Second-order Møller-Plesset perturbation theory without basis set superposition error : II : open-shell systems

The basis set superposition error-free second-order MØller-Plesset perturbation theory of intermolecular interactions was studied. The difficulties of the counterpoise (CP) correction in open-shell systems were also discussed. The calculations were performed by a program which was used for testing the new variants of the theory. It was shown that the CP correction for the diabatic surfaces should be preferred to the adiabatic ones

One- and two-center physical space partitioning of the energy in the density functional theory

A conceptually new approach is introduced for the decomposition of the molecular energy calculated at the density functional theory level of theory into sum of one- and two-atomic energy components, and is realized in the "fuzzy atoms" framework. (Fuzzy atoms mean that the three-dimensional physical space is divided into atomic regions having no sharp boundaries but exhibiting a continuous transition from one to another.) The new scheme uses the new concept of "bond order density" to calculate the diatomic exchange energy components and gives them unexpectedly close to the values calculated by the exact (Hartree-Fock) exchange for the same Kohn-Sham orbitals

The Employment Precariousness Scale (EPRES): psychometric properties of a new tool for epidemiological studies among waged and salaried workers

Background: Despite the fact that labour market flexibility has resulted in an expansion of precarious employment in industrialized countries, to date there is limited empirical evidence about its health consequences. The Employment Precariousness Scale (EPRES) is a newly developed, theory-based, multidimensional questionnaire specifically devised for epidemiological studies among waged and salaried workers. Objective: To assess acceptability, reliability and construct validity of EPRES in a sample of waged and salaried workers in Spain. Methods: Cross-sectional study, using a sub-sample of 6.968 temporary and permanent workers from a population-based survey carried out in 2004-2005. The survey questionnaire was interviewer administered and included the six EPRES subscales, measures of the psychosocial work environment (COPSOQ ISTAS21), and perceived general and mental health (SF-36). Results: A high response rate to all EPRES items indicated good acceptability; Cronbach’s alpha coefficients, over 0.70 for all subscales and the global score, demonstrated good internal consistency reliability; exploratory factor analysis using principal axis analysis and varimax rotation confirmed the six-subscale structure and the theoretical allocation of all items. Patterns across known groups and correlation coefficients with psychosocial work environment measures and perceived health demonstrated the expected relations, providing evidence of construct validity. Conclusions: Our results provide evidence in support of the psychometric properties of EPRES, which appears to be a promising tool for the measurement of employment precariousness in public health research.

Salience theory of choice under risk

We present a theory of choice among lotteries in which the decision maker's attention is drawn to (precisely defined) salient payoffs. This leads the decision maker to a context-dependent representation of lotteries in which true probabilities are replaced by decision weights distorted in favor of salient payoffs. By endogenizing decision weights as a function of payoffs, our model provides a novel and unified account of many empirical phenomena, including frequent risk-seeking behavior, invariance failures such as the Allais paradox, and preference reversals. It also yields new predictions, including some that distinguish it from Prospect Theory, which we test.

Cooperative games in strategic form

In this paper we view bargaining and cooperation as an interaction superimposed on a strategic form game. A multistage bargaining procedure for N players, the proposer commitment procedure, is presented. It is inspired by Nash s two-player variable-threat model; a key feature is the commitment to threats. We establish links to classical cooperative game theory solutions, such as the Shapley value in the transferable utility case. However, we show that even in standard pure exchange economies the traditional coalitional function may not be adequate when utilities are not transferable.

Unemployment in an estimated new Keynesian model

We reformulate the Smets-Wouters (2007) framework by embedding the theory of unemployment proposed in Galí (2011a,b). Weestimate the resulting model using postwar U.S. data, while treatingthe unemployment rate as an additional observable variable. Our approach overcomes the lack of identification of wage markup and laborsupply shocks highlighted by Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2008) intheir criticism of New Keynesian models, and allows us to estimate a"correct" measure of the output gap. In addition, the estimated modelcan be used to analyze the sources of unemployment fluctuations.

Notes for a new guide to Keynes (I): Wages, aggregate demand, and employment

I revisit the General Theory's discussion of the role of wages inemployment determination through the lens of the New Keynesianmodel. The analysis points to the key role played by the monetarypolicy rule in shaping the link between wages and employment, andin determining the welfare impact of enhanced wage flexibility. I showthat the latter is not always welfare improving.

The implicit theory of historical change in the work of Alan S. Milward

Alan S. Milward was an economic historian who developed an implicit theory ofhistorical change. His interpretation which was neither liberal nor Marxist positedthat social, political, and economic change, for it to be sustainable, had to be agradual process rather than one resulting from a sudden, cataclysmicrevolutionary event occurring in one sector of the economy or society. Benignchange depended much less on natural resource endowment or technologicaldevelopments than on the ability of state institutions to respond to changingpolitical demands from within each society. State bureaucracies were fundamentalto formulating those political demands and advising politicians of ways to meetthem. Since each society was different there was no single model of developmentto be adopted or which could be imposed successfully by one nation-state onothers, either through force or through foreign aid programs. Nor coulddevelopment be promoted simply by copying the model of a more successfuleconomy. Each nation-state had to find its own response to the political demandsarising from within its society. Integration occurred when a number of nation states shared similar political objectives which they could not meet individuallybut could meet collectively. It was not simply the result of their increasinginterdependence. It was how and whether nation-states responded to thesedomestic demands which determined the nature of historical change.

Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty

This paper introduces a new solution concept, a minimax regret equilibrium, which allows for the possibility that players are uncertain about the rationality and conjectures of their opponents. We provide several applications of our concept. In particular, we consider pricesetting environments and show that optimal pricing policy follows a non-degenerate distribution. The induced price dispersion is consistent with experimental and empirical observations (Baye and Morgan (2004)).

On forward induction and evolutionary and strategic stability

We analyze which normal form solution concepts capture the notion offorward induction, as defined by van Damme (JET, 1989) in the classof generic two player normal form games preceded by an outsideoption. We find that none of the known strategic stability concepts(including Mertens stable sets and hyperstable sets) captures this form of forward induction. On the other hand, we show that the evolutionary concept of EES set (Swinkels, JET, 1992) is always consistent with forward induction.

An economic theory of church strictness

This paper makes several contributions to the growing literatureon the economics of religion. First, we explicitly introduce spatial-location models into the economics of religion. Second, we offer a newexplanation for the observed tendency of state (monopoly) churches tolocate toward the "low-tension" end of the "strictness continuum" (ina one-dimensional product space): This result is obtained through theconjunction of "benevolent preferences" (denominations care about theaggregate utility of members) and asymmetric costs of going to a moreor less strict church than one prefers.We also derive implications regarding the relationship between religiousstrictness and membership. The driving forces of our analysis, religiousmarket interactions and asymmetric costs of membership, high-light newexplanations for some well-established stylized facts. The analysis opensthe way to new empirical tests, aimed at confronting the implications ofour model against more traditional explanations.

A leverage theory of reputation building with co-branding: Complementarity in reputation building

We present a leverage theory of reputation building with co-branding. We showthat under certain conditions, co-branding that links unknown firms in a new sectorwith established firms in a mature sector allows the unknown firms to signal a highproduct quality and establish their own reputation. We compare this situationwith a benchmark in which both sectors are new and firms signal their qualityonly with prices. We investigate how this comparison is affected by the nature ofthe technology linking the two sectors and a cross-sector inference problem thatconsumers might face in identifying the true cause of product failure. We find thatco-branding facilitates the process in which a Þrm in the new sector to signal itsproduct quality only if the co-branding sectors produce complementary inputs andconsumers face a cross-sector inference problem. We apply our insight to economicsof superstars, multinational firms and co-authorship.

The growth and diffusion of knowlegde and the theory of the firm

We analyze the implications of a market imperfection related to the inability to establish intellectual property rights, that we label {\it unverifiable communication}. Employees are able to collude with external parties selling ``knowledge capital'' of the firm. The firm organizer engages in strategic interaction simultaneously with employees and competitors, as she introduces endogenous transaction costs in the market for information between those agents. Incentive schemes and communication costs are the key strategic variables used by the firm to induce frictions in collusive markets. Unverifiable communication introduces severe allocative distortions, both at internal product development and at intended sale of information (technology transfer). We derive implications of the model for observable decisions like characteristics of the employment relationship (full employment, incompatibility with other jobs), firms' preferences over cluster characteristics for location decisions, optimal size at entry, in--house development vs sale strategies for innovations and industry evolution.

Managing by values in the next milenium: Cultural redesign for strategic organizational change

The system of beliefs and values, that shaped the model for management and organizations during the 20th century, is just not good enough today. In order to keep a business functioning well and competing successfully in markets that are increasingly more global, complex, professionally demanding, constantly changing and oriented towards quality and customer satisfaction a new model is needed. In this paper, we will propose that both Management by Instructions (MBI) and Management by Objectives (MBO) today give notoriously inadequate results. By contrast, description of a new approach labeled: Management by Values (MBV), seem to be emerging as a strategic leadership tool. The paper outlines this approach and discusses the implementation of MBV as a tool to redesign culture in organizations and prepare them for the next millenium.

Parental altruism under imperfect information: Theory and evidence

Can we reconcile the predictions of the altruism model of the family withthe evidence on parental monetary transfers in the US? This paper providesa new assessment of this question. I expand the altruism model by introducingeffort of the child and by relaxing the assumption of perfect informationof the parent about the labor market opportunities of the child. First,I solve and simulate a model of altruism and labor supply under imperfectinformation. Second, I use cross-sectional data to test the following prediction of the model: Are parental transfers especially responsive tothe income variations of children who are very attached to the labor market? The results of the analysis suggest that imperfect informationaccounts for many of the patterns of intergenerational transfers in theUS.