Time-delayed reaction-diffusion fronts

A time-delayed second-order approximation for the front speed in reaction-dispersion systems was obtained by Fort and Méndez [Phys. Rev. Lett. 82, 867 (1999)]. Here we show that taking proper care of the effect of the time delay on the reactive process yields a different evolution equation and, therefore, an alternate equation for the front speed. We apply the new equation to the Neolithic transition. For this application the new equation yields speeds about 10% slower than the previous one

Reaction-diffusion waves of advance in the transition to agricultural economics

In a previous paper [J.Fort and V.Méndez, Phys. Rev. Lett. 82, 867 (1999)], the possible importance of higher-order terms in a human population wave of advance has been studied. However, only a few such terms were considered. Here we develop a theory including all higher-order terms. Results are in good agreement with the experimental evidence involving the expansion of agriculture in Europe

Consistent solutions in exchange economies: A characterization of the price mechanism

We characterize the Walrasian allocations correspondence by means offour axioms: consistency, replica invariance, individual rationality andPareto optimality. It is shown that for any given class of exchange economiesany solution that satisfies the axioms is a selection from the Walrasianallocations with slack. Preferences are assumed to be smooth, but may besatiated and non--convex. A class of economies is defined as all economieswhose agents' preferences belong to an arbitrary family (finite or infinite)of types. The result can be modified to characterize equal budget Walrasianallocations with slack by replacing individual rationality with individualrationality from equal division. The results are valid also for classes ofeconomies in which core--Walras equivalence does not hold.

The role of interbank markets in monetary policy: A model with rationing

This paper analyses the impact of asymmetric information in the interbankmarket and establishes its crucial role in the microfoundations of the monetarypolicy transmission mechanism. We show that interbank market imperfectionsinduce an equilibrium with rationing in the credit market. This has two majorimplications: first, it reconciles the irresponsiveness of business investment to theuser cost of capital with the large impact of monetary policy (magnitude effect)and, second, it shows that banks liquidity positions condition their reaction tomonetary policy (Kashyap and Stein liquidity effect).

Corporate finance and the monetary transmission mechanism

This paper analyzes the transmission mechanisms of monetarypolicy in a general equilibrium model of securities marketsand banking with asymmetric information. Banks' optimal asset/liability policy is such that in equilibrium capital adequacy constraints are always binding. Asymmetric information about banks' net worth adds a cost to outside equity capital, which limits the extent to which banks can relax their capital constraint. In this context monetarypolicy does not affect bank lending through changes in bank liquidity. Rather, it has the effect of changing theaggregate composition of financing by firms. The model also produces multiple equilibria, one of which displays all the features of a "credit crunch". Thus, monetary policy can also have large effects when it induces a shift from one equilibrium to the other.