exists and is unique. It belongs to the bargaining set and to the core whenever the latter is not empty. In fact, when the grand coalition can simply execute one of the three possible bilateral trades, the R solution is the most egalitarian selection of the bargaining set. Finally, we discuss how the R solution changes important conclusions of several well known Industrial Organization models.
Resumo:
Songs were the means used by the Romanian Communist Party to ‘educate’ Romanians. Through them, Romanians were told what they had to appreciate, how grateful they were supposed to be to the regime, how great President Ceausescu was and how they had to work harder and harder so that they could be even better Communists. This paper comprises the translation of three songs composed, performed and broadcast in Communist Romania and their analysis from the point of view of communication. In translating the song, I have chosen to translate closest to the original possible meaning and meanwhile to respect to the best of my ability Low’s ‘pentathlon principle’: singability, rhyme, rhythm, naturalness and fidelity to the sense of the source text
Resumo:
This paper analyzes a spatial model of political competition between two policy- motivated parties in hard times of crisis. Hard times are modeled in terms of policy- making costs carried by a newly elected party. The results predict policy divergence in equilibrium. If the ideological preferences of parties are quite diverse and extreme, there is a unique equilibrium in which the parties announce symmetric platforms and each party wins with probability one half. If one party is extreme while the other is more moderate, there is a unique equilibrium in which the parties announce asymmetric platforms. If the preferred policies of the parties are not very distinct, there are two equilibria with asymmetric platforms. An important property of equilibrium with asymmetric platforms is that a winning party necessarily announces its most preferred policy as a platform. JEL classification: D72. Keywords: Spatial model; Political competition; Two-party system; Policy-motivated parties; Hard times; Crisis.
Resumo:
El objetivo de este proyecto es el de crear una plataforma para conectar a empresas con la necesidad de cubrir puestos de trabajo muy concretos con los mejores candidatos. Más allá del proyecto descrito en este documento, se pretende crear una empresa integradora de servicios de terceros tanto para empresas como para candidatos. Este proyecto se centra en el desarrollo de una plataforma Web basada en programario libre. La plataforma gira entorno a un portal que integra servicios de búsqueda de candidatos, reclutamiento y selección de personal. El portal utilizará la Web 2.0 y las redes sociales para llevar a cabo su cometido. El portal está disponible en http://www.sntalent.com.