Uncertainty, electoral Incentives and political myopia

In this paper, we study the determinants of political myopia in a rational model of electoral accountability where the key elements are informational frictions and uncertainty. We build a framework where political ability is ex-ante unknown and policy choices are not perfectly observable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politicians invest too little in costly policies with future returns in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reelection probability. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, uncertainty reduces political myopia and may, under some conditions, increase social welfare. We use the model to study how political rewards can be set so as to maximise social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limit to governments. The predictions of our theory are consistent with a number of stylised facts and with a new empirical observation documented in this paper: aggregate uncertainty, measured by economic volatility, is associated to better ...scal discipline in a panel of 20 OECD countries.

El Sistema de financiación regional: la liquidación de 2010 y algunas reflexiones sobre la reciente reforma

El pasado mes de julio el Ministerio de Hacienda y Administraciones Públicas hizo pública la liquidación del sistema de financiación de las comunidades autónomas de régimen común correspondiente a 2010, que marca la madurez del nuevo modelo acordado en 2009. En el presente trabajo se describe la distribución de recursos que se fija en este documento, se analizan las fuentes próximas de los cambios observados en la financiación de las distintas comunidades autónomas entre 2009 y 2010 y se realiza una valoración de los efectos de la reciente reforma sobre la equidad del reparto territorial de los recursos del sistema.

Aixecament, anàlisi constructiu i projecte de reforma i canvi d'ús a l'escola de Saderra

L’objectiu principal és:Realització de l’aixecament de l’edifici existent.Recull de la informació històrica, necessària per conèixer lescaracterístiques de l’edifici.Estudi i catalogació de les diferents patologies que pateix l’edifici.Projecte de reforma i canvi d’ús per tal de que l’edifici doni un nou serveial municipi.A partir d’aquesta informació es determinarà, l’estat actual de l’estructura.A partir de l’estudi històric s’intentarà entendre la forma de construir de principis desegle i els diferents materials utilitzats.La realització de les fitxes de les diferents patologies que degraden l’edificació enspermetran l’actuació sobre aquestes i donar possibles solucions als fets que elsoriginen.El projecte de reforma i canvi d’ús s’intentarà donar un nou espai al municipi per tal deque la gent del poble i/o l’ajuntament en puguin treure algun profit

Algunas propuestas para la reforma del sistema de financiación de las comunidades autónomas de régimen común

En el presente trabajo se avanzan una serie de recomendaciones para la reforma del sistema de financiación de las comunidades autónomas de régimen común. La primera de ellas tiene que ver con la estructura del sistema y con el reparto de recursos entre regiones. El resto se centran en resolver el déficit de autonomía de ingreso y de responsabilidad fiscal que todavía caracteriza al sistema.

Impacte econòmic de la reforma de l'avinguda Diagonal

Quina és la primera imatge que et ve al cap quan sents parlar de l’avinguda Diagonal?Segurament és la d’una avinguda llarga i sovint altament congestionada pel trànsit.No obstant, fa seixanta anys l’avinguda Diagonal complia unes funcions ben diferents a les que compleix avui en dia. Tot just acabava de finalitzar la Guerra Civil i la gent necessitava diversió, i per això l’avinguda acollia sales de festa, bars i cafès, els grans premis d’automoció de l’època i era una mena d’autopista per travessar la ciutat de manera ràpida. Tot això es ben diferent de la Diagonal actual on el trànsit és molt dens, i la congestió i el desordre estan presents al nostre cap quan pensem en aquesta columna vertebral de l’Eixample.Res a veure amb la Diagonal del futur, on els vianants tindran un espai molt generósper poder passejar, comprar o fer una copa a la terrassa d’un bar tranquil·lament sense haver d’esquivar les bicicletes que, per cert, també tindran un espai reservat i bendelimitat. I una reducció del trànsit molt important, per tal de tenir una avingudamoderna, neta, cosmopolita i al nivell de la ciutat de Barcelona.I, com veurem a continuació, aquesta reforma es mourà al voltant d’un polèmic i controvertit punt: la unió dels dos tramvies de la ciutat a través de l’avinguda Diagonal.

Electoral Platforms, Implemented Policies, and Abstention

Recent studies of American politics evidence that political polarization of both the electorate and the political elite have moved 'almost in tandem for the past half century' (McCarty et al., 2003, p.2), and that party polarization has steadily increased since the 1970s. On the other hand, the empirical literature on party platforms and implemented policies has consistently found an imperfect but nonnegligible correlation between electoral platforms and governmental policies: while platforms tend to be polarized, policies are moderate or centrist. However, existing theoretical models of political competition are not manifestly compatible with these observations. In this paper, we distinguish between electoral platforms and implemented policies by incorporating a non-trivial policy-setting process. It follows that voters may care not only about the implemented policy but also about the platform they support with their vote. We find that while parties tend to polarize their positions, the risk of alienating their constituency prevents them from radicalizing. The analysis evidences that the distribution of the electorate, and not only the (expected) location of a pivotal voter, matters in determining policies. Our results are consistent with the observation of polarized platforms and moderate policies, and the alienation and indifference components of abstention.

Associationism and electoral participation: A multilevel study of 2000 Spanish general election

This work presents an application of the multilevel analysis techniques tothe study of the abstention in the 2000 Spanish general election. Theinterest of the study is both, substantive and methodological. From thesubstantive point of view the article intends to explain the causes ofabstention and analyze the impact of associationism on it. From themethodological point of view it is intended to analyze the interaction betweenindividual and context with a modelisation that takes into account thehierarchical structure of data. The multilevel study of this paper validatesthe one level results obtained in previous analysis of the abstention andshows that only a fraction of the differences in abstention are explained bythe individual characteristics of the electors. Another important fraction ofthese differences is due to the political and social characteristics of thecontext. Relating to associationism, the data suggest that individualparticipation in associations decrease the probability of abstention. However,better indicators are needed in order to catch more properly the effect ofassociationism in electoral behaviour.

An agenda-setting model of electoral competition

This paper presents a model of electoral competition focusing on the formation of thepublic agenda. An incumbent government and a challenger party in opposition competein elections by choosing the issues that will key out their campaigns. Giving salience toan issue implies proposing an innovative policy proposal, alternative to the status-quo.Parties trade off the issues with high salience in voters concerns and those with broadagreement on some alternative policy proposal. Each party expects a higher probabilityof victory if the issue it chooses becomes salient in the voters decision. But remarkably,the issues which are considered the most important ones by a majority of votes may notbe given salience during the electoral campaign. An incumbent government may survivein spite of its bad policy performance if there is no sufficiently broad agreement on apolicy alternative. We illustrate the analytical potential of the model with the case of theUnited States presidential election in 2004.

It's parties that choose electoral systems (or Duverger's Law upside down)

This article presents, discusses and tests the hypothesis that it is the number of parties what can explain the choice of electoral systems, rather than the other way round. Already existing political parties tend to choose electoral systems that, rather than generate new party systems by themselves, will crystallize, consolidate or reinforce previously existing party configurations. A general model develops the argument and presents the concept of 'behavioral-institutional equilibrium' to account for the relation between electoral systems and party systems. The most comprehensive dataset and test of these notions to date, encompassing 219 elections in 87 countries since the 19th century, are presented. The analysis gives strong support to the hypotheses that political party configurations dominated by a few parties tend to establish majority rule electoral systems, while multiparty systems already existed before the introduction of proportional representation. It also offers the new theoretical proposition that strategic party choice of electoral systems leads to a general trend toward proportional representation over time.

Setting the rules of the game: The choice of electoral systems in advanced democracies

The origins of electoral systems have received scant attention in the literature. Looking at the history of electoral rules in the advanced world in the last century, this paper shows that the existing wide variation in electoral rules across nations can be traced to the strategic decisions that the current ruling parties, anticipating the coordinating consequences of different electoral regimes, make to maximize their representation according to the following conditions. On the one hand, as long as the electoral arena does not change substantially and the current electoral regime serves the ruling parties well, the latter have no incentives to modify the electoral regime. On the other hand, as soon as the electoral arena changes (due to the entry of new voters or a change in their preferences), the ruling parties will entertain changing the electoral system, depending on two main conditions: the emergence of new parties and the coordinating capacities of the old ruling parties. Accordingly, if the new parties are strong, the old parties shift from plurality/majority rules to proportional representation (PR) only if the latter are locked into a 'non-Duvergerian' equilibrium; i.e. if no old party enjoys a dominant position (the case of most small European states)--conversely, they do not if a Duvergerian equilibrium exists (the case of Great Britain). Similarly, whenever the new entrants are weak, a non-PR system is maintained, regardless of the structure of the old party system (the case of the USA). The paper discusses as well the role of trade and ethnic and religious heterogeneity in the adoption of PR rules.

Strategic ambiguity in electoral competition

Many have observed that political candidates running for election areoften purposefully expressing themselves in vague and ambiguous terms. In thispaper we provide a simple formal model of this phenomenon. We model theelectoral competition between two candidates as a two--stage game. In thefirst stage of the game two candidates simultaneously choose their ideologies,and in the second stage they simultaneously choose their level of ambiguity.Our results show that ambiguity, although disliked by voters, may be sustainedin equilibrium. The introduction of ambiguity as a strategic choice variablefor the candidates can also serve to explain why candidates with the sameelectoral objectives end up ``separating'', that is, assuming different ideological positions.

On the origins of electoral systems and political parties. The role of elections in multi-member districts

The old, understudied electoral system composed of multi-member districts, open ballot and plurality rule is presented as the most remote scene of the origin of both political parties and new electoral systems. A survey of the uses of this set of electoral rules in different parts of the world during remote and recent periods shows its wide spread. A model of voting by this electoral system demonstrates that, while it can produce varied and pluralistic representation, it also provides incentives to form factional or partisan candidacies. Famous negative reactions to the emergence of factions and political parties during the 18th and 19th centuries are reinterpreted in this context. Many electoral rules and procedures invented since the second half of the 19th century, including the Australian ballot, single-member districts, limited and cumulative ballots, and proportional representation rules, derived from the search to reduce the effects of the originating multi-member district system in favor of a single party sweep. The general relations between political parties and electoral systems are restated to account for the foundational stage here discussed.

Las deducciones en el IRPF por gasto sanitario privado: situación actual y posibilidades de reforma

The paper provides information about the tax treatment given to personalhealth expenditures in the Personal Income Tax in Spain, and analyseswhat we know about it and how the tax credit or other forms ofpreferential tax treatment can contribute to the financement of privatehealth expenditures, of special relevance in view of the recent PersonalIncome Tax modification proposals . It also points out some of the mainredistributive results coming out from this type of public financement,differentiating between types of expenditures (mainly those on healthservices which are not provided by the public health system, from thosewhich are).

Negativity effect in multiparty electoral competition

We construct a dynamic voting model of multiparty competition in order to capture the following facts: voters base their decision on past economicperformance of the parties, and parties and candidates have different objectives. This model may explain the emergence of parties' ideologies,and shows the compatibility of the different objectives of parties and candidates. Together, these results give rise to the formation ofpolitical parties, as infinetely-lived agents with a certain ideology, out of the competition of myopic candidates freely choosing policy positions. We also show that in multicandidate elections held under the plurality system, Hotelling's principle of minimum differentiation is no longer satisfied.