Approximate knowledge of rationality and correlated equilibria

We extend Aumann's theorem [Aumann 1987], deriving correlated equilibria as a consequence of common priors and common knowledge of rationality, by explicitly allowing for non-rational behavior. Wereplace the assumption of common knowledge of rationality with a substantially weaker one, joint p-belief of rationality, where agents believe the other agents are rational with probability p or more. We show that behavior in this case constitutes a kind of correlated equilibrium satisfying certain p-belief constraints, and that it varies continuously in the parameters p and, for p sufficiently close to one,with high probability is supported on strategies that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. Finally, we extend the analysis to characterizing rational expectations of interimtypes, to games of incomplete information, as well as to the case of non-common priors.

Research joint ventures in an international economy

D'Aspremont and Jacquemin's (1988) model is extended to studyalternative configurations of research agreements in a two--country integratedworld economy. Under unambiguous conditions on spillovers we show that:1) Allowing national firms to cooperate in R\&D confers them an advantageover foreign rivals, an effect similar to R\&D subsidies. 2) In a policygame, each government would allow national cooperative agreements. 3) Contraryto other trade policies which lead to a ``prisoners' dilemma'' result,welfare in both countries increases when they both allow R\&D cooperation.4) Welfare is even higher if a generalized (international) coalition isformed.

Estimating the probability of leaving unemployment using uncompleted spells from repeated cross-section data

We propose a new econometric estimation method for analyzing the probabilityof leaving unemployment using uncompleted spells from repeated cross-sectiondata, which can be especially useful when panel data are not available. Theproposed method-of-moments-based estimator has two important features:(1) it estimates the exit probability at the individual level and(2) it does not rely on the stationarity assumption of the inflowcomposition. We illustrate and gauge the performance of the proposedestimator using the Spanish Labor Force Survey data, and analyze the changesin distribution of unemployment between the 1980s and 1990s during a periodof labor market reform. We find that the relative probability of leavingunemployment of the short-term unemployed versus the long-term unemployedbecomes significantly higher in the 1990s.

Influence activity and the organization of research and development

The organizational design of research and development conditions theincentives of the researchers of the research project. In particular,the organizational form determines the allocation of effort of theresearcher between time spent on research and time spent lobbying management. Researchers prefer to spend their time on research. However,the researchers only get utility from performing research if theproject is approved for its full duration. Spending time lobbyingmanagement for the continuation of the researcher s project increasesthe probability that the management observes a favorable signal aboutthe project. Organizing a research joint venture increases theflexibility of the organizational form with respect to the continuationdecision. For low correlation between the signals of the partners aboutthe expected profitability of the project, we find that the organizationof a research joint venture reduces influence activity by the researchersand increases expected profits of the partners. For high correlationbetween the signals, internal research projects lower influence activityby the researchers. We try to relate the correlation of the partnerssignals to the characteristics of basic research versus more appliedresearch projects, and find that the model is consistent with theobservation that research joint ventures seem involved in more basicresearch projects compared to internal R&D departments, whichconcentrate on more applied research.

Optimal magnitude and probability of fines

The economic literature on crime and punishment focuses on the trade-off between probability and severity of punishment, and suggests that detection probability and fines are substitutes. In this paper it is shown that, in presence of substantial underdeterrence caused by costly detection and punishment, these instruments may become complements. When offenders are poor, the deterrent value of monetary sanctions is low. Thus, the government does not invest a lot in detection. If offenders are rich, however, the deterrent value of monetary sanctions is high, so it is more profitable to prosecute them.

Research joint ventures and optimal R&D policy with asymmetric information

When to allow Research Joint Ventures (RJVs) or not is an importantinstrument in the development of an optimal R&D policy. Theregulator, however, is unlikely to know all the relevant informationto regulate R&D optimally. The extent to which there existappropriability problems between the firms is one such variable thatis private information to the firms in the industry. In a duopolysetting we analyze the characteristics of a second-best R&D policywhere the government can either allow RJVs or not and give lump-sumsubsidies to the parties involved. The second-best R&D policy withoutsubsidies will either block some welfare improving RJVs or allow somewelfare reducing ones. With lump-sum subsidies, the second-best policytrades off the expected subsidy cost with allowing welfare decreasingRJVs or blocking welfare increasing ones.

Building an honest microfinance organization: Embezzlement and the optimality of rigid repayment schedules and joint liability

We consider the agency problem of a staff member managing microfinancing programs, who can abuse his discretion to embezzle borrowers' repayments. The fact that most borrowers of microfinancing programs are illiterate and live in rural areas where transportation costs are very high make staff's embezzlement particularly relevant as is documented by Mknelly and Kevane (2002). We study the trade-off between the optimal rigid lending contract and the optimal discretionary one and find that a rigid contract is optimal when the audit cost is larger than gains from insurance. Our analysis explains rigid repayment schedules used by the Grameen bank as an optimal response to the bank staff's agency problem. Joint liability reduces borrowers' burden of respecting the rigid repayment schedules by providing them with partial insurance. However, the same insurance can be provided byborrowers themselves under individual liability through a side-contract.

From correspondence analysis to multiple and joint correspondence analysis

The generalization of simple (two-variable) correspondence analysis to more than two categorical variables, commonly referred to as multiple correspondence analysis, is neither obvious nor well-defined. We present two alternative ways of generalizing correspondence analysis, one based on the quantification of the variables and intercorrelation relationships, and the other based on the geometric ideas of simple correspondence analysis. We propose a version of multiple correspondence analysis, with adjusted principal inertias, as the method of choice for the geometric definition, since it contains simple correspondence analysis as an exact special case, which is not the situation of the standard generalizations. We also clarify the issue of supplementary point representation and the properties of joint correspondence analysis, a method that visualizes all two-way relationships between the variables. The methodology is illustrated using data on attitudes to science from the International Social Survey Program on Environment in 1993.

Conglomeration with bankruptcy costs: Separate or joint financing?

The paper analyzes the determinants of the optimal scope of incorporation in the presenceof bankruptcy costs. Bankruptcy costs alone generate a non-trivial tradeoff between thebenefit of coinsurance and the cost of risk contamination associated to joint financing corporate projects through debt. This tradeoff is characterized for projects with binary returns,depending on the distributional characteristics of returns (mean, variability, skewness, heterogeneity, correlation, and number of projects), the bankruptcy recovery rate, and the taxrate advantage of debt relative to equity. Our testable predictions are broadly consistentwith existing empirical evidence on conglomerate mergers, spin-offs, project finance, andsecuritization.

Dispersal probability distributions and the wave-front speed problem

The speed and width of front solutions to reaction-dispersal models are analyzed both analytically and numerically. We perform our analysis for Laplace and Gaussian distribution kernels, both for delayed and nondelayed models. The results are discussed in terms of the characteristic parameters of the models

Informe del seminari Library and Information Science Education in Europe: "Issues in joint curriculum development and Bologna perspectives" (Copenhaguen, Dinamarca, 11-12 d'agost de 2005)

Els dies 11 i 12 d'agost va tenir lloc a Copenhaguen, Dinamarca, el seminari de treball Library and Information Science Education in Europe: ¿Issues in joint curriculum development and Bologna perspectives¿. Aquest seminari, que va estar coordinat per la Royal School of Library and Information Science de Dinamarca, amb la col·laboració de l'European Association for Library and Information Education and Research (EUCLID), es va organitzar en el marc d'un projecte europeu subvencionat pel programa Sòcrates. La Facultat de Biblioteconomia i Documentació de la Universitat de Barcelona, present entre 2001 i 2005 en la Junta de Govern de l'EUCLID, va participar-hi com a soci del projecte. L'objectiu del seminari era aplegar una cinquantena d'experts europeus de l'àrea de Biblioteconomia i Documentació ¿tots ells professors d'escoles i de facultats d'universitats europees¿ per discutir qüestions relacionades amb els plans d'estudis dels ensenyaments des de la perspectiva del procés de Bolonya. El seminari consistí en dues conferències i en les reunions de treball de dotze grups formats per experts que examinaren dotze grans temes ¿prèviament acordats pels organitzadors de l'esdeveniment¿ relacionats amb els plans d'estudis d'aquells ensenyaments.

On-axis joint transform correlation based on a four-level power spectrum

We propose a method to obtain a single centered correlation with use of a joint transform correlator. We analyze the required setup to carry out the whole process optically, and we also present experimental results.