Presidents and parties in regional politics: Italy and Spain compared

This article examines the relationship between political parties and regional presidents in Italy and Spain, adopting a comparative case study approach based on extensive archival analysis and in-depth interviews with regional politicians. The findings confirm a strong pattern of growing presidentialism at regional level, regardless of whether there are formal mechanisms for direct election, and regardless of the partisan composition of regional government. Regional presidents tend to exert their growing power through a personalised control of regional party organisations, rather than governing past parties in a direct appeal to the electorate. Nevertheless, parties can still present a significant constraint on regional presidents, so successful regional presidents tend to maintain a mediating form of leadership and fully exploit the opportunities for party patronage to build up their support and smooth governing tensions. An autonomist drive helps presidents hold together disparate coalitions or loose parties at regional level, but their lack of internal coherence presents major problems when it comes to political succession.

An Inquiry into the use of illegal electoral practices and effects of political violence

This article investigates whether vote-buying and the instigation of violence in the disputed 2007 Kenyan elections were strategically motivated, and whether those affected by electoral violence changed their views towards ethno-politics and the use of violence. To answer these questions, a panel survey conducted before and after the elections is combined with external indicators of electoral violence. We find that political parties targeted vote-buying towards specific groups to weaken the support of their political rivals and to mobilize their own supporters. Furthermore, parties instigated violence strategically in areas where they were less likely to win. Although the victims of violence would prefer that parties are no longer allowed to organize in ethnic or religious lines, they are more likely to identify in ethnic terms, support the use of violence and avoid relying on the police to resolve disputes. The overall findings suggest an increased risk of electoral-violence reoccurring.

Political mobilisation and models of trade unionism : Southern Europe in comparative perspective

The relationship between union membership and political mobilization has been studied under many perspectives, but quantitative cross-national analyses have been hampered by the absence of international comparable survey data until the first round of the European Social Survey (ESS-2002) was made available. Using different national samples from this survey in four moments of time (2002, 2004 and 2006), our paper provides evidence of cross-country divergence in the empirical association between political mobilisation and trade union membership. Cross-national differences in union members’ political mobilization, we argue, can be explained by the existence of models of unionism that in turn differ with respect to two decisive factors: the institutionalisation of trade union activity and the opportunities left-wing parties have available for gaining access to executive power.

Overcoming the ethical dilemmas of skilled migration? An analysis of international narratives on the “brain drain”

Migration-related issues have, since approximately 2000, been the object of increased attention at the international level. This has led, among other things, to the production of international narratives, which aim both at understanding migration and at proposing policy recommendations on how to address it, with the objective of improving the governance of migration at the global level. But this implies overcoming dilemmas stemming from the diverging interests of states and other actors (like NGOs and the private sector). This article examines the way in which international migration narratives address skilled migration, which is characterised by some of the clearest political trade-offs between stakeholders. It argues that these narratives attempt to speak to all parties and conciliate contradictory arguments about what should be done, in order to discursively overcome policy dilemmas and create a consensus. While this is line with the mandate of international organizations, it depoliticises migration issues.

The Nationalism of stateless nations and Europe. The Catalan case

This paper analyzes how the ideas and concepts of Europe have developed in Catalonia, under the conditions of a decentralizing “nation-state” (Spain) on one hand, and the European integration process on the other. It analyzes the programmes, manifestations of political leaders, and political actions of the Catalan political parties, specially the nationalists, from the setting up of the Spanish state of autonomies (1977-1982) until today. The paper tries to show how, in multilevel governance, holistic and enthusiastic visions of an economically and political integrating Europe as a “natural ally” of a Catalan nationalism were partially replaced by more pragmatic and even more critical assessments.

Human Capital, the Structure of Production, and Growth

Recent decisions by the Spanish national competition authority (TDC) mandate payment systems to include only two costs when setting their domestic multilateral interchange fees (MIF): a fixed processing cost and a variable cost for the risk of fraud. This artificial lowering of MIFs will not lower consumer prices, because of uncompetitive retailing; but it will however lead to higher cardholders fees and, likely, new prices for point of sale terminals, delaying the development of the immature Spanish card market. Also, to the extent that increased cardholders fees do not offset the fall in MIFs revenue, the task of issuing new cards will be underpaid relatively to the task of acquiring new merchants, causing an imbalance between the two sides of the networks. Moreover, the pricing scheme arising from the decisions will cause unbundling and underprovision of those services whose costs are excluded. Indeed, the payment guarantee and the free funding period will tend to be removed from the package of services currently provided, to be either provided by third parties, by issuers for a separate fee, or not provided at all, especially to smaller and medium-sized merchants. Transaction services will also suffer the consequences that the TDC precludes pricing them in variable terms.

The Law of Impersonal Transactions: Meaning and Difficulties

Most economic interactions happen in a context of sequential exchange in which innocent third parties suffer information asymmetry with respect to previous "originative" contracts. The law reduces transaction costs by protecting these third parties but preserves some element of consent by property right holders to avoid damaging property enforcement-e.g., it is they as principals who authorize agents in originative contracts. Judicial verifiability of these originative contracts is obtained either as an automatic byproduct of transactions or, when these would have remained private, by requiring them to be made public. Protecting third parties produces a sort of legal commodity which is easy to trade impersonally, improving the allocation and specialization of resources. Historical delay in generalizing this legal commoditization paradigm is attributed to path dependency-the law first developed for personal trade-and an unbalance in vested interests, as luddite legal professionals face weak public bureaucracies.

The Economic Effects of Christian Moralities

This article examines the different influences that Catholicism and Protestantism exert on economically relevant values. It argues that Catholic theology and practice facilitate personal transactions while Protestantism favors values and types of moral and legal enforcement better adapted for impersonal trade. Protestantism may thus be more conducive to economic growth through anonymous exchange while Catholicism may provide better support for personal contracting. Several components of this hypothesis are confirmed using statistical models with data from the 1998 ISSP international survey on religion. These show that Protestants are more trusting of anonymous counter parties, develop more reliable institutions for legal enforcement and are more willing to spend resources on monitoring and punishing other members of the community. Catholicism is more protective of the family and small-group relationships, and provides more tolerant and less motivating beliefs. Relatively smaller and less consistent differences appear in terms of worldly personal success and incentives.

Market and institutional determinants in the regulation of conveyancers

Demand for law professionals in the conveyancing of property is decreasing because of market and institutional changes. On the market side, many transactions feature large, well-known parties and standardized transactions, which make professionals less effective or necessary for protecting the parties to private contracts. On the institutional side, public titling makes it possible to dispense with a broadening set of their former functions. Recording of deeds made professionals redundant as depositories of deeds and reduced demand for them to design title guarantees. Effective registration of rights increasingly substitutes professionals for detecting title conflicts with third parties and gathering their consent. Market changes undermine the information asymmetry rationale for regulating conveyancing, while institutional changes facilitate liberalizing not only conduct but also license regulations. These arguments are supported here by disentangling the logic of titling systems and presenting empirical evidence from the European and USA markets.

An agenda-setting model of electoral competition

This paper presents a model of electoral competition focusing on the formation of thepublic agenda. An incumbent government and a challenger party in opposition competein elections by choosing the issues that will key out their campaigns. Giving salience toan issue implies proposing an innovative policy proposal, alternative to the status-quo.Parties trade off the issues with high salience in voters concerns and those with broadagreement on some alternative policy proposal. Each party expects a higher probabilityof victory if the issue it chooses becomes salient in the voters decision. But remarkably,the issues which are considered the most important ones by a majority of votes may notbe given salience during the electoral campaign. An incumbent government may survivein spite of its bad policy performance if there is no sufficiently broad agreement on apolicy alternative. We illustrate the analytical potential of the model with the case of theUnited States presidential election in 2004.

Negativity effect and the emergence of ideologies

``Negativity effect'' refers to the psychological phenomenon that peopletend to attach greater weight to negative information than to equallyextreme and equally likely positive information in a variety of informationprocessing tasks. Numerous studies of impression formation have found thatnegative information is weighted more heavily than positive information asimpressions of others are formed. There is empirical evidence in politicalscience that shows the importance of the negativity effect in the informationprocessing of the voters. This effect can explain the observed decreaseof popularity for a president the longer he is in office. \\We construct a dynamic model of political competition, incorporating thenegativity effect in the decision rule of the voters and allowing their preferencesto change over time, according to the past performance of the candidateswhile in office. Our model may explain the emergence of ideologies out ofthe competition for votes of myopic candidates freely choosing policypositions. This result gives rise to the formation of political parties,as infinitely--lived agents with a certain ideology. Furthermore, in thismodel some voters may start out by switching among parties associated withdifferent policies, but find themselves supporting one of the parties fromsome point on. Thus, the model describes a process by which some votersbecome identified with a ``right'' or ``left'' bloc, while others ``swing''between the two parties.

Setting the rules of the game: The choice of electoral systems in advanced democracies

The origins of electoral systems have received scant attention in the literature. Looking at the history of electoral rules in the advanced world in the last century, this paper shows that the existing wide variation in electoral rules across nations can be traced to the strategic decisions that the current ruling parties, anticipating the coordinating consequences of different electoral regimes, make to maximize their representation according to the following conditions. On the one hand, as long as the electoral arena does not change substantially and the current electoral regime serves the ruling parties well, the latter have no incentives to modify the electoral regime. On the other hand, as soon as the electoral arena changes (due to the entry of new voters or a change in their preferences), the ruling parties will entertain changing the electoral system, depending on two main conditions: the emergence of new parties and the coordinating capacities of the old ruling parties. Accordingly, if the new parties are strong, the old parties shift from plurality/majority rules to proportional representation (PR) only if the latter are locked into a 'non-Duvergerian' equilibrium; i.e. if no old party enjoys a dominant position (the case of most small European states)--conversely, they do not if a Duvergerian equilibrium exists (the case of Great Britain). Similarly, whenever the new entrants are weak, a non-PR system is maintained, regardless of the structure of the old party system (the case of the USA). The paper discusses as well the role of trade and ethnic and religious heterogeneity in the adoption of PR rules.

The role of institutions in the contractual process

Human beings increase their productivity by specializingtheir resources and exchanging their products. Theorganization of exchange is costly, however, becausespecialized activities need coordination and incentiveshave to be aligned. This work first describes how theseexchanges are organized in an institutional environment.It then focuses on the dual effect of this environment-as with any other specialized resource, institutions maybe used for expropriation purposes. They enjoyspecialization advantages in safeguarding exchange butthey also make possible new forms of opportunism,causing new costs of exchange. Three perverse tendenciesare identified:In the legal field, there is a surplus ofmandatory rules and, at the same time, a deficit in default rules. Second, courts activity is biased againstthe quasi-judicial role of the parties and the market. Third, Market enforcement is based on reputationalassets that are badly exposed to opportunism.

How political parties, rather than member-states, are building the European Union

Political party formation and coalition building in the European Parliament is being a driving force for making governance of the highly pluralistic European Union relatively effective and consensual. In spite of successive enlargements and the very high number of electoral partiesobtaining representation in the European Union institutions, the number of effective European Political Groups in the European Parliament has decreased from the first direct election in 1979 to the fifth in 1999. The formal analysis of national party¹s voting power in different Europeanparty configurations can explain the incentives for national parties to join large European Political Groups instead of forming smaller nationalistic groupings. Empirical evidence shows increasing cohesion of European Political Groups and an increasing role of the European Parliament in EU inter-institutional decision making. As a consequence of this evolution, intergovernmentalism is being replaced with federalizing relations. The analysis can support positive expectations regarding the governability of the European Union after further enlargements provided that new member states have party systems fitting the European PoliticalGroups.

Generalized canonical correlation analysis of matrices with different row and column orders

A Method is offered that makes it possible to apply generalized canonicalcorrelations analysis (CANCOR) to two or more matrices of different row and column order. The new method optimizes the generalized canonical correlationanalysis objective by considering only the observed values. This is achieved byemploying selection matrices. We present and discuss fit measures to assessthe quality of the solutions. In a simulation study we assess the performance of our new method and compare it to an existing procedure called GENCOM,proposed by Green and Carroll. We find that our new method outperforms the GENCOM algorithm both with respect to model fit and recovery of the truestructure. Moreover, as our new method does not require any type of iteration itis easier to implement and requires less computation. We illustrate the methodby means of an example concerning the relative positions of the political parties inthe Netherlands based on provincial data.