E-learning : implementació d'un CMS per a la gestió d'un Campus Virtual

L'objectiu d'aquest treball consisteix a elegir una eina de gestió de continguts per a l'aplicació en la gestió d'un campus virtual. L'estudi de les característiques de diversos dels CMS més emprats ens permetrà, a més, acostar-nos-hi d'una manera pràctica, atès que una part del treball inclou, després de la tria del CMS, la seva instal·lació en un servidor a Internet i la configuració pertinent per a adequar-lo als rols d'administradors, professors, estudiants, etc.

Sobre l´elecció de bisbes durant el franquisme: els casos de Narcís Jubany (1964) i Jaume Camprodon (1973) per a la seu de Girona

L'objectiu d'aquest article és presentar les circumstàncies i algunes de les actuacions que es produïren a l'hora de fer els dos nomenaments que afectaren la diòcesi de Girona. El primer, per causa de la mort del bisbe Cartañà, enregistrada el 1963; i el segon, motivat pel trasllat del bisbe Jubany a Barcelona, el 1971

A tale of two logits, compositional data analysis and zero observations

The application of compositional data analysis through log ratio trans-formations corresponds to a multinomial logit model for the shares themselves.This model is characterized by the property of Independence of Irrelevant Alter-natives (IIA). IIA states that the odds ratio in this case the ratio of shares is invariant to the addition or deletion of outcomes to the problem. It is exactlythis invariance of the ratio that underlies the commonly used zero replacementprocedure in compositional data analysis. In this paper we investigate using thenested logit model that does not embody IIA and an associated zero replacementprocedure and compare its performance with that of the more usual approach ofusing the multinomial logit model. Our comparisons exploit a data set that com-bines voting data by electoral division with corresponding census data for eachdivision for the 2001 Federal election in Australia

Presidents and parties in regional politics: Italy and Spain compared

This article examines the relationship between political parties and regional presidents in Italy and Spain, adopting a comparative case study approach based on extensive archival analysis and in-depth interviews with regional politicians. The findings confirm a strong pattern of growing presidentialism at regional level, regardless of whether there are formal mechanisms for direct election, and regardless of the partisan composition of regional government. Regional presidents tend to exert their growing power through a personalised control of regional party organisations, rather than governing past parties in a direct appeal to the electorate. Nevertheless, parties can still present a significant constraint on regional presidents, so successful regional presidents tend to maintain a mediating form of leadership and fully exploit the opportunities for party patronage to build up their support and smooth governing tensions. An autonomist drive helps presidents hold together disparate coalitions or loose parties at regional level, but their lack of internal coherence presents major problems when it comes to political succession.

Alternation and Cooperation in a Two-party System: Implications for Resource-Based Developing Economies

This paper studies cooperation in a political system dominated by two opportunistic parties competing in a resource-based economy. Since a binding agreement as an external solution might be difficult to enforce due to the close association between the incumbent party and the government, the paper explores the extent to which co-operation between political parties that alternate in office can rely on self-enforcing strategies to provide an internal solution. We show that, for appropriate values of the probability of re-election and the discount factor cooperation in maintaining the value of a state variable is possible, but fragile. Another result is that, in such political framework, debt decisions contain an externality element linked to electoral incentives that creates a bias towards excessive borrowing.

The concentration of foreigners in French schools: interaction effects in place?

This paper explores the existence of negative peer-group pressures derived from the concentration of foreigners in French lower secondary schools. Using different dependent variables (number of years spent in lower secondary education, grades in 4th ‘and 3rd year and track election in upper secondary schooling) the analyses indicate that the much disputed existence of significant and negative effects of the concentration of foreign students in schools depends on the method used for the estimation. If we assume that the concentration of foreigners is a random and exogenous process, then the multivariate analyses confirm negative interactions. If, on the contrary, we question the assumption that this contextual information is not end the result of prior sorting mechanisms of individuals across social spaces, the concentration of foreigners has no statistical impact on attainment.

Predictors of political orientation among US-born Mexican Americans: cultural identification, acculturation attitudes and socioeconomic status

With each passing election, U.S. political campaigns have renewed their efforts in courting the “Latino vote,” yet the Latino population is not a culturally homogenous voting bloc. This study examined how cultural identifications and acculturation attitudes in U.S. born Mexican Americans interacted with socioeconomic status (SES) to predict political orientation. Individuals who held stronger Mexican identity and supported biculturalism as an acculturation strategy had a more liberal orientation, while belonging to a higher SES group and holding stronger assimilation attitudes predicted a less liberal orientation. Mexican cultural identification interacted with SES such that those who held a weaker Mexican identity, but came from a higher social class were less liberal and more moderate in their political orientation. Weak Mexican identification and higher SES also predicted weaker endorsement of bicultural acculturation attitudes, which in turn, mediated the differences in political orientation. The acceptance of one’s ethnic identity and endorsement of bicultural attitudes predicted a more liberal political orientation. In light of these findings, political candidates should be cautious in how they pander to Latino constituents—referencing the groups’ ethnic culture or customs may distance constituents who are not strongly identified with their ethnic culture.

Policy Making in Divided Government. A Pivotal Actors Model with Party Discipline.

This article presents a formal model of policy decision-making in an institutional framework of separation of powers in which the main actors are pivotal political parties with voting discipline. The basic model previously developed from pivotal politics theory for the analysis of the United States lawmaking is here modified to account for policy outcomes and institutional performances in other presidential regimes, especially in Latin America. Legislators' party indiscipline at voting and multi-partism appear as favorable conditions to reduce the size of the equilibrium set containing collectively inefficient outcomes, while a two-party system with strong party discipline is most prone to produce 'gridlock', that is, stability of socially inefficient policies. The article provides a framework for analysis which can induce significant revisions of empirical data, especially regarding the effects of situations of (newly defined) unified and divided government, different decision rules, the number of parties and their discipline. These implications should be testable and may inspire future analytical and empirical work.

Voting after the bombing: Can terrorist attacks change the outcome of democratic elections?

Economists have recently turned their attention to the effects of terrorism. One much debated effect of terrorist attacks is its impact on the results of democratic elections. We use the electoral consequences of the terrorist attacks of the 11-M in Madrid to analyze this issue. We consider this particular experiment since the attack took place only three days before the 2004 Congressional Election, which allows the use of credible identification criteria. In particular, we use the advance voting by Spanish residents abroad, who cast their vote before the terrorist attack, to identify the effect of the bombing. We exploit this macabre natural experiment to run a difference-in-differences estimation using data on three consecutive Congressional elections. Our empirical results indicate that a terrorist attack can have a large impact on the outcome of democratic elections.

Policy making in divided government. A pivotal actors model with party discipline

This article presents a formal model of policy decision-making in an institutional framework of separation of powers in which the main actors are pivotal political parties with voting discipline. The basic model previously developed from pivotal politics theory for the analysis of the United States lawmaking is here modified to account for policy outcomes and institutional performances in other presidential regimes, especially in Latin America. Legislators' party indiscipline at voting and multi-partism appear as favorable conditions to reduce the size of the equilibrium set containing collectively inefficient outcomes, while a two-party system with strong party discipline is most prone to produce 'gridlock', that is, stability of socially inefficient policies. The article provides a framework for analysis which can induce significant revisions of empirical data, especially regarding the effects of situations of (newly defined) unified and divided government, different decision rules, the number of parties and their discipline. These implications should be testable and may inspire future analytical and empirical work.

How political parties, rather than member-states, are building the European Union

Political party formation and coalition building in the European Parliament is being a driving force for making governance of the highly pluralistic European Union relatively effective and consensual. In spite of successive enlargements and the very high number of electoral partiesobtaining representation in the European Union institutions, the number of effective European Political Groups in the European Parliament has decreased from the first direct election in 1979 to the fifth in 1999. The formal analysis of national party¹s voting power in different Europeanparty configurations can explain the incentives for national parties to join large European Political Groups instead of forming smaller nationalistic groupings. Empirical evidence shows increasing cohesion of European Political Groups and an increasing role of the European Parliament in EU inter-institutional decision making. As a consequence of this evolution, intergovernmentalism is being replaced with federalizing relations. The analysis can support positive expectations regarding the governability of the European Union after further enlargements provided that new member states have party systems fitting the European PoliticalGroups.

Strategic ambiguity in electoral competition

Many have observed that political candidates running for election areoften purposefully expressing themselves in vague and ambiguous terms. In thispaper we provide a simple formal model of this phenomenon. We model theelectoral competition between two candidates as a two--stage game. In thefirst stage of the game two candidates simultaneously choose their ideologies,and in the second stage they simultaneously choose their level of ambiguity.Our results show that ambiguity, although disliked by voters, may be sustainedin equilibrium. The introduction of ambiguity as a strategic choice variablefor the candidates can also serve to explain why candidates with the sameelectoral objectives end up ``separating'', that is, assuming different ideological positions.

Estimating parliamentary composition through electoral polls

Any electoral system has an electoral formula that converts voteproportions into parliamentary seats. Pre-electoral polls usually focuson estimating vote proportions and then applying the electoral formulato give a forecast of the parliament's composition. We here describe theproblems arising from this approach: there is always a bias in theforecast. We study the origin of the bias and some methods to evaluateand to reduce it. We propose some rules to compute the sample sizerequired for a given forecast accuracy. We show by Monte Carlo simulationthe performance of the proposed methods using data from Spanish electionsin last years. We also propose graphical methods to visualize how electoralformulae and parliamentary forecasts work (or fail).

Social security in theory and practice (I): Facts and political theories

166 countries have some kind of public old age pension. What economic forcescreate and sustain old age Social Security as a public program? We document some of the internationally and historically common features of Social Security programs including explicit and implicit taxes on labor supply, pay-as-you-go features, intergenerational redistribution, benefits which areincreasing functions of lifetime earnings and not means-tested. We partition theories of Social Security into three groups: "political", "efficiency" and "narrative" theories. We explore three political theories in this paper: the majority rational voting model (with its two versions: "the elderly as the leaders of a winning coalition with the poor" and the "once and for all election" model), the "time-intensive model of political competition" and the "taxpayer protection model". Each of the explanations is compared with the international and historical facts. A companion paper explores the "efficiency" and "narrative" theories, and derives implicationsof all the theories for replacing the typical pay-as-you-go system with a forced savings plan.

Electoral competition under the threat of political unrest

We study elections in which one party (the strong party) controls a source of political unrest; e.g., this party could instigate riots if it lost the election. We show that the strong party is more likely to win the election when there is less information about its ability to cause unrest. This is because when theweak party is better informed, it can more reliably prevent political unrest by implementing a ``centrist'' policy. When there is uncertainty over the credibility of the threat, ``posturing'' by the strong party leads to platform divergence.