The effect of intergroup competition on group coordination: An experimental study

We report an experiment on the effect of intergroup competition on group coordination in the minimal-effort game (Van Huyck et al., 1990). The competition was between two 7-person groups. Each player in each group independently chose an integer from 1 to 7. The group with the higher minimum won the competition and each of its members was paid according to the game s original payoff matrix. Members of the losing group were paid nothing. In case of a tie, each player was paid half the payoff in the original matrix. This treatment was contrasted with two control treatments where each of the two groups played an independent coordination game, either with or without information about the minimum chosen by the outgroup. Although the intergroup competition does not change the set of strict equilibria, we found that it improved collective rationality by moving group members in the direction of higher-payoff equilibria. Merely providing group members with information about the minimal-effort level in the other group was not sufficient to generate this effect.

Credit cycles in theory and experiment

We test in the laboratory the potential of evolutionary dynamics as predictor of actual behavior. To this end, we propose an asymmetricgame -which we interpret as a borrowerlender relation-, study itsevolutionary dynamics in a random matching set-up, and tests itspredictions. The model provides conditions for the existence ofcredit markets and credit cycles. The theoretical predictions seemto be good approximations of the experimental results.

One, two, (three), infinity: Newspaper and lab beauty-contest experiments

"Beauty-contest" is a game in which participants have to choose, typically, a number in [0,100], the winner being the person whose number is closest to a proportion of the average of all chosen numbers. We describe and analyze Beauty-contest experiments run in newspapers in UK, Spain, and Germany and find stable patterns of behavior across them, despite the uncontrollability of these experiments. These results are then compared with lab experiments involving undergraduates and game theorists as subjects, in what must be one of the largest empirical corroborations of interactive behavior ever tried. We claim that all observed behavior, across a wide variety of treatments and subject pools, can be interpretedas iterative reasoning. Level-1 reasoning, Level-2 reasoning and Level-3 reasoning are commonly observed in all the samples, while the equilibrium choice (Level-Maximum reasoning) is only prominently chosen by newspaper readers and theorists. The results show the empirical power of experiments run with large subject-pools, and open the door for more experimental work performed on the rich platform offered by newspapers and magazines.

Econometrics and decision making: Effects of presentation mode

Much of empirical economics involves regression analysis. However, does thepresentation of results affect economists ability to make inferences for decision makingpurposes? In a survey, 257 academic economists were asked to make probabilisticinferences on the basis of the outputs of a regression analysis presented in a standardformat. Questions concerned the distribution of the dependent variable conditional onknown values of the independent variable. However, many respondents underestimateduncertainty by failing to take into account the standard deviation of the estimatedresiduals. The addition of graphs did not substantially improve inferences. On the otherhand, when only graphs were provided (i.e., with no statistics), respondents weresubstantially more accurate. We discuss implications for improving practice in reportingresults of regression analyses.

Entrepreneurial success and failure: Confidence and fallible judgement

Excess entry or the high failure rate of market-entry decisions is often attributed tooverconfidence exhibited by entreprene urs. We show analytically that whereas excess entryis an inevitable consequence of imperfect assessments of entrepreneurial skill, it does notimply overconfidence. Judgmental fallibility leads to excess entry even when everyone isunderconfident. Self-selection implies greater confidence (but not necessarilyoverconfidence) among those who start new businesses than those who do not and amongsuccessful entrants than failures. Our results question claims that entrepreneurs areoverconfident and emphasize the need to understand the role of judgmental fallibility inproducing economic outcomes.

Take-the-best and other simple strategies: Why and when they work 'well' in binary choice

The effectiveness of decision rules depends on characteristics of bothrules and environments. A theoretical analysis of environments specifiesthe relative predictive accuracies of the lexicographic rule 'take-the-best'(TTB) and other simple strategies for binary choice. We identify threefactors: how the environment weights variables; characteristics of choicesets; and error. For cases involving from three to five binary cues, TTBis effective across many environments. However, hybrids of equal weights(EW) and TTB models are more effective as environments become morecompensatory. In the presence of error, TTB and similar models do not predictmuch better than a naïve model that exploits dominance. We emphasizepsychological implications and the need for more complete theories of theenvironment that include the role of error.

Is confidence in decisions related to feedback? Evidence-and lack of evidence-from random samples of real-world managerial behavior?

Confidence in decision making is an important dimension of managerialbehavior. However, what is the relation between confidence, on the onehand, and the fact of receiving or expecting to receive feedback ondecisions taken, on the other hand? To explore this and related issuesin the context of everyday decision making, use was made of the ESM(Experience Sampling Method) to sample decisions taken by undergraduatesand business executives. For several days, participants received 4 or 5SMS messages daily (on their mobile telephones) at random moments at whichpoint they completed brief questionnaires about their current decisionmaking activities. Issues considered here include differences between thetypes of decisions faced by the two groups, their structure, feedback(received and expected), and confidence in decisions taken as well as inthe validity of feedback. No relation was found between confidence indecisions and whether participants received or expected to receivefeedback on those decisions. In addition, although participants areclearly aware that feedback can provide both confirming and disconfirming evidence, their ability to specify appropriatefeedback is imperfect. Finally, difficulties experienced inusing the ESM are discussed as are possibilities for further researchusing this methodology.

Social preferences and skill segregation

This paper shows that models where preferences of individuals dependnot only on their allocations, but also on the well-being of otherpersons, can produce both large and testable effects. We study theallocation of workers with heterogeneous productivities to firms. Weshow that even small deviations from purely selfish preferences leadsto widespread workplace skill segregation. That is, workers ofdifferent abilities tend to work in di¤erent firms, as long as theycare somewhat more about the utilities of workers who are close .

The gain-loss asymmetry and single-self preferences

Kahneman and Tversky asserted a fundamental asymmetry between gains and losses, namely a reflection effect which occurs when an individual prefers a sure gain of $ pz to anuncertain gain of $ z with probability p, while preferring an uncertain loss of $z with probability p to a certain loss of $ pz.We focus on this class of choices (actuarially fair), and explore the extent to which thereflection effect, understood as occurring at a range of wealth levels, is compatible with single-self preferences.We decompose the reflection effect into two components, a probability switch effect,which is compatible with single-self preferences, and a translation effect, which is not. To argue the first point, we analyze two classes of single-self, nonexpected utility preferences, which we label homothetic and weakly homothetic. In both cases, we characterize the switch effect as well as the dependence of risk attitudes on wealth.We also discuss two types of utility functions of a form reminiscent of expected utility but with distorted probabilities. Type I always distorts the probability of the worst outcome downwards, yielding attraction to small risks for all probabilities. Type II distorts low probabilities upwards, and high probabilities downwards, implying risk aversion when the probability of the worst outcome is low. By combining homothetic or weak homothetic preferences with Type I or Type II distortion functions, we present four explicit examples: All four display a switch effect and, hence, a form of reflection effect consistent a single self preferences.

Equilibrium selection through incomplete information in coordination games: An experimental study

We perform an experiment on a pure coordination game with uncertaintyabout the payoffs. Our game is closely related to models that have beenused in many macroeconomic and financial applications to solve problemsof equilibrium indeterminacy. In our experiment each subject receives anoisy signal about the true payoffs. This game has a unique strategyprofile that survives the iterative deletion of strictly dominatedstrategies (thus a unique Nash equilibrium). The equilibrium outcomecoincides, on average, with the risk-dominant equilibrium outcome ofthe underlying coordination game. The behavior of the subjects convergesto the theoretical prediction after enough experience has been gained. The data (and the comments) suggest that subjects do not apply through"a priori" reasoning the iterated deletion of dominated strategies.Instead, they adapt to the responses of other players. Thus, the lengthof the learning phase clearly varies for the different signals. We alsotest behavior in a game without uncertainty as a benchmark case. The gamewith uncertainty is inspired by the "global" games of Carlsson and VanDamme (1993).

A measure of rationality and welfare

There is evidence showing that individual behavior often deviates fromthe classical principle of maximization. This evidence raises at least two importantquestions: (i) how severe the deviations are and (ii) which method is the best forextracting relevant information from choice behavior for the purposes of welfare analysis.In this paper we address these two questions by identifying from a foundationalanalysis a new measure of the rationality of individuals that enables the analysis ofindividual welfare in potentially inconsistent subjects, all based on standard revealedpreference data. We call such measure minimal index.

The challenge of representative design in psychology and economics

The demands of representative design, as formulated by Egon Brunswik (1956), set a high methodological standard. Both experimental participants and the situations with which they are faced should be representative of the populations to which researchers claim to generalize results. Failure to observe the latter has led to notable experimental failures in psychology from which economics could learn. It also raises questions about the meaning of testing economic theories in abstract environments. Logically, abstract tests can only be generalized to abstract realities and these may or may not have anything to do with the empirical realities experienced by economic actors.

Deciding analytically or trusting your intuition? The advantadges and disadvantadges of analytic and intuitive thought

Recent research has highlighted the notion that people can make judgmentsand choices by means of two systems that are labeled here tacit(or intuitive) and deliberate (or analytic). Whereas most decisionstypically involve both systems, this chapter examines the conditions underwhich each system is liable to be more effective. This aims to illuminatethe age-old issue of whether and when people should trust intuition or analysis. To do this, a framework is presented to understand how thetacit and deliberate systems work in tandem. Distinctions are also madebetween the types of information typically used by both systems as wellas the characteristics of environments that facilitate or hinder accuratelearning by the tacit system. Next, several experiments that havecontrasted intuitive and analytic modes on the same tasks are reviewed.Together, the theoretical framework and experimental evidence leads tospecifying the trade-off that characterizes their relative effectiveness.Tacit system responses can be subject to biases. In making deliberate systemresponses, however, people might not be aware of the correct rule to dealwith the task they are facing and/or make errors in executing it. Whethertacit or deliberate responses are more valid in particular circumstancesrequires assessing this trade-off. In this, the probability of making errorsin deliberate thought is postulated to be a function of the analytical complexityof the task as perceived by the person. Thus the trade-off is one of bias (inimplicit responses) versus analytical complexity (when tasks are handled indeliberate mode). Finally, it is noted that whereas much attention has beenpaid in the past to helping people make decisions in deliberate mode, effortsshould also be directed toward improving ability to make decisions intacit mode since the effectiveness of decisions clearly depends on both. Thistherefore represents an important frontier for research.

Altruism, equity and reciprocity in a gift-exchange experiment: An encompassing approach

Considerable experimental evidence suggests that non-pecuniary motivesmust be addressed when modeling behavior in economic contexts. Recentmodels of non-pecuniary motives can be classified as either altruism-based, equity-based, or reciprocity-based. We estimate and compareleading approaches in these categories, using experimental data. Wethen offer a flexible approach that nests the above three approaches,thereby allowing for nested hypothesis testing and for determiningthe relative strength of each of the competing theories. In addition,the encompassing approach provides a functional form for utility in different settings without the restrictive nature of the approaches nested within it. Using this flexible form for nested tests, we findthat intentional reciprocity, distributive concerns, and altruisticconsiderations all play a significant role in players' decisions.

The impact of gender composition on team performance and decision-making: Evidence from the field

We investigate whether the gender composition of teams affect theireconomic performance. We study a large business game, played in groups ofthree, where each group takes the role of a general manager. There are twoparallel competitions, one involving undergraduates and the other involvingMBAs. Our analysis shows that teams formed by three women aresignificantly outperformed by any other gender combination, both at theundergraduate and MBA levels. Looking across the performancedistribution, we find that for undergraduates, three women teams areoutperformed throughout, but by as much as 10pp at the bottom and by only1pp at the top. For MBAs, at the top, the best performing group is two menand one woman. The differences in performance are explained bydifferences in decision-making. We observe that three women teams are lessaggressive in their pricing strategies, invest less in R&D, and invest more insocial sustainability initiatives, than any other gender combination teams.Finally, we find support for the hypothesis that it is poor work dynamicsamong the three women teams that drives the results.