Bundling and competition for slots: On the portfolio effects of bundling

We consider competition among sellers when each of them sells a portfolio ofdistinct products to a buyer having limited slots. We study how bundling affectscompetition for slots. Under independent pricing, equilibrium often does not existand hence the outcome is often inefficient. When bundling is allowed, each sellerhas an incentive to bundle his products and an efficient equilibrium always exists.Furthermore, in the case of digital goods, all equilibria are efficient if slotting contracts are prohibited. We also identify portfolio effects of bundling and analyze theconsequences on horizontal mergers. Finally, we derive clear-cut policy implications.

Electoral competition under the threat of political unrest

We study elections in which one party (the strong party) controls a source of political unrest; e.g., this party could instigate riots if it lost the election. We show that the strong party is more likely to win the election when there is less information about its ability to cause unrest. This is because when theweak party is better informed, it can more reliably prevent political unrest by implementing a ``centrist'' policy. When there is uncertainty over the credibility of the threat, ``posturing'' by the strong party leads to platform divergence.

Immigration policy with partisan parties

This paper analyzes the political economy of immigration when the salient electoralissue is the level of immigrants and the relevant immigration policy is the expenditurein immigration control. We consider that immigration affects voters? welfarethrough economic and non economic factors. We model political competition `a laWittman with the ideology of parties endogenously determined at equilibrium. Atequilibrium, parties propose different levels of immigration, located to the left and tothe right of the median voter?s ideal point, and combine skilled and unskilled workersamong their constituencies. Numerical simulations provide the levels of immigrationproposed by the two parties and the composition of parties? constituencies as we varythe efficacy of immigration control and the intensity of immigration aversion.

Tobacco control policies in hospitals before and after the implementation of a national smoking ban in Catalonia, Spain

Background: Diverse projects and guidelines to assist hospitals towards the attainment of comprehensive smoke-free policies have been developed. In 2006, Spain government passed a new smoking ban that reinforce tobacco control policies and banned completely smoking in hospitals. This study assesses the progression of tobacco control policies in the Catalan Network of Smokefree Hospitals before and after a comprehensive national smoking ban. Methods: We used the Self-Audit Questionnaire of the European Network for Smoke-free Hospitals to score the compliance of 9 policy standards (global score = 102). We used two crosssectional surveys to evaluate tobacco control policies before (2005) and after the implementation of a national smoking ban (2007) in 32 hospitals of Catalonia, Spain. We compared the means of the overall score in 2005 and 2007 according to the type of hospital, the number of beds, the prevalence of tobacco consumption, and the number of years as a smoke-free hospital. Results: The mean of the implementation score of tobacco control policies was 52.4 (95% CI:45.4-59.5) in 2005 and 71.6 (95% CI: 67.0-76.2) in 2007 with an increase of 36.7% (p < 0.01). The hospitals with greater improvement were general hospitals (48% increase; p < 0.01), hospitals with > 300 beds (41.1% increase; p < 0.01), hospitals with employees' tobacco consumption prevalence 35-39% (72.2% increase; p < 0.05) and hospitals that had recently implemented smoke-free policies (74.2% increase; p < 0.01). Conclusion: The national smoking ban appears to increase tobacco control activities in hospitals combined with other non-bylaw initiatives such as the Smoke-free Hospital Network.

Tobacco control policies in hospitals before and after the implementation of a national smoking ban in Catalonia, Spain

Background: Diverse projects and guidelines to assist hospitals towards the attainment of comprehensive smoke-free policies have been developed. In 2006, Spain government passed a new smoking ban that reinforce tobacco control policies and banned completely smoking in hospitals. This study assesses the progression of tobacco control policies in the Catalan Network of Smokefree Hospitals before and after a comprehensive national smoking ban. Methods: We used the Self-Audit Questionnaire of the European Network for Smoke-free Hospitals to score the compliance of 9 policy standards (global score = 102). We used two crosssectional surveys to evaluate tobacco control policies before (2005) and after the implementation of a national smoking ban (2007) in 32 hospitals of Catalonia, Spain. We compared the means of the overall score in 2005 and 2007 according to the type of hospital, the number of beds, the prevalence of tobacco consumption, and the number of years as a smoke-free hospital. Results: The mean of the implementation score of tobacco control policies was 52.4 (95% CI:45.4-59.5) in 2005 and 71.6 (95% CI: 67.0-76.2) in 2007 with an increase of 36.7% (p < 0.01). The hospitals with greater improvement were general hospitals (48% increase; p < 0.01), hospitals with > 300 beds (41.1% increase; p < 0.01), hospitals with employees' tobacco consumption prevalence 35-39% (72.2% increase; p < 0.05) and hospitals that had recently implemented smoke-free policies (74.2% increase; p < 0.01). Conclusion: The national smoking ban appears to increase tobacco control activities in hospitals combined with other non-bylaw initiatives such as the Smoke-free Hospital Network.

Determinants of Broadband Access: Is Platform Competition always the Key Variable to Success?

Previous studies have identified the rivalry among technological platforms as one of the main driving forces of broadband services penetration. This paper draws on data from the Spanish market between 2005 and 2011 to estimate the main determinants of broadband prices. Controlling for broadband tariffs features and network variables, we examine the impact of the different modes of competition on prices. We find that inter-platform competition has no significant effects over prices, while intra-platform competition is a key driver of the prices charged in the broadband market. Our analysis suggests that the impact of different types of competition on prices is critically affected by the levels of development of the broadband market achieved by the considered country

Regulation of Port Charges in Spain: Global versus Local Competition

This article examines the determinants of traffic volumes and the revenues per tonne generated by Spain’s port authorities. The interest of the study lies on the strong differences between port authorities in a context of strict regulation but that provides some scope for price competition. We find that port charges influence the amount of traffic that a port is able to generate. Furthermore, we find clear evidence of local price competition and report mixed results for global competition. Revenues per tonne are higher in ports operating more international regular lines and with multinational terminal operators, while they are lower in ports with nearby competing facilities and where the market share of the dominant shipping firm is high.

Entry Regulation Asymmetries and Gasoline Competition in a Mixed Motorway Network

Regulatory and funding asymmetries in the Spanish motorway network produce huge differences in the structure of gasoline markets by motorway type: free or toll. While competition is encouraged among gas stations on free motorways, the regulations for toll motorways allow private concessionaires to auction all gas stations to the same provider, thereby limiting competition and consolidating market power. This paper reports how this regulatory asymmetry results in higher prices and fewer gas stations. Specifically, we show that competition is constrained on toll motorways by the granting of geographical monopolies, resulting in a small number of rivals operating in close proximity to each other, and allowing gas stations to operate as local monopolies. The lack of competition would seem to account for the price differential between toll and free motorways. According to available evidence, deregulation measures affecting toll motorway concessions could help to mitigate price inefficiencies and increase consumer welfare.

Vertical relations and local competition : an empirical approach

The analysis of vertical industry relations forms an essential element in the field of industrial organization. This paper tests hypotheses derived from transaction cost theory and the principal-agent problem in Chile’s petrol market. It shows that local competition plays an important role in the choice of a disintegrated vertical structure, and that low levels of service investment have the same effect. Conversely, the number of own-brand outlets and a high level of investment in services reduce the probability of disintegration. The paper demonstrates that vertical disintegration has a null effect on wholesale petrol prices and a positive effect on retail petrol prices of between 1.6 and 7 per cent, depending on fuel type.

High-Speed Rail: lessons for policy makers from experiences abroad

In April 2009, the US government unveiled its blueprint for a national network of high-speed passenger rail (HSR) lines aimed at reducing traffic congestion, cutting national dependence on foreign oil and improving rural and urban environments. In implementing such a program, it is essential to identify the factors that might influence decision making and the eventual success of the HSR project, as well as foreseeing the obstacles that will have to be overcome.

Social Preferences and Transport Policy: The case of US speed limits

This article, in reviewing the longrunning US debate on speed limits, illustrates how a different valuation of the trade-off between private mobility needs and safety concerns can shape transport policies. It is argued that the regulatory decentralization debate, together with the speed limit in force in each state, obey the social preferences and valuation given to this tradeoff. Such a view is consistent with evidence that higher speed limits are to be found in states with greater private mobility needs, even though their fatality rates might be among the highest in the country. By contrast, lower speed limits and supporters of a low national speed limit are to be found in states that show a greater concern for safety outcomes and which are less dependent on private mobility. By reviewing these events and examining the role played by the main actors and analyzing their motivations, the article identifies important lessons for similar future discussions on transport policy.

Public and Private Production in a Mixed Delivery System: Regulation, Competition and Costs

Academics and policy makers are increasingly shifting the debate concerning the best form of public service provision beyond the traditional dilemma between pure public and pure private delivery modes, because, among other reasons, there is a growing body of evidence that casts doubt on the existence of systematic cost savings from privatization, while any competition seems to be eroded over time. In this paper we compare the relative merits of public and private delivery within a mixed delivery system. We study the role played by ownership, transaction costs, and competition on local public service delivery within the same jurisdiction. Using a stochastic cost frontier, we analyze the public-private urban bus system in the Barcelona Metropolitan Area. Our results suggest that private firms tendering the service have higher delivery costs than those incurred by the public firm, especially when transaction costs are taken into account. Tenders, therefore, do not help to reduce delivery costs. Our results suggest that under a mixed delivery scheme, which permits the co-existence of public and private production, the metropolitan government and the regulator can use private delivery to contain costs in the public firm and, at the same time, benefit from the greater flexibility of private firms for dealing with events not provided for under contract.

Similar problems, different solutions: Comparing refuse collection in the Netherlands and Spain

Local public service provision can vary greatly because of differences in institutional arrangements, public service markets, and national traditions regarding government intervention. In this paper we compare the procedures adopted by the local governments of the Netherlands and Spain in arranging for the provision of solid waste collection. We find that Spain faces a consolidation problem, opting more frequently to implement policies of privatization and cooperation, at the expense of competition. By contrast, the Netherlands has, on average, larger municipalities, resorting somewhat less to privatization and cooperation, and more to competition. The two options - cooperation and competition - have their merits when striving to strike a balance between transaction costs and scale economies. The choices made in organizational reform seem to be related to several factors, among which the nature of the political system and the size of municipalities appear to be relevant.