The spatial inequality of wage income in Barcelona Metropolitan Area

ABSTRACT The measure and estimation of income levels in Barcelona Metropolitan Area (BMA) goes back a long way. Using different approaches and focusing on different municipalities, there is a lot of work in the field. The majority of the literature has focused on the estimation of income levels using variables related to consumption. The empirical evidence on wage differentials has shown an important growth during 80’s and 90’s especially in United Kingdom and USA. Less is known on spatial distribution of inequality. This paper presents a new data set for analyzing spatial distribution of wage income. This data is obtained by matching Wage Structure Survey (WSS) with data from Census disaggregated by census tracts. In this way we have a unique data set with wage incomes for every census track for 36 municipalities belonging to BMA. We develop a descriptive analysis of spatial distribution, testing for spatial autocorrelation and use the family of Generalised Entropy Indices to measure inequality. Properties of the index allow us to decompose inequality into inter and intra-municipality measures. Since we have two cross-sectional data for WSS (1995-2002) we can also analyze the evolution of the inequality in this period of economic growth. Key words: spatial distribution of wages, spatial autocorrelation, inequality indices.

Linking conflict to inequality and polarization

In this paper we study a behavioral model of conflict that provides a basis for choosing certain indices of dispersion as indicators for conflict. We show that the (equilibrium) level of conflict can be expressed as an (approximate) linear function of the Gini coefficient, the Herfindahl-Hirschman fractionalization index, and a specific measure of polarization due to Esteban and Ray

Sharp A₂ inequality for haar shift operators

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El Nuevo acuerdo de financiación regional: un análisis de urgencia

El pasado 15 de julio el Consejo de Política Fiscal y Financiera (CPPF) aprobó un nuevo acuerdo de financiación para las comunidades autónomas de régimen común. El documento en el que se recoge el acuerdo no es precisamente un prodigio de claridad expositiva y describe además un modelo complejo. Como resultado de ambos factores, las descripciones del nuevo sistema que han aparecido en la prensa reciente y en el material "informativo" distribuido por algunas administraciones resultan bastante confusas y no reflejan correctamente, a mi entender, el funcionamiento del modelo o su previsible incidencia sobre la distribución territorial de los recursos públicos. Con el fin de facilitar un debate más informado sobre el tema, en este trabajo se intenta clarificar el funcionamiento del nuevo modelo, ofreciendo una descripción sistemática del mismo, un análisis de sus propiedades dinámicas y una primera estimación de sus resultados iniciales. Por otra parte, en el trabajo se realiza también una valoración crítica del nuevo sistema y se identifican ciertos aspectos del mismo que pueden ser problemáticos. Algunos de ellos son de carácter técnico y podrían corregirse durante el proceso de elaboración de la normativa en la que ha de plasmarse el nuevo acuerdo sin alterar la esencia de éste.

El Nuevo acuerdo de financiación regional: un análisis de urgencia ADENDA

This note contains some addenda to a recent paper (de la Fuente, 2009) that analyzed the new Spanish system of regional financing on the basis of the agreement between the central and regional Governments reached last July. The note updates my previous discussion after examining the bill that has been recently sent to Parliament by the Government and identifies some technical problems of the Government's proposal.

Inter-regional redistribution through infrastructure investment: tactical or programmatic?

In this paper we analyze the effects of both tactical and programmatic politics on the inter-regional allocation of infrastructure investment. We use a panel of data for the Spanish electoral districts during the period 1964-2004 to estimate an equation where investment depends both on economic and political variables. The results show that tactical politics do matter since, after controlling for economic traits, the districts with more ‘Political power’ still receive more investment. These districts are those where the incumbents’ Vote margin of victory/ defeat in the past election is low, where the Marginal seat price is low, where there is Partisan alignment between the executives at the central and regional layers of government, and where there are Pivotal regional parties which are influential in the formation of the central executive. However, the results also show that programmatic politics matter, since inter-regional redistribution (measured as the elasticity of investment to per capita income) is shown to increase with the arrival of the Democracy and EU Funds, with Left governments, and to decrease the higher is the correlation between a measure of ‘Political power’ and per capita income.

Human capital spillovers, productivity and regional convergence in Spain

This paper analyses the differential impact of human capital, in terms of different levels of schooling, on regional productivity and convergence. The potential existence of geographical spillovers of human capital is also considered by applying spatial panel data techniques. The empirical analysis of Spanish provinces between 1980 and 2007 confirms the positive impact of human capital on regional productivity and convergence, but reveals no evidence of any positive geographical spillovers of human capital. In fact, in some specifications the spatial lag presented by tertiary studies has a negative effect on the variables under consideration.

A three dimensional signed small ball inequality

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Los Actores económicos y la dimensión regional : la Cambra de Comerç de Barcelona y Foment del Treball Nacional (1997-2007)

Esta investigación trata de esclarecer qué opinión merece y cómo repercute la existencia de gobiernos regionales en las organizaciones empresariales de ámbito regional. Ello lo observamos mediante el análisis de dos organizaciones empresariales catalanas: Foment del Treball Nacional y la Cambra de Comerç, Indústria i Navegació de Barcelona. Desafortunadamente, como sucede para el caso español, tras más de veinticinco años de experiencia regional existe un vacío en la literatura académica, tan sólo unos pocos estudios referenciados, tanto de organizaciones empresariales regionales como de su opinión sobre el Estado de las Autonomías y sus implicaciones para un determinado modelo económico y proyecto político.

Connections between ∞-Poincaré inequality, quasi-convexity, and N1,∞

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Sobre la puesta en marcha del nuevo sistema de financiación regional: proyecciones para 2009 y algunas reflexiones

This paper presents an estimate of the financial results of the new Spanish system of regional financing in 2009. According to these estimates, some regions will experience sharp reductions in their adjusted financing per capita between 2007 and 2009 which may be very difficult to accept. This would mean that there will be strong pressures for the reform of the new system from the very beginning. To avoid, or at least mitigate, this problem it would be helpful to introduce some changes in the bill currently being discussed by the Parliament. The necessary changes would not alter the nucleus of the recent agreement.

El nuevo sistema de financiación regional: Un análisis crítico y proyecciones para 2009

The central and regional governments of Spain have recently reached an agreement to reform the regional financing system. This paper describes the structure of the new system and provides preliminary estimates of its initial financial results. It also identifies some shortcomings of the new model.

Investor protection and income inequality: risk sharing vs risk taking

This paper studies the relationship between investor protection, entrepreneurial risk taking and income inequality. In the presence of market frictions, better protection makes investors more willing to take on entrepreneurial risk when lending to firms, thereby improving the degree of risk sharing between financiers and entrepreneurs. On the other hand, by increasing risk sharing, investor protection also induces more firms to undertake risky projects. By increasing entrepreneurial risk taking, it raises income dispersion. By reducing the risk faced by entrepreneurs, it reduces income volatility. As a result, investor protection raises income inequality to the extent that it fosters risk taking, while it reduces it for a given level of risk taking. Empirical evidence from a panel of forty-five countries spanning the period 1976-2000 supports the predictions of the model.

Una Nota sobre la dinámica de la financiación regional

En esta nota se analizan las propiedades dinámicas del actual sistema de financiación y se comparan con las de su antecesor, prestando especial atención a la sensibilidad de ambos al crecimiento de la renta y la población regional así como a la evolución de la estructura por edades de esta última