119 resultados para Political Regime
Resumo:
This research primarily analyses relevant climate bargaining dynamics that have been informed by a North-South impasse. This working paper argues that the first stage of negotiations for a climate convention indeed witnessed a North-South divide which became institutionalized in the Framework Convention on Climate Change. However, in subsequent negotiation rounds the key loci of bargaining struggles was centered between developed countries, in which relevant North-South cooperation dynamics were also present. Finally, this paper assesses the unfinished post-Kyoto bargaining process in which two trends are already being observed: both the emergence of a new geopolitics between the United States and major developing countries, and a fragmentation process within the South, in which the Copenhagen Accord itself has begun to institutionalize such fragmentation.
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In this paper, I provide a formal justi cation for a well-established coattail effect, when a popular candidate at one branch of government attracts votes to candidates from the same political party for other branches of government. A political agency frame- work with moral hazard is applied to analyze coattails in simultaneous presidential and congressional elections. I show that coattail voting is a natural outcome of the optimal reelection scheme adopted by a representative voter to motivate politicians' efforts in a retrospective voting environment. I assume that an office-motivated politician (executive or congressman) prefers her counterpart to be affiliated with the same political party. This correlation of incentives leads the voter to adopt a joint performance evaluation rule, which is conditioned on the politicians belonging to the same party or different parties. The two-sided coattail effects then arise. On the one hand, the executive's suc- cess/failure props up/drags down her partisan ally in congressional election, which implies presidential coattails. On the other hand, the executive's reelection itself is affected by the congressman's performance, which results in reverse coattails. JEL classi fication: D72, D86. Keywords: Coattail voting; Presidential coattails; Reverse coattails; Simultaneous elections; Political Agency; Retrospective voting.
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This paper formalizes in a fully-rational model the popular idea that politicians perceive an electoral cost in adopting costly reforms with future benefits and reconciles it with the evidence that reformist governments are not punished by voters. To do so, it proposes a model of elections where political ability is ex-ante unknown and investment in reforms is unobservable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politicians make too little reforms in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reappointment probability. Although in a rational expectation equilibrium voters cannot be fooled and hence reelection does not depend on reforms, the strategy of underinvesting in reforms is nonetheless sustained by out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, uncertainty makes reforms more politically viable and may, under some conditions, increase social welfare. The model is then used to study how political rewards can be set so as to maximize social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limit to governments. The predictions of this theory are consistent with a number of empirical regularities on the determinants of reforms and reelection. They are also consistent with a new stylized fact documented in this paper: economic uncertainty is associated to more reforms in a panel of 20 OECD countries.
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Mentre que les nanotecnologies s'espera que porti beneficis importants en molts sectors i contribuir a la competitivitat, hi ha un creixent cos de dades científiques que indiquin que hi ha motius raonables per témer que els nanomaterials en particular pot donar lloc a els possibles riscos i efectes nocius per a la salut i el medi ambient. El meu objectiu és examinar com la Unió Europea està donant forma a un règim regulatori per nanomaterials: l'opció regulatòria escollida, la legislació vigent aplicable i la seva eficàcia (amb especial atenció sobre REACH buits normatius), la posició adoptada per la els diferents actors en aquest procés i l'evolució prevista legal en el curt termini.
Resumo:
Projecte de recerca elaborat a partir d’una estada a la London School of Economics and Political Science, United Kingdom, entre 2007 i 2009. L’objecte principal del projecte ha estat analitzar les implicacions jurídico-polítiques i institucionals d’una teoria de la justícia i la igualtat liberals aplicada a societats multiculturals amb un marcat predomini de la diversitat cultural. L’anàlisi desenvolupa una línia d'investigació interdisciplinar - entre el dret i la teoria política - iniciada en una tesis doctoral sobre multiculturalisme i drets de les minories culturals (UPF, 2000) que va culminar en la publicació de Group Rights as Human Rights (Springer, 2006). La recerca adopta com a punt de partida les conclusions de l'esmentada obra, en especial, la rellevància del reconeixement de drets col•lectius; tanmateix, el tipus de qüestions plantejades, l’enfoc i la metodologia emprades són substancialment diferents. En concret, s'adrecen preguntes específiques sobre el model i aspiracions del constitucionalisme democràtic i el paper del dret en contextos multiculturals. També s’atorga un pes central a la dimensió institucional dels models de gestió de la diversitat que s’analitzen, prioritzant un enfocament comparatiu a partir de l’estudi de controvèrsies concretes. L’objectiu és superar algunes limitacions importants de la literatura actual, com ara la tendència a examinar en abstracte la compatibilitat de determinades demandes amb el constitucionalisme democràtic, sense abordar el funcionament d'estratègies de gestió de la diversitat cultural emprades en contextos concrets. Els treballs producte d'aquest projecte articulen les línies bàsiques d’un model pluralista, basat en principis més que en regles, que desafia els plantejaments dominants actualment. Aquest model es caracteritza pel compromís amb la legitimitat i igualtat comparatives, rebutjant el paternalisme i les visions liberals típiques sobre el paper de la regulació. La presumpció de l’“standing” moral dels grups identitaris és fonamental per tal de considerar-los interlocutors vàlids amb interessos genuïns. També s’argumenta que la integració social en contextos multiculturals no depèn tant de l’eliminació del conflicte sinó, sobre tot, d’una gestió eficient que eviti abusos de poder sistemàtics. El model defensa el rol del dret en la institucionalització del diàleg intercultural, però admet que el diàleg no necessàriament condueix a l’acord o a una estructura reguladora coherent i uniforme. Les aspiracions del ordre jurídic pluralista són més modestes: afavorir la negociació i resolució en cada conflicte, malgrat la persistència de la fragmentació i la provisionalitat dels acords. La manca d'un marc regulador comú esdevé una virtut en la mesura que permet la interacció de diferents subordres; una interacció governada per una multiplicitat de regles no necessàriament harmòniques. Els avantatges i problemes d’aquest model s'analitzen a partir de l'anàlisi de l’estructura fragmentària de l'ordre jurídic internacional i del règim Europeu de drets humans.
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My interest in higher education and citizenship in the Middle East at large and in Jordan in particular is fostered by some of the reflections Eickelman proposed (1992). Being a quite recent phenomenon, intimately linked with the more general topic of state formation it seemed to me more suitable to study it in a little country with a recent history (a field study left almost unexplored until now as far as Jordan is concerned, to the best of my knowledge, since Antoun 1994 focuses on the migration as a quest for higher education). The process of state formation in Jordan is quite studied. I thus intended to study the higher education policies as an attempt both to create a national citizenry and more recently as a way of controlling the more problematic part of the population (youth, which constitutes more than the double of the population. See UNDP and Ministry of Planning 2000). How do the young students enter the university system, and in which way does this system work? How is this system designed, in order to retain social control of the students (since they are usually perceived to be a factor of social and political instability, as in Iran or in Egypt)? Is there any significant difference between different faculties? And if so, why? My conclusions at this stage are that the university system is an integral part of the survival of the regime. The system works quite well, and Jordan has one of the best educational position in the region. Yet there are important distinctions to be made: the access to the better faculties is socially selective while the less valued faculties are left to the poorer and less wealthy youth. This results in a different treatment of the students and of the courses that I analysed. In the better faculties the teaching standards are quite high, and the relationship between professors and students is almost on a same-level base, while in the less privileged faculties the opposite is true. Thus we can observe a concrete politics of divide et impera intended to split the youth in two. For the more privileged there are some freedoms, both within and outside classes, designed I guess at forging them as autonomous individuals. On the opposite the less privileged are kept under tight control, even if also these students are a privileged category among youth at large.
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This paper analyzes a spatial model of political competition between two policy- motivated parties in hard times of crisis. Hard times are modeled in terms of policy- making costs carried by a newly elected party. The results predict policy divergence in equilibrium. If the ideological preferences of parties are quite diverse and extreme, there is a unique equilibrium in which the parties announce symmetric platforms and each party wins with probability one half. If one party is extreme while the other is more moderate, there is a unique equilibrium in which the parties announce asymmetric platforms. If the preferred policies of the parties are not very distinct, there are two equilibria with asymmetric platforms. An important property of equilibrium with asymmetric platforms is that a winning party necessarily announces its most preferred policy as a platform. JEL classification: D72. Keywords: Spatial model; Political competition; Two-party system; Policy-motivated parties; Hard times; Crisis.
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A credible analysis or proposal to solve the problem of the treatment of violence in divided societies has to based in a good understanding of the micro-foundations of the political mobilization in these societies. Much of the engineering models seem to have been based on rather strong simplifications of the electoral behaviour of the citizens. This paper aims to contribute to the understanding of the underlying political competition in divided societies with a neo-downsian model of party competition that is based on the interpretation of Tsebelis (1991) of the consociationalism.
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The low quality of education is a persistent problem in many developed countries. Parallel to in the last decades exists a tendency towards decentralization in many developed and developing countries. Using micro data from the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) referred to 22 countries, we test whether there exists an impact of fiscal and political decentralization on student performance in the areas of mathematics, reading skills and science. We observe that fiscal decentralization exerts an unequivocal positive effect on students’ outcomes in all areas, while the effect of political decentralization is more ambiguous. On the one hand, the capacity of the subnational governments to rule on its region has a positive effect on students’ performance in mathematics. On the other hand, the capacity to influence the country as a whole has a negative impact on mathematics achievement. As a general result, we observe that students’ performance in Mathematics is more sensible to these exogenous variations than in Sciences and reading skills. Keywords: School outcomes, PISA, fiscal decentralization, political decentralization JEL codes: H11, H77, I21
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Aquest treball té com a objectiu analitzar el multilingüisme a la Unió europea des d’una perspectiva interdisciplinària entre traducció i dret de la Unió europea. Aquest article estudia la Unió com a un sistema multilingüe, amb especial èmfasi en les raons jurídiques i polítiques darrera l’actual règim lingüístic. També s’intentarà examinar els efectes que la diversitat lingüística té en la interpretació de la legislació europea. Hi han vint i tres llengües oficials i els textos publicats en les diferents llengües son igualment autèntics (Article 55 TFUE). Però les regles poden tenir la mateixa implicació jurídica en mes d’una llengua?
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The EU has been one of the main actors involved in the construction process of an international climate change regime, adopting it as an identity sign in the international arena. This activism has reverted in the European political agenda and in the one of its Members States. Therefore, climate change has become a driver for the EU growing participation in energy policy and for its governance evolution. In this context, much attention has been paid to the climate and energy policies integration agreed after the 2007 spring European Council. Apparently, this decision meant a decisive step towards the incorporation of the environmental variable in the energy policy-making. Moreover, the Action Plan [2007-2009] “Energy Policy for Europe” outlined priority actions in a variety of energy-related areas, implying the new European Energy Policy commencement. Against this background, there is still much left to understand about its formulation and its further development. Rooted on the Environmental Policy Integration approach, this paper traces the increasing proximity between environment and energy policies in order to understand the green contribution to the European Energy Policy construction.
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This article investigates whether vote-buying and the instigation of violence in the disputed 2007 Kenyan elections were strategically motivated, and whether those affected by electoral violence changed their views towards ethno-politics and the use of violence. To answer these questions, a panel survey conducted before and after the elections is combined with external indicators of electoral violence. We find that political parties targeted vote-buying towards specific groups to weaken the support of their political rivals and to mobilize their own supporters. Furthermore, parties instigated violence strategically in areas where they were less likely to win. Although the victims of violence would prefer that parties are no longer allowed to organize in ethnic or religious lines, they are more likely to identify in ethnic terms, support the use of violence and avoid relying on the police to resolve disputes. The overall findings suggest an increased risk of electoral-violence reoccurring.
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In this paper, we study the determinants of political myopia in a rational model of electoral accountability where the key elements are informational frictions and uncertainty. We build a framework where political ability is ex-ante unknown and policy choices are not perfectly observable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politicians invest too little in costly policies with future returns in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reelection probability. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, uncertainty reduces political myopia and may, under some conditions, increase social welfare. We use the model to study how political rewards can be set so as to maximise social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limit to governments. The predictions of our theory are consistent with a number of stylised facts and with a new empirical observation documented in this paper: aggregate uncertainty, measured by economic volatility, is associated to better ...scal discipline in a panel of 20 OECD countries.
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La etnografía de la comunidad mixe de Salto de la Tuxpana y del grave conflicto que se produjo entre 2005 y 2007 es el punto de partida del presente artículo. La investigación realizada arrojó como resultado más destacado el descubrimiento de un violento cacicazgo, legitimado ideológicamente en la autonomía comunitaria, la identidad étnica y el reclamo de una jurisdicción propia, y asentado firmemente sobre tres mecanismos de control social: protección a través de la Policía Comunitaria Armada, acceso a la tierra y acceso a los programas de «desarrollo». El caciquismo se define como el régimen político personalista, basado en estructuras clientelares, que monopoliza y controla recursos y votos. También se propone la hipótesis de que la mayor parte de la violencia desplegada por los caciques es el resultado del proceso de reproducción social del mismo sistema político, cuando se genera una faccionalización simétrica de la comunidad, después de un periodo de estabilidad complementaria.