Overcoming the ethical dilemmas of skilled migration? An analysis of international narratives on the “brain drain”

Migration-related issues have, since approximately 2000, been the object of increased attention at the international level. This has led, among other things, to the production of international narratives, which aim both at understanding migration and at proposing policy recommendations on how to address it, with the objective of improving the governance of migration at the global level. But this implies overcoming dilemmas stemming from the diverging interests of states and other actors (like NGOs and the private sector). This article examines the way in which international migration narratives address skilled migration, which is characterised by some of the clearest political trade-offs between stakeholders. It argues that these narratives attempt to speak to all parties and conciliate contradictory arguments about what should be done, in order to discursively overcome policy dilemmas and create a consensus. While this is line with the mandate of international organizations, it depoliticises migration issues.

Financial Crises and International Portfolio Dynamics

This paper analyzes the behavior of international capital flows by foreigners and domestic agents, especially during financial crises. We show that gross capital flows by foreigners and domestic agents are very large and volatile, especially relative to net capital flows. This is because when foreigners invest in a country domestic agents tend to invest abroad and vice versa. Gross capital flows are also pro-cyclical. During expansions, foreigners tend to bring in more capital and domestic agents tend to invest more abroad. During crises, there is retrenchment, i.e. a reduction in capital inflows by foreigners and an increase in capital inflows by domestic agents. This is especially true during severe crises and during systemic crises. The evidence can shed light on the nature of shocks driving international capital flows. It seems to favor shocks that affect foreigners and domestic agents asymmetrically -e.g. sovereign risk and asymmetric information- over productivity shocks.

Employment Protection, International Specialization, and Innovation

We develop a model to analyse the implications of firing costs on incentives for R&D and international specialization. The Key idea is paying the firing cost, the country with a rigid labor market will tend to produce relatively secure goods, at a late stage of their product life cycle. Under international trade, an international product cycle emerges where, roughly, new goods are first produced in the low firing cost country will specialize in 'secondary innovations', that is, improvements in existing goods, while the low firing cost country will more specialize in 'primary innovation', that is, invention of new goods.