The Complete Information First. Price Auction or the Importance of Being Indivisible

Abstract Despite the popularity of auction theoretical thinking, it appears that no one has presented an elementary equilibrium analysis of the first-price sealed-bid auction mechanism under complete information. This paper aims to remedy that omission. We show that the existence of pure strategy undominated Nash equilibria requires that the bidding space is not "too divisible" (that is, a continuum). In fact, when bids must form part of a finite grid there always exists a "high price equilibrium". However, there might also be "low price equilibria" and when the bidding space is very restrictive the revenue obtained in these "low price equilibria" might be very low. We discuss the properties of the equilibria and an application of auction theoretical thinking in which "low price equilibria" may be relevant. Keywords: First-price auctions, undominated Nash equilibria. JEL Classification Numbers: C72 (Noncooperative Games), D44 (Auctions).

Government information transparency

This paper studies a model of announcements by a privately informed government about the future state of the economic activity in an economy subject to recurrent shocks and with distortions due to income taxation. Although transparent communication would ex ante be desirable, we find that even a benevolent government may ex-post be non-informative, in an attempt to countervail the tax distortion with a "second best" compensating distortion in information. This result provides a rationale for independent national statistical offices, committed to truthful communication. We also find that whether inequality in income distribution favors or harms government transparency depends on labor supply elasticity.

Testing low-altitude infrared digital photography from a mini-UAV to retrieve information for biological conservation

Satellite remote sensing imagery is used for forestry, conservation and environmental applications, but insufficient spatial resolution, and, in particular, unavailability of images at the precise timing required for a given application, often prevent achieving a fully operational stage. Airborne remote sensing has the advantage of custom-tuned sensors, resolution and timing, but its price prevents using it as a routine technique for the mentioned fields. Some Unmanned Aerial Vehicles might provide a “third way” solution as low-cost techniques for acquiring remotely sensed information, under close control of the end-user, albeit at the expense of lower quality instrumentation and instability. This report evaluates a light remote sensing system based on a remotely-controlled mini-UAV (ATMOS-3) equipped with a color infra-red camera (VEGCAM-1) designed and operated by CATUAV. We conducted a testing mission over a Mediterranean landscape dominated by an evergreen woodland of Aleppo pine (Pinus halepensis) and (Holm) oak (Quercus ilex) in the Montseny National Park (Catalonia, NE Spain). We took advantage of state-of-the-art ortho-rectified digital aerial imagery (acquired by the Institut Cartogràfic de Catalunya over the area during the previous year) and used it as quality reference. In particular, we paid attention to: 1) Operationality of flight and image acquisition according to a previously defined plan; 2) Radiometric and geometric quality of the images; and 3) Operational use of the images in the context of applications. We conclude that the system has achieved an operational stage regarding flight activities, although with meteorological limits set by wind speed and turbulence. Appropriate landing areas can be sometimes limiting also, but the system is able to land on small and relatively rough terrains such as patches of grassland or short matorral, and we have operated the UAV as far as 7 km from the control unit. Radiometric quality is sufficient for interactive analysis, but probably insufficient for automated processing. A forthcoming camera is supposed to greatly improve radiometric quality and consistency. Conventional GPS positioning through time synchronization provides coarse orientation of the images, with no roll information.

Information Dispersion and Equilibrium Multiplicity

This paper studies the implications of correlation of private signals about the liquidation value of a risky asset in a variation of a standard noisy rational expectations model in which traders receive endowment shocks which are private information and have a common component. We …nd that a necessary condition to generate multiple linear partially revealing rational expectations equilibria is the existence of several sources of information dispersion. In this context equilibrium multiplicity tends to occur when information is more dispersed. A necessary condition to have strategic complementarity in information acquisition is to have mul- tiple equilibria. When the equilibrium is unique there is strategic substi- tutability in information acquisition, corroborating the result obtained in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). JEL Classi…cation: D82, D83, G14 Keywords: Multiplicity of equilibria, strategic complementarity, asym- metric information.

Dynamic stackelberg game with risk-averse players: optimal risk-sharing under asymmetric information

The objective of this paper is to clarify the interactive nature of the leader-follower relationship when both players are endogenously risk-averse. The analysis is placed in the context of a dynamic closed-loop Stackelberg game with private information. The case of a risk-neutral leader, very often discussed in the literature, is only a borderline possibility in the present study. Each player in the game is characterized by a risk-averse type which is unknown to his opponent. The goal of the leader is to implement an optimal incentive compatible risk-sharing contract. The proposed approach provides a qualitative analysis of adaptive risk behavior profiles for asymmetrically informed players in the context of dynamic strategic interactions modelled as incentive Stackelberg games.

Egalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information

We propose a definition of egalitarian equivalence that extends Pazner and Schmeidler's (1978) concept to environments with incomplete information. If every feasible allocation rule can be implemented by an incentive compatible mechanism (as, for instance, in the case of non-exclusive information), then interim egalitarian equivalence and interim incentive efficiency remain compatible, as they were under complete information. When incentive constraints are more restrictive, on the other hand, the two criteria may become incompatible.

Monitorització de rendiment i accounting de centres de computació grid

El Port d'Informació Científica és un centre de Computació Grid de referència que dona suport a comunitats científiques, com el LHC (CERN). Al PIC, trobem una gran varietat de tecnologies que proporcionen serveis al centre. Des de l'arquitectura i elements de la xarxa, fins a recursos informàtics de computació, sistemes d'emmagatzematge a disc i cinta magnètica, bases de dades (ORACLE/PostgreSQL). El projecte consisteix en el disseny i implementació d'una base de dades col·lectora de tota la informació rellevant dels diferents sistemes del centre, i un portal web on mostrar tots els valors i gràfiques, tot basat en programari lliure.

Testing for sufficient information in structural VARs

We derive necessary and sufficient conditions under which a set of variables is informationally sufficient, i.e. it contains enough information to estimate the structural shocks with a VAR model. Based on such conditions, we suggest a procedure to test for informational sufficiency. Moreover, we show how to amend the VAR if informational sufficiency is rejected. We apply our procedure to a VAR including TFP, unemployment and per-capita hours worked. We find that the three variables are not informationally sufficient. When adding missing information, the effects of technology shocks change dramatically.