Organisational structure, communication and group ethics

This paper investigates experimentally how organisational decision processes affect the moral motivations of actors inside a firm that must forego profits to reduce harming a third party. In a "vertical" treatment, one insider unilaterally sets the harm-reduction strategy; the other can only accept or quit. In a "horizontal" treatment, the insiders decide by consensus. Our 2-by-2 design also controls for communication effects. In our data, communication makes vertical firms more ethical; voice appears to mitigate "responsibility-alleviation" in that subordinates with voice feel responsible for what their firms do. Vertical firms are then more ethical than the horizontal firms for which our bargaining data reveal a dynamic form of responsibility-alleviation and our chat data indicate a strong "insider-outsider" effect.

Cooperative vs. non-cooperative mechanisms in the EU decision making process

According to the account of the European Union (EU) decision making proposed in this paper, this is a bargaining process during which actors shift their policy positions with a view to reaching agreements on controversial issues.

Foundations for contest success functions

In the literature the outcome of contests is either interpreted as win probabilities or as shares of the prize. With this in mind, we examine two approaches to contest success functions. In the first we analyze the implications of contestants' incomplete information concerning the "type" of the contest administrator. While in the case of two contestants this approach can rationalize prominent contest success functions, we show that it runs into difficulties when there are more agents. Our second approach interprets contest success functions as sharing rules and establishes a connection to bargaining and claims problems which is independent of the number of contestants. Both approaches provide foundations for popular contest success functions and guidelines for the definition of new ones. Keywords: Endogenous Contests, Contest Success Function. JEL Classification: C72 (Noncooperative Games), D72 (Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections), D74 (Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances).

Civil war and foreign influence

We study a symmetric information bargaining model of civil war where a third (foreign) party can affect the probabilities of winning the conflict and the size of the post conflict spoils. We show that the possible alliance with a third party makes peaceful agreements difficult to reach and might lead to new commitment problems that trigger war. Also, we argue that the foreign party is likely to induce persistent informational asymmetries which might explain long lasting civil wars. We explore both political and economic incentives for a third party to intervene. The explicit consideration of political incentives leads to two predictions that allow for identifying the influence of foreign intervention on civil war incidence. Both predictions are confirmed for the case of the U.S. as a potential intervening nation: (i) civil wars around the world are more likely under Republican governments and (ii) the probability of civil wars decreases with U.S. presidential approval rates.

The New Institutions of Transatlantic Aviation

This article focuses on the institutions of transatlantic aviation since 1945, and aims at extracting from this historical process topical policy implications. Using the methodology of an analytic narrative, we describe and explain the creation of the international cartel institutions in the 1940s, their operation throughout the 1950s and 60s, their increasing vulnerability in the 1970s, and then the progressive liberalization of the whole system. Our analytic narrative has a natural end, marked by the signing of an Open Skies Agreement between the US and the EU in 2007. We place particular explanatory power on (a) the progressive liberalization of the US domestic market, and (b) the active role of the European Commission in Europe. More specifically, we explain these developments using two frameworks. First, a “political limit pricing” model, which seemed promising, then failed, and then seemed promising again because it failed. Second, a strategic bargaining model inspired by Susanne Schmidt’s analysis of how the European Commission uses the threat of infringement proceedings to force member governments into line and obtain the sole negotiating power in transatlantic aviation.

Territorial autonomy and self-determination conflicts: opportunity and willingness cases from Bolivia, Niger, and Thailand

The paradox of autonomy is about whether self-rule accommodates or exacerbates armed conflict. This study attempts to unpack the puzzle examining the effectiveness of territorial autonomy as a state response to self-determination conflicts throughout the world. It challenges the conflict-inducing features of autonomy arguing that territorial autonomy can mitigate armed conflict by channeling group grievances into peaceful forms of protest. Thus, this study aims at arriving at a comprehensive theory that identifies which factors are responsible for violent escalation of conflicts grounded in self-determination demands. By using the concepts of opportunity structures and willingness dimension, this study shows that conflict escalation only takes place when minorities with greater bargaining power vis-à-vis the center, in contexts of high levels of economic inequality within dyad, are mobilized around autonomy and separatist demands.

The Evolution of the Climate Change Regime: Beyond a North-South Divide?

This research primarily analyses relevant climate bargaining dynamics that have been informed by a North-South impasse. This working paper argues that the first stage of negotiations for a climate convention indeed witnessed a North-South divide which became institutionalized in the Framework Convention on Climate Change. However, in subsequent negotiation rounds the key loci of bargaining struggles was centered between developed countries, in which relevant North-South cooperation dynamics were also present. Finally, this paper assesses the unfinished post-Kyoto bargaining process in which two trends are already being observed: both the emergence of a new geopolitics between the United States and major developing countries, and a fragmentation process within the South, in which the Copenhagen Accord itself has begun to institutionalize such fragmentation.

Dawn for the galaxy: creació d'un joc web d'estratègia en temps real, multijugador i massiu

“Dawn or the Galaxy” és un treball de final de carrera que té com a objectiu principal la creació i desenvolupament d’una versió de demostració per a un joc del tipus MMORTS (massive multiplayer online real-time strategy) tractant d’incloure elements innovadors en aquest gènere de jocs i oferint un ampli ventall estratègic des de l’inici del joc. Per tal d’assolir l’objectiu es realitzarà un petit sondeig de mercat inicial i un estudi de models de jocs d’estratègia. El joc estarà integrat per més de seixanta fitxers de codi, una base de dades amb catorze taules interrelacionades no normalitzades i podrà tenir cabuda per a uns cinc-cents jugadors. Un cop programat l’aplicatiu, el joc es provarà en un entorn real, amb usuaris reals. Per a resoldre els problemes durant el transcurs del joc de forma ràpida, la aplicació serà sotmesa a un seguiment exhaustiu. La col·laboració dels jugadors en aquest punt serà fonamental.

Les "grans negociacions" a la Unió Europea: la formació de preferències, les estratègies y l’èxit a les negociacions

Projecte de recerca elaborat a partir d’una estada a la School of politics and international relations, de la University College of Dublin, United Kingdom, entre 2007 i 2009. L’ objectiu del projecte present ha estat contribuir a l’estudi de les negociacions intergovernamentals a la Unió Europea (UE). En primer lloc, s’ha estudiat les estratègies de negociació del estats membres a negociacions intergovernamentals en la UE, per la qual cosa s’ha desenvolupat una tipologia d’estratègies de negociació, diferenciant entre les més agressives (conflictives) i les menys agressives (cooperatives). La conclusió principal ha estat que els actors difereixen en la elecció de les estratègies i que és precisament el poder relatiu dels actors que explica quines estratègies adopten. En segon lloc, s’analitza la ratificació dels resultats a les negociacions intergovernamentals, concentrant-me en l’us dels referèndums. La investigació mostra que els referèndums són sovint usats pels partits polítics com un instrument utilitzat durant les campanyes electorals, posant en dubte la tesis de que l’objectiu principal dels referèndums és influenciar els poder relatiu dels estats membres en negociacions intergovernamentals. Finalment, s’ha estudiat com els actors socials influeixen aquestes negociacions en la UE. La evidencia empírica clarament mostra que la pressió que exerceixen els grups de pressió es sovint subestimada.

Joc d'Othello multijugador per torns en sistemes iOS

Treball final de carrera que desenvolupa una aplicació per sistemes iOS que consisteix en un joc multijugador per torns ambientat en el joc d'Othello.

Invisible work, unseen hazards: the health of women immigrant household service workers in Spain

Backgroud: Household service work has been largely absent from occupational health studies. We examine the occupational hazards and health effects identified by immigrant women household service workers. Methods: Exploratory, descriptive study of 46 documented and undocumented immigrant women in household services in Spain, using a phenomenological approach. Data were collected between September 2006 and May 2007 through focus groups and semi-structured individual interviews. Data were separated for analysis by documentation status and sorted using a mixed-generation process. In a second phase of analysis, data on psychosocial hazards were organized using the Copenhagen Psychosocial Questionnaire as a guide. Results: Informants reported a number of environmental, ergonomic and psychosocial hazards and corresponding health effects. Psychosocial hazards were especially strongly present in data. Data on reported hazards were similar by documentation status and varied by several emerging categories: whether participants were primarily cleaners or carers and whether they lived in or outside of the homes of their employers. Documentation status was relevant in terms of empowerment and bargaining, but did not appear to influence work tasks or exposure to hazards directly. Conclusions:Female immigrant household service workers are exposed to a variety of health hazards that could be acted upon by improved legislation, enforcement, and preventive workplace measures, which are discussed.

Union activism in an inclusive model of industrial relations : evidence from an Spanish case

In this article we analyze the reasons, within the context of Spanish industrial relations, for trade union members’ active participation in their regional union. The case of Spain is particularly interesting as the unions’ main activity, collective bargaining, is a public good. The text, based on research involving a representative survey of members of a regional branch of the “Workers” Commissions” (Comisiones Obreras) trade union, provides empirical evidence that the union presence in the workplace has a significant influence on members’ propensity for activism. By contrast, the alternative hypothesis based on instrumental reasons appears of little relevance in the Spanish industrial relations context.

Government and the distribution of skills

Individuals' life chances in the future will very much depend on how we invest in our children now. An optimal human capital model would combine a high mean with minimal variance of skills. It is well-established that early childhood learning is key to adult success. The impact of social origins on child outcomes remains strong, and the new role of women poses additional challenges to our conventional nurturing approach to child development. This paper focuses on skill development in the early years, examining how we might best combine family inputs and public policy to invest optimally in our future human capital. I emphasize three issues: one, the uneven capacity of parents to invest in children; two, the impact of mothers' employment on child outcomes; and three, the potential benefits of early pre-school programmes. I conclude that mothers' intra-family bargaining power is decisive for family investments and that universal child care is key if our goal is to arrive at a strong mean with minimal variance.

Temporary employment in advanced economies: drawing lessons from Spain

This study analyses the determinants of the rate of temporary employment in various OECD countries using both macro-level data drawn from the OECD and EUROSTAT databases, as well as micro-level data drawn from the 8th wave of the European Household Panel. Comparative analysis is set out to test different explanations originally formulated for the Spanish case. The evidence suggests that the overall distribution of temporary employment in advanced economies does not seem to be explicable by the characteristics of national productive structures. This evidence seems at odds with previous interpretations based on segmentation theories. As an alternative explanation, two types of supply-side factors are tested: crowding-out effects and educational gaps in the workforce. The former seems non significant, whilst the effects of the latter disappear after controlling for the levels of institutional protection in standard employment during the 1980s. Multivariate analysis shows that only this latter institutional variable, together with the degree of coordinated centralisation of the collective bargaining system, seem to have a significant impact on the distribution of temporary employment in the countries examined. On the basis of this observation, an explanation of the very high levels of temporary employment observed in Spain is proposed. This explanation is consistent with both country-specific and comparative evidence.

Assessing the Political Viability of Labour Market Reform: The Case of Employment Protection

We analyze the political support for employment protection legislation. Unlike my previous work on the same topic, this paper pays a lot of attention to the role of obsolescence in the growth process. In voting in favour of employment protection, incumbent employees trade off lower living standards (because employment protection maintains workers in less productive activities) against longer job duration. The support for employment protection will then depend on the value of the latter relative to the cost of the former. We highlight two key deeterminants of this trade-off: first, the workers' bargaining power, second, the economy's growth rate-more precisely its rate of creative destruction.