Guía para la evaluación de programas y políticas públicas de discapacidad

El estudio se ha llevado a cabo de acuerdo con el Contrato de prestación de serviciosfirmado entre la Fundación ONCE y la Fundació Bosch i Gimpera (Universidadde Barcelona) con fecha 23 de julio de 2012. Este Contrato se enmarca en el ProgramaOperativo de “Lucha contra la Discriminación 2007-2013”, cofinanciado por elFondo Social Europeo (FSE).

Treinta años de cooperación al desarrollo en España: análisis de la continuidad y cambio en las políticas públicas

A partir del análisis de la red de actores (policy network) y de la teoría del equilibrio interrumpido desarrollado por Baumgartner y Jones (1993), en este trabajo se analiza el caso de la política de cooperación al desarrollo de España desde la transición democrática hasta el presente. El objetivo es analizar la continuidad y cambio de esta política desde la perspectiva del análisis de las políticas públicas. Se demuestra que, al igual que en otros casos, la estabilidad más que el cambio caracteriza su evolución. Al mismo tiempo, se señala que las características propias del subsistema político de la cooperación al desarrollo afectan la magnitud y la frecuencia de los cambios en la política.

Policy Making in Divided Government. A Pivotal Actors Model with Party Discipline.

This article presents a formal model of policy decision-making in an institutional framework of separation of powers in which the main actors are pivotal political parties with voting discipline. The basic model previously developed from pivotal politics theory for the analysis of the United States lawmaking is here modified to account for policy outcomes and institutional performances in other presidential regimes, especially in Latin America. Legislators' party indiscipline at voting and multi-partism appear as favorable conditions to reduce the size of the equilibrium set containing collectively inefficient outcomes, while a two-party system with strong party discipline is most prone to produce 'gridlock', that is, stability of socially inefficient policies. The article provides a framework for analysis which can induce significant revisions of empirical data, especially regarding the effects of situations of (newly defined) unified and divided government, different decision rules, the number of parties and their discipline. These implications should be testable and may inspire future analytical and empirical work.

Policy making in divided government. A pivotal actors model with party discipline

This article presents a formal model of policy decision-making in an institutional framework of separation of powers in which the main actors are pivotal political parties with voting discipline. The basic model previously developed from pivotal politics theory for the analysis of the United States lawmaking is here modified to account for policy outcomes and institutional performances in other presidential regimes, especially in Latin America. Legislators' party indiscipline at voting and multi-partism appear as favorable conditions to reduce the size of the equilibrium set containing collectively inefficient outcomes, while a two-party system with strong party discipline is most prone to produce 'gridlock', that is, stability of socially inefficient policies. The article provides a framework for analysis which can induce significant revisions of empirical data, especially regarding the effects of situations of (newly defined) unified and divided government, different decision rules, the number of parties and their discipline. These implications should be testable and may inspire future analytical and empirical work.