49 resultados para Lower cost
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In this paper, we investigate the agency costs of government ownership and their impact on corporate governance and firm value. China is used as a laboratory because of the prevalent state shareholdings in exchange-listed firms. In this context, we specifically consider the trade-offs involved in the voluntary formation of an audit committee when the controlling shareholder is the state. The decision to improve corporate governance (in this case, introduce an audit committee) is shown to be value relevant and a function of existing agency relationships and non-trivial implementation costs. Our findings are robust to the level of pyramid groups, the ownership-control wedge, and financial leverage. The research adds to the debate regarding the effect of government shareholdings on corporate culture and performance - a topic that hastaken on renewed importance in recent times.
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Pensions together with savings and investments during active life are key elements of retirement planning. Motivation for personal choices about the standard of living, bequest and the replacement ratio of pension with respect to last salary income must be considered. This research contributes to the financial planning by helping to quantify long-term care economic needs. We estimate life expectancy from retirement age onwards. The economic cost of care per unit of service is linked to the expected time of needed care and the intensity of required services. The expected individual cost of long-term care from an onset of dependence is estimated separately for men and women. Assumptions on the mortality of the dependent people compared to the general population are introduced. Parameters defining eligibility for various forms of coverage by the universal public social care of the welfare system are addressed. The impact of the intensity of social services on individual predictions is assessed, and a partial coverage by standard private insurance products is also explored. Data were collected by the Spanish Institute of Statistics in two surveys conducted on the general Spanish population in 1999 and in 2008. Official mortality records and life table trends were used to create realistic scenarios for longevity. We find empirical evidence that the public long-term care system in Spain effectively mitigates the risk of incurring huge lifetime costs. We also find that the most vulnerable categories are citizens with moderate disabilities that do not qualify to obtain public social care support. In the Spanish case, the trends between 1999 and 2008 need to be further explored.
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The availability of rich firm-level data sets has recently led researchers to uncover new evidence on the effects of trade liberalization. First, trade openness forces the least productive firms to exit the market. Secondly, it induces surviving firms to increase their innovation efforts and thirdly, it increases the degree of product market competition. In this paper we propose a model aimed at providing a coherent interpretation of these findings. We introducing firm heterogeneity into an innovation-driven growth model, where incumbent firms operating in oligopolistic industries perform cost-reducing innovations. In this framework, trade liberalization leads to higher product market competition, lower markups and higher quantity produced. These changes in markups and quantities, in turn, promote innovation and productivity growth through a direct competition effect, based on the increase in the size of the market, and a selection effect, produced by the reallocation of resources towards more productive firms. Calibrated to match US aggregate and firm-level statistics, the model predicts that a 10 percent reduction in variable trade costs reduces markups by 1:15 percent, firm surviving probabilities by 1 percent, and induces an increase in productivity growth of about 13 percent. More than 90 percent of the trade-induced growth increase can be attributed to the selection effect.
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This paper studies a dynamic principal-monitor-agent relation where a strategic principal delegates the task of monitoring the effort of a strategic agent to a third party. The latter we call the monitor, whose type is initially unknown. Through repeated interaction the agent might learn his type. We show that this process damages the principal's payoffs. Compensation is assumed exogenous, limiting to a great extent the provision of incentives. We go around this difficulty by introducing costly replacement strategies, i.e. the principal replaces the monitor, thus disrupting the agent's learning. We found that even when replacement costs are null, if the revealed monitor is strictly preferred by both parties, there is a loss in efficiency due to the impossibility of bene…tting from it. Nonetheless, these strategies can partially recover the principal's losses. Additionally, we establish upper and lower bounds on the payoffs that the principal and the agent can achieve. Finally we characterize the equilibrium strategies under public and private monitoring (with communication) for different cost and impatience levels.
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We use a difference-in-difference estimator to examine the effects of a merger involving three airlines. The novelty lies in the examination of this operation in two distinct scenarios: (1) on routes where two low-cost carriers and (2) on routes where a network and one of the low-cost airlines had previously been competing. We report a reduction in frequencies but no substantial effect on prices in the first scenario, while in the second we report an increase in prices but no substantial effect on frequencies. These results may be attributed to the differences in passenger types flying on these routes.
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This paper formalizes in a fully-rational model the popular idea that politicians perceive an electoral cost in adopting costly reforms with future benefits and reconciles it with the evidence that reformist governments are not punished by voters. To do so, it proposes a model of elections where political ability is ex-ante unknown and investment in reforms is unobservable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politicians make too little reforms in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reappointment probability. Although in a rational expectation equilibrium voters cannot be fooled and hence reelection does not depend on reforms, the strategy of underinvesting in reforms is nonetheless sustained by out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, uncertainty makes reforms more politically viable and may, under some conditions, increase social welfare. The model is then used to study how political rewards can be set so as to maximize social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limit to governments. The predictions of this theory are consistent with a number of empirical regularities on the determinants of reforms and reelection. They are also consistent with a new stylized fact documented in this paper: economic uncertainty is associated to more reforms in a panel of 20 OECD countries.
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We present sharpened lower bounds on the size of cut free proofs for first-order logic. Prior lower bounds for eliminating cuts from a proof established superexponential lower bounds as a stack of exponentials, with the height of the stack proportional to the maximum depth d of the formulas in the original proof. Our new lower bounds remove the constant of proportionality, giving an exponential stack of height equal to d − O(1). The proof method is based on more efficiently expressing the Gentzen-Solovay cut formulas as low depth formulas.
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We study a dynamic model where growth requires both long-term investment and the selection of talented managers. When ability is not ex-ante observable and contracts are incomplete, managerial selection imposes a cost, as managers facing the risk of being replaced tend to choose a sub-optimally low level of long-term investment. This generates a trade-off between selection and investment that has implications for the choice of contractual relationships. Our analysis shows that rigid long-term contracts sacrificing managerial selection may be optimal at early stages of economic development and when access to information is limited. As the economy grows, however, knowledge accumulation increases the return to talent and makes it optimal to adopt flexible contractual relationships, where managerial selection is implemented even at the cost of lower investment. Better institutions, in the form of a richer contracting environment and less severe informational frictions, speed up the transition to short-term relationships.
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"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt"
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Cercador web de viatges utilitzant tècniques de web scraping.
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This paper presents a new charging scheme for cost distribution along a point-to-multipoint connection when destination nodes are responsible for the cost. The scheme focus on QoS considerations and a complete range of choices is presented. These choices go from a safe scheme for the network operator to a fair scheme to the customer. The in-between cases are also covered. Specific and general problems, like the incidence of users disconnecting dynamically is also discussed. The aim of this scheme is to encourage the users to disperse the resource demand instead of having a large number of direct connections to the source of the data, which would result in a higher than necessary bandwidth use from the source. This would benefit the overall performance of the network. The implementation of this task must balance between the necessity to offer a competitive service and the risk of not recovering such service cost for the network operator. Throughout this paper reference to multicast charging is made without making any reference to any specific category of service. The proposed scheme is also evaluated with the criteria set proposed in the European ATM charging project CANCAN
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All-optical label swapping (AOLS) forms a key technology towards the implementation of all-optical packet switching nodes (AOPS) for the future optical Internet. The capital expenditures of the deployment of AOLS increases with the size of the label spaces (i.e. the number of used labels), since a special optical device is needed for each recognized label on every node. Label space sizes are affected by the way in which demands are routed. For instance, while shortest-path routing leads to the usage of fewer labels but high link utilization, minimum interference routing leads to the opposite. This paper studies all-optical label stacking (AOLStack), which is an extension of the AOLS architecture. AOLStack aims at reducing label spaces while easing the compromise with link utilization. In this paper, an integer lineal program is proposed with the objective of analyzing the softening of the aforementioned trade-off due to AOLStack. Furthermore, a heuristic aiming at finding good solutions in polynomial-time is proposed as well. Simulation results show that AOLStack either a) reduces the label spaces with a low increase in the link utilization or, similarly, b) uses better the residual bandwidth to decrease the number of labels even more
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In networks with small buffers, such as optical packet switching based networks, the convolution approach is presented as one of the most accurate method used for the connection admission control. Admission control and resource management have been addressed in other works oriented to bursty traffic and ATM. This paper focuses on heterogeneous traffic in OPS based networks. Using heterogeneous traffic and bufferless networks the enhanced convolution approach is a good solution. However, both methods (CA and ECA) present a high computational cost for high number of connections. Two new mechanisms (UMCA and ISCA) based on Monte Carlo method are proposed to overcome this drawback. Simulation results show that our proposals achieve lower computational cost compared to enhanced convolution approach with an small stochastic error in the probability estimation
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El projecte es planteja el repte de cobrir un forat en l’oferta turística seguint la fórmula low cost: el guiatge turístic. La idea de la empresa que volem estudiar i crear (BREAKGUIDES) és la de poder oferir els serveis de guiatge, ja siguin guies correu o guies locals en destinació, seguint una fórmula low cost que s’adapti al nou perfil de turista i al seu pressupost. L’empresa tindrà un perfil semblant al d’una xarxa social que ofereixi serveis de guiatge a canvi d’un petit sou i la manutenció
Resumo:
Aquest treball es justifica per la complementarietat que, d'una banda ofereix el potencial i volum d'un mercat en plena efervescència com és l'àmbit urbà de la Xina, on el seu incipient maduresa, com a conseqüència de l'efecte d'arrossegament que la inversió estrangera - intensa i innovadora - ha provocat, facilitant l'aparició d'una demanda d'un nivell superior, no primària, com les activitats emmarcades en el lleure i el turisme. D'altra banda, per una proposta de negoci dins d'un sector amb grans expectatives de desenvolupament com és el turístic i, finalment, també per l'opció d'un consum basat en el factor preu, amb unes característiques socioeconòmiques determinades de demanda, i en què la societat urbana de la Xina ja comença a veure's reflectida. Més enllà del paper tradicional de la Xina com a procés avantatjós dins de la cadena productiva o com a mercat d'outputs de volum, es dibuixa una nova classe mitjana urbana, inserint-se de ple i en molt poc temps en les dinàmiques de consum global, recolzada en les noves tecnologies - on el procés productiu low cost basa gran part del seu desenvolupament -.