A Simple Access Pricing Rule to Achieve the Ramsey Outcome in Two-Way Access

In this paper, I consider a general and informationally effcient approach to determine the optimal access rule and show that there exists a simple rule that achieves the Ramsey outcome as the unique equilibrium when networks compete in linear prices without network-based price discrimination. My approach is informationally effcient in the sense that the regulator is required to know only the marginal cost structure, i.e. the marginal cost of making and terminating a call. The approach is general in that access prices can depend not only on the marginal costs but also on the retail prices, which can be observed by consumers and therefore by the regulator as well. In particular, I consider the set of linear access pricing rules which includes any fixed access price, the Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR) and the Modified ECPR as special cases. I show that in this set, there is a unique access rule that achieves the Ramsey outcome as the unique equilibrium as long as there exists at least a mild degree of substitutability among networks' services.

The Simple Economics of Conglomeration with Bankruptcy Costs: Separate or Joint Financing?

Which projects should be financed through separate non-recourse loans (or limited- liability companies) and which should be bundled into a single loan? In the pres- ence of bankruptcy costs, this conglomeration decision trades off the benefit of co- insurance with the cost of risk contamination. This paper characterize this tradeoff for projects with binary returns, depending on the mean, variability, and skewness of returns, the bankruptcy recovery rate, the correlation across projects, the number of projects, and their heterogeneous characteristics. In some cases, separate financing dominates joint financing, even though it increases the interest rate or the probability of bankruptcy.

Strategies for sequential prediction of stationary time series

We present simple procedures for the prediction of a real valued sequence. The algorithms are based on a combinationof several simple predictors. We show that if the sequence is a realization of a bounded stationary and ergodic random process then the average of squared errors converges, almost surely, to that of the optimum, given by the Bayes predictor. We offer an analog result for the prediction of stationary gaussian processes.

A simple permutation test for clusteredness

Hierarchical clustering is a popular method for finding structure in multivariate data,resulting in a binary tree constructed on the particular objects of the study, usually samplingunits. The user faces the decision where to cut the binary tree in order to determine the numberof clusters to interpret and there are various ad hoc rules for arriving at a decision. A simplepermutation test is presented that diagnoses whether non-random levels of clustering are presentin the set of objects and, if so, indicates the specific level at which the tree can be cut. The test isvalidated against random matrices to verify the type I error probability and a power study isperformed on data sets with known clusteredness to study the type II error.

Solving two production scheduling problems with sequence-dependent set-up times

In today’s competitive markets, the importance of goodscheduling strategies in manufacturing companies lead to theneed of developing efficient methods to solve complexscheduling problems.In this paper, we studied two production scheduling problemswith sequence-dependent setups times. The setup times areone of the most common complications in scheduling problems,and are usually associated with cleaning operations andchanging tools and shapes in machines.The first problem considered is a single-machine schedulingwith release dates, sequence-dependent setup times anddelivery times. The performance measure is the maximumlateness.The second problem is a job-shop scheduling problem withsequence-dependent setup times where the objective is tominimize the makespan.We present several priority dispatching rules for bothproblems, followed by a study of their performance. Finally,conclusions and directions of future research are presented.

Simple models for multi-attribute choice with many alternatives: When it does and does not pay to face tradeoffs with binary attributes

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A simple adaptive procedure leading to correlated equilibrium

We propose a simple adaptive procedure for playing a game. In thisprocedure, players depart from their current play with probabilities thatare proportional to measures of regret for not having used other strategies(these measures are updated every period). It is shown that our adaptiveprocedure guaranties that with probability one, the sample distributionsof play converge to the set of correlated equilibria of the game. Tocompute these regret measures, a player needs to know his payoff functionand the history of play. We also offer a variation where every playerknows only his own realized payoff history (but not his payoff function).

Take-the-best and other simple strategies: Why and when they work 'well' in binary choice

The effectiveness of decision rules depends on characteristics of bothrules and environments. A theoretical analysis of environments specifiesthe relative predictive accuracies of the lexicographic rule 'take-the-best'(TTB) and other simple strategies for binary choice. We identify threefactors: how the environment weights variables; characteristics of choicesets; and error. For cases involving from three to five binary cues, TTBis effective across many environments. However, hybrids of equal weights(EW) and TTB models are more effective as environments become morecompensatory. In the presence of error, TTB and similar models do not predictmuch better than a naïve model that exploits dominance. We emphasizepsychological implications and the need for more complete theories of theenvironment that include the role of error.

World population growth and fertility patterns, 1960-2000. A simple model explaining the evolution of world's fertility during the second half of the 20th Century

In this paper we attempt to describe the general reasons behind the world populationexplosion in the 20th century. The size of the population at the end of the century inquestion, deemed excessive by some, was a consequence of a dramatic improvementin life expectancies, attributable, in turn, to scientific innovation, the circulation ofinformation and economic growth. Nevertheless, fertility is a variable that plays acrucial role in differences in demographic growth. We identify infant mortality, femaleeducation levels and racial identity as important exogenous variables affecting fertility.It is estimated that in poor countries one additional year of primary schooling forwomen leads to 0.614 child less per couple on average (worldwide). While it may bepossible to identify a global tendency towards convergence in demographic trends,particular attention should be paid to the case of Africa, not only due to its differentdemographic patterns, but also because much of the continent's population has yet toexperience improvement in quality of life generally enjoyed across the rest of theplanet.

Social preferences: Some simple tests and a new model

Departures from pure self interest in economic experiments have recently inspired models of "social preferences". We conduct experiments on simple two-person and three-person games with binary choices that test these theories more directly than the array of games conventionally considered. Our experiments show strong support for the prevalence of "quasi-maximin" preferences: People sacrifice to increase the payoffs for all recipients, but especially for the lowest-payoff recipients. People are also motivated by reciprocity: While people are reluctant to sacrifice to reciprocate good or bad behavior beyond what they would sacrifice for neutral parties, they withdraw willingness to sacrifice to achieve a fair outcome when others are themselves unwilling to sacrifice. Some participants are averse to getting different payoffs than others, but based on our experiments and reinterpretation of previous experiments we argue that behavior that has been presented as "difference aversion" in recent papers is actually a combination of reciprocal and quasi-maximin motivations. We formulate a model in which each player is willing to sacrifice to allocate the quasi-maximin allocation only to those players also believed to be pursuing the quasi-maximin allocation, and may sacrifice to punish unfair players.

Exact tests for correlation and for the slope in simple linear regressions without making assumptions

We present an exact test for whether two random variables that have known bounds on their support are negatively correlated. The alternative hypothesis is that they are not negatively correlated. No assumptions are made on the underlying distributions. We show by example that the Spearman rank correlation test as the competing exact test of correlation in nonparametric settings rests on an additional assumption on the data generating process without which it is not valid as a test for correlation.We then show how to test for the significance of the slope in a linear regression analysis that invovles a single independent variable and where outcomes of the dependent variable belong to a known bounded set.

A simple access pricing rule to achieve the Ramsey outcome for interconnected networks

This paper considers a general and informationally efficient approach to determine the optimal access pricing rule for interconnected networks. It shows that there exists a simple rule that achieves the Ramsey outcome as the unique equilibrium when networks compete in linear prices without network-based price discrimination. The approach is informationally efficient in the sense that the regulator is required to know only the marginal cost structure, i.e. the marginal cost of making and terminating a call. The approach is general in that access prices can depend not only on the marginal costs but also on the retail prices, which can be observed by consumers and therefore by the regulator as well. In particular, I consider the set of linear access pricing rules which includes any fixed access price, the Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR) and the Modified ECPR as special cases. I show that in this set, there is a unique rule that implements the Ramsey outcome as the unique equilibrium independently of the underlying demand conditions.

Nonlinear models and small sample performance of the generalized method of moments

In this paper I explore the issue of nonlinearity (both in the datageneration process and in the functional form that establishes therelationship between the parameters and the data) regarding the poorperformance of the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) in small samples.To this purpose I build a sequence of models starting with a simple linearmodel and enlarging it progressively until I approximate a standard (nonlinear)neoclassical growth model. I then use simulation techniques to find the smallsample distribution of the GMM estimators in each of the models.

A simple model of multiple equilibria based on risk

This paper shows how risk may aggravate fluctuations in economies with imperfect insurance and multiple assets. A two period job matching model is studied, in which risk averse agents act both as workers and as entrepreneurs. They choose between two types of investment: one type is riskless, while the other is a risky activity that creates jobs.Equilibrium is unique under full insurance. If investment is fully insured but unemployment risk is uninsured, then precautionary saving behavior dampens output fluctuations. However, if both investment and employment are uninsured, then an increase in unemployment gives agents an incentive to shift investment away from the risky asset, further increasing unemployment. This positive feedback may lead to multiple Pareto ranked equilibria. An overlapping generations version of the model may exhibit poverty traps or persistent multiplicity. Greater insurance is doubly beneficial in this context since it can both prevent multiplicity and promote risky investment.

A simple optimised search heuristic for the job-shop scheduling problem

This paper presents a simple Optimised Search Heuristic for the Job Shop Scheduling problem that combines a GRASP heuristic with a branch-and-bound algorithm. The proposed method is compared with similar approaches and leads to better results in terms of solution quality and computing times.